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Note to the Reader
T he word “anymal” in the title of this study is no misprint. While writing about anymals figuring in poems, I grew more and more uneasy with the term “animal poetry”. True, this more recognisable rubric proba-
bly brings to mind precisely the poems that are discussed in this study: poems 
about cats, dogs, horses, and maybe even less cuddly or eye-catching animals, 
such as insects. When not considered in much depth, the term “animal poetry” 
is awkward only because it refers to “animals”, which, despite the classification 
being so familiar to us, do not exist. Given that humans are animals, one might 
expect that, in writing about nonhuman animals in poetry, I would refer to 
my corpus as “nonhuman animal poetry” or “other animal poetry”. Although 
these labels capture perfectly well who I am writing about, namely a group of 
creatures that are not humans, there are disadvantages to these designations 
as well. Firstly, they still set humans apart from other animals, even though 
some nonhuman animals are much closer to humans than to any other animal 
species. Secondly, “nonhuman animals” are so diverse as a group that this “one-
label-fits-all” approach becomes gradually more uncomfortable when reading 
about a specific group or individual. 
Seeing others beyond oneself as a homogenous group is not morally neu-
tral. In this respect, the activist and philosopher Lisa Kemmerer alludes to the 
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in writing that “language holds a moral ele-
ment and is created and recreated” (10). She proposes a new word, “anymal”, 
intended to mean “any animal who does not happen to be the species that I am” 
(10). Although this term still draws a dividing line between nonhuman animals 
and humans, she notes as two advantages that, firstly, “othering” prefixes like 
‘non’ and ‘other’ are absent and, secondly, the word is short and therefore easy 
to use and to remember. Moreover, “anymal” does not only nullify the disad-

















of verbal activism in that it acknowledges the linguistic need for a word to refer 
to a – giant – group that is not the same species as oneself, but at the same time 
swiftly draws attention to how we use such a word. At some moments, when I 
need to refer to an assumed human-animal binary, or when I use a fixed expres-
sion like “animal studies” I write the word with an ‘i’. In all other instances, 
when the common usage prescribes “animal”, I use “anymal” instead. I see the 
‘any’ in “anymal” as an incentive to think about the manifold groups it refers 
to. The term “anymal” draws attention not only to the word itself, but also to 
reality and to our conception of reality, which is similar to the “stop-and-think” 
ability of poetry. Using the term “anymal” as a form of verbal activism is con-
sistent with my view on the nature of poetry as an engagement with the world. 
For these reasons, I adopt the term “anymal” in this study. 
Introduction
C an we know what it is like to be a bat, cow, or bee? And if we were to answer the question negatively, what would our answer be based upon? Differences in bodily makeup, the fact that we do not speak the 
same language, or other reasons? If we were to approach this issue sceptically, 
we would cast doubt on the possibility of knowing anymal minds, thinking 
that it would be better to err on the side of caution. The philosophical exercise 
of being sceptical about the existence and knowability of other minds seems to 
gain in plausibility when the other minds in question are anymal minds. Scepsis 
would end in not having to allow for the possibility of anymals having expe-
riential lives. However, the sceptic has to account for instances of anymals and 
human animals living closely together, communicating effectively, and taking 
care of each other. A cat who learns that meowing is the way to attract his fellow 
human’s attention or a dog who senses that her companion needs comfort are 
examples of co-creative learning. It is in these instances that the sceptic’s ideas 
about the incommensurability between species’ minds appear to be especially 
problematic. 
In animal studies, the sceptical stance toward anymal minds has been aban-
doned (Andrews, Animal Mind; E. Meijer; Wynne and Udell; Andrews and Beck; 
Zapf). In their various disciplinary modes, ethologists, biosemioticians, legal 
scholars, philosophers, and artists endeavour to come closer to understand-
ing anymals – and, as a by-product, learn to see the value of other disciplines’ 
approaches. Many supposed truths about anymals have been countered in ani-
mal studies. Scholars have dispelled the idea that culture can only be found 
in human animals (Rocheleau and Nirmal, 51-52), that anymals cannot learn 
prototypes (Wynne and Udell, 47), and that human animals live a life that is 
closed off from their ecological surroundings (Morton; Gruen), to name just 












a new paradigm for thinking about anymal minds, which is centred on the idea 
that anymals are agents rather than mindless machines (Moe 9). 
In this non-sceptical consideration of anymals, the first supposed truth to 
be discarded is the Cartesian dualism between body and mind.1 After all, if 
we distinguish body from mind, behaviour from experience, and expressions 
from feelings, then we can only assume that anymals are philosophical zombies 
– bodies acting as if they have experiential life, but in fact without phenomenal 
consciousness. Even though the notion of the inseparability of body and mind 
is commonly accepted in psychology, philosophy, and the practice of medicine, 
a kind of dualism still prevails with regard to the minds of anymals. Moreo-
ver, mid-twentieth-century behaviourism also contributed to the idea that 
anthropomorphising anymals was a sign of an unscientific approach.2 For a 
long time, the possibility of shifting perspectives – let alone empathising with 
anymals – was not taken seriously (De Waal; Goodall). Leaving behind the scep-
tical approach to anymal opens up a broad field of possibilities and questions. 
Above all, it allows to search for new terminology that befits anymals as psycho-
physical wholes. Equally, considering anymals as agents leads to new findings 
that affect long-standing definitions of concepts such as intentionality, mean-
ing, communication, and empathy (the focus of this study). The interpretation 
of all of these concepts is again open to debate. 
An exploration of the role of zoopoetry in challenging Cartesian dualism 
and searching for a new terminology is central to this wider revisionist project. 
The definition of zoopoetry and zoopoetics is not clear cut, but in any case, 
the genre involves recognising the alterity of anymals by listening “otherwise” 
(Driscoll “Unheard” 8) and “an attentiveness to another species’ bodily poiesis” 
(Moe 10). Furthermore, zoopoetry relates to anymals residing in poetry and 
considers the ways in which the anymals themselves shape the poem. When 
readers and poets share in attentive listening, presentations of anymals in 
zoopoetry can take the form of an engagement with an anymal – an approach 
deeply lacking in scientific accounts (Andrews How 9). On a more cautious note, 
poetic accounts of engagements with anymals run the risk of anthropocen-
trism. Finding a way to empathetically engage with anymals whilst refraining 
from understanding them on one’s own terms is, I think, the challenge that the 
poets I discuss set for themselves.
1 See Andrews (Animal Mind) for a critical evaluation of Descartes’ influence on the philosophy of any-
mal minds (7-8) and Riskin (2016) for a discussion of the paradigm shift from a mechanistic view of 
nature to a conception of nature as having agency.












Zoopoetics has found its way into discussions in animal studies thanks to liter-
ary scholars who query anthropocentrism and engage with poetic anymals as 
a central part of their work. They include Aaron Moe, Louise Westling (Logos), 
Onno Oerlemans, Michael Malay, and Kári Driscoll and Eva Hoffmann. In this 
body of work all researchers, to a lesser or greater extent, draw attention to the 
question of anymals outside of a text versus anymals inside of a text. In provid-
ing three illustrations of the back and forth between text and world, I want to 
show what has triggered my interest in the main questions that run through 
this project. 
The first example is from Oerlemans’ monograph Poetry and Animals: Blurring 
the Boundaries with the Human, in which he writes that “poetry has the poten-
tial of engaging the physical being, the individual creature. It can originate in 
direct experience and emotion, retain mystery and blur boundaries” (8). Some 
pages later, however, he writes of “a poem that somehow registers the reality of 
the individual animal in and of itself, that allows the animal to signify itself or 
bridges a gap between observer and animal … some poems express the desire 
to reach this impossible ideal, while others clearly do not” (21-22; my emphasis). 
Whereas in the first quotation Oerlemans does not explicitly sever text from 
world, in the second he suddenly suggests the existence of a gap impossible 
to bridge. A second example is offered by Driscoll when he refers to the phi-
losopher George Bataille who probes the potential of engaging with anymals 
through art and poetry. He sees the intimate link between art and anymals: 
[t]he animal opens before me a depth that attracts me and is familiar to me. 
In a sense, I know this depth: it is my own. It is also that which is farthest 
removed from me, that which deserves the name depth, which means pre-
cisely that which is unfathomable to me [ce qui m’échappe]. But this too is 
poetry  [or: it is also poetry; mais c’est aussi la poésie]. (qtd. in “Sticky Temp-
tation” 215, alternative translation: Driscoll)
The depth Bataille experiences results in a “doomed-to-fail leap”, which Driscoll 
describes as follows: “Animality is that which eternally eludes our attempts to 
capture it in language. In absolute terms, this poetic leap is doomed to fail – 
we will never reach the other side – but this is precisely what constitutes its 
value” (“Sticky Temptation” 216). Reaching the other side of an assumed gap 
is a theme that already appeared in Oerlemans’ paragraph and we will come 
across many times. Finally, Malay considers the exercise of hearing a poetic 
squirrel. The purpose of this exercise, he suggests, is not to physically succeed 
in hearing a squirrel; this is rather a matter of sensibility, through which one 
can imagine ‘what it is like’ (2). Further into the text, however, it becomes clear 
16 that Malay is not only doubtful about the desirability of identification with 
anymals, but rejects the manoeuvre in view of the danger of “projective or 
incorporative identification”: 
The idea of sympathy … may end up eliding distinctions between humans 
and the nonhuman in such a way that we come to identify as the subject of 
our sympathy – as in, for example, a jaguar muttering ‘some drum-song 
of murder’. In certain cases, identification can be a very dubious aim. (21)3 
It seems that in all positions identifying with anymals is seen as an impossible 
ideal; between humans and anymals exists a gap that we cannot cross. This 
is partly because we cannot come to know anymals in ways we come to know 
humans, which implies that identification will inevitably lead to dubious 
anthropomorphic appropriation of the anymal. 
These three passages from Oerlemans, Driscoll, and Malay indicate a hesi-
tancy towards exploring the possibility of identifying with anymals through 
poetry. These hesitancies differ dramatically from Martha Nussbaum’s confi-
dent commentary on fictional narratives figuring human animal protagonists: 
“Narrative art has the power to make us see the lives of the different with more 
than a casual tourist’s interest – with involvement and sympathetic under-
standing” (Cultivating Humanity 88).4 Contrary to the three examples given 
in the former paragraph, Nussbaum does not draw a line between the narra-
tive and the real world. In fact, in real life tourists are often thought to have 
a reduced and filtered vision of reality, whereas the reader of novels enjoys a 
deep, layered view. 
The cautiousness of Oerlemans, Bataille, and Malay raises some questions. 
Why do readers of zoopoetry fear eliding the distinctions between anymals and 
human animals, despite the fact that we experience identification, as Malay 
suggests? Would this fear be diminished in cases in which reader and pro-
tagonist are of the same species? Or is it a matter of genre: would narrative 
fiction figuring anymals lead to different positions on the line between real 
and imagined life? Why should it be impossible to identify without projecting 
oneself onto the anymal; is this a specific danger because the other is an anymal? 
And why would anthropomorphism be inevitable, as Malay implies? Does this 
3 The line “some drum-song of murder” is taken from Ted Hughes’ “Second Glance at A Jaguar”. 
4 Suzanne Keen critically discusses Nussbaum’s “empathy-altruism” assumption, which entails that 
we “become… better world citizen[s] through reading canonical novels” (Empathy Novel vii). In her 
study, Keen formulates her criticism succinctly: “I find the case for altruism stemming from novel 
reading inconclusive at best and nearly always exaggerated in favor of beneficial effects of novel read-











17apply to any human character in a novel as well; are they in fact the author in 
disguise? 
These questions emerge from an area of tension that is created by the fol-
lowing series of oppositions: 
1. Anthropocentrism versus anymals in themselves;
2. Projectivism versus empathy or sympathetic identification; and 
3. Anymals inside of a text versus anymals outside of a text. 
The tensions conjured by these binaries are at the heart of my dissertation. 
Remarkably, the terminology used in debates concerning the zoopoetical is 
very similar to that used in the philosophical discussion of anymal minds. The 
idea of reaching for an ‘impossible ideal’, along with the image of the doomed-
to-fail leap, resembles the sceptical stance regarding anymal minds. In the 
philosophical discourse around anymal minds, however, the sceptical stance 
has lost its significance, partly as a result of empirical research. One might 
counter my analogy between the two fields by saying that poetry and philoso-
phy are different areas of practice and that empirical data does not alter the 
fact that there is a gap between anymals within and without a text. No one will 
deny that poems are textual events, but then why is it that we do not hesitate to 
say that novels depicting human-animal lives instigate an empathetic attitude 
in the reader in real life (Djikic et al.)? What is more, high school students are 
encouraged to read novels largely because literature is thought to enlarge their 
empathic circle (Nussbaum Cultivating 88-89). Is it solely an assumed species 
gap that keeps the sceptical stance valid when reading and evaluating zoo-
poetry? 
In this project, I have approached poems as explorations “towards the pos-
sible” as Judith Beveridge puts it (333). In this sense, the probing powers of 
poems can be read as a way of critiquing existing paradigms. Hence, I do not 
take philosophy and poetry to be separate areas of reflection. For the purposes 
of this project, poetry, in my view, is best evaluated through a phenomenologi-
cal lens, which allows one to stay close to one’s senses and primordial way of 
thinking. My two leading questions in this project are connected with the idea 
of zoopoets being conceptual deconstructivists, in that they question, unsettle, 
and reshape concepts: 
1. In what ways does zoopoetry confront and unsettle Cartesian dualism and 
the above-mentioned oppositions? 
2. How do instances of perspective shift and empathy evoked through zoo-











18 The merit of zoopoetry has not yet been fully explored in empathy studies. Still, 
as a fringe area of reflection it has the potential to reveal assumptions at work 
in the empathy debate and occasion a more inclusive definition of empathy. 
The default understanding of the term assumes that empathy is only possible 
between separate selves whose emotions match up as a result of similarities in 
their bodily makeup (Coplan and Goldie; Maibom Empathy). Furthermore, Car-
tesian dualism is sometimes still evident in reflections on empathy. Although 
more attention is given to phenomenological approaches towards empathy, 
divisions between cognitive and affective forms of empathy are largely anthro-
pocentric and rest on a definition of human animals that divides mind from 
body. Poems that give anymals a voice or focalise their perspective, by con-
trast, integrate body and mind in a way that links up with current views on 
the embodiedness of knowledge and phenomenological accounts of the lived 
body. 
To imagine an anymal as a whole, poets use techniques that I have labelled 
‘zoopoetical tools’. A number of these techniques – such as rhythm, metaphor, 
simile, and neologism – are common and appear in poetry at large. It is in zoo-
poems, however, that these tools are put to the specific purpose of bridging the 
assumed gap between anymals and human animals and thus connecting with 
anymal energies. In addition to these familiar tools, I discern a series of other 
techniques: descriptions ex negative, pronoun drop, commingling words, ques-
tions and hesitations, and zoopoetical chiaroscuro: the poetic equivalent of the 
chiaroscuro effect in painting and photography, whereby something is starkly 
illuminated whilst other elements fade into the background. These tools are all 
aimed at foregrounding the anymal and diminishing the presence of human 
subjectivity.
Not all zoopoetry proved to be suited for this project, as I discovered when 
compiling my corpus. My choice of poetry has been influenced by the literary 
scholar Elizabeth Atkins’ observation that in post-First World War America the 
depiction of anymals in poetry shifted from the allegorical to “carefully literal” 
(263). This shift in the arts is also recognised by Kári Driscoll, who characterises 
it as artists’ “fervent search for a nonhuman perspective on the world”. Further-
more, he sees it as the task of literary theory and criticism to “allow animals 
to be themselves”. This is an uncommon perspective, for anymals are often 
regarded as metaphors (“Sticky Temptation” 213, 214). Together with Atkins’ 
observation, Driscoll’s characterisation has influenced my choice of poetry. 
However, how anymals in poetry can be themselves is something that remains 
to be decided. When considering poetry in which anymals are used as stand-ins 











19of negative zoology in that anymals are not presented as themselves.5 In empa-
thising with these anymals, with whom are we empathising?
Conversely, the idea that certain poetic anymals ‘are themselves’ requires 
analysis, which I conduct partly by grouping the zoopoems examined in this 
dissertation. To bring different engagements with anymals in poetry into focus, 
I distinguish between four groups of poetic anymals. In three of these groups 
anymals are partially or wholly in service of humans; in the last they are pre-
sented in their alterity. By grouping the poems, I do not want to suggest that 
their characteristics never overlap or that there are no other ways of organising 
and approaching zoopoetry. Still, these groupings play a guiding role through-
out this project, albeit in the background, in that they bring us to a clearer 
understanding of what the phrase anymals “as themselves” might mean.
The first group consists of allegorical poems in which anymals are used as 
stand-ins for humans or human virtues. In these poems, the courageous lion 
and cunning fox have full-blown conversations about human problems. In 
the second group, anymals are recognisable as anymals because they perform 
species-specific behaviour. In the poem as a whole, however, they symbolise 
something that the speaker has lost: paradise, youth, or innocence and purity. 
Anymals in this group are often mystified, frequently through zoopoetical 
chiaroscuro. Although mystified anymals no longer speak of human values 
and affairs, this is mainly because they no longer speak at all. The common 
denominator in this group is that anymals often function as symbols of loss. In 
the third and penultimate group, anymals again are recognisable as a specific 
anymal but are primarily used to present the human reader with a moral chal-
lenge. Simply by being there, they epitomise the decline of species and their 
habitats, to give just one example, or how they, unlike human animals, live 
in harmony with their ecological surroundings, to give another. ‘Anymals as 
moral appeal’ would be an apt description of the anymals in this group. 
In these three groups we read about anymals, but always in relation to 
human animals; they are substitutes for either humans as a whole (group 1), the 
things that humans long for (group 2), or the things that humans need to learn 
(group 3). In contrast, the final group presents anymals not in service of human 
beings, but in their alterity. For the purpose of this project, this last group of 
zoopoetry is the most instructive. If we want to explore how zoopoetry can 
evoke empathy with poetic anymals then poems that provide a space for their 
5 Onno Oerlemans discusses the difficulty of grouping zoopoetry (21-23). He argues that even the seem-
ingly obvious category of anymals in fables and allegories is not that evident at all, because allegorical 
anymals still reflect “something of the actual animal” (24). For the purpose of this project, however, 












20 alterity are to be the final group. ‘Anymals as alterior beings’, then, is a suitable 
header for this group of poems, in which the aforementioned zoopoetical tools 
abound. Together, these techniques serve to background the voice of the poet 
and foreground the anymal. It is as if poets push language to its limits to both 
capture and set free the anymals they write about. 
The two leading questions that I cited earlier on – one having to do with 
overcoming Cartesian dualism, the other with zoopoetical empathy – pro-
vide the structure for this project. My endeavour of formulating a zoopoetical 
definition of empathy starts in chapters 1 and 2, “Philosophical and Literary 
Perspectives on the Problem of Anymal Minds” and “Giving Anymals a Voice”. 
In these chapters I explain how the problem of anymal minds is driven by Car-
tesian dualism and examine the extent to which this affects the anymals voiced 
in poetry. 
Then, in chapter 3, “Openness, Wholeness, and Growth: Exploring Addi-
tional Zoopoetical Tools”, I explore the ways in which zoopoetry confronts 
Cartesian dualism. In so doing, I offer a new interpretation of empathy and 
delineate a shift in perspectives precipitated by zoopoetical tools. In interpret-
ing zoopoems, I show that grasping the phenomenality of instances of what I 
call ‘feeling with’ evoked by zoopoetry requires a different approach to defin-
ing empathy to that which currently prevails. 
In chapter 4, “Anymals Moving Through Text and World”, I take a step 
back to address the intricate relation between text and world, and explore 
what it means to engage with an anymal through a poetic text. In chapter 5, 
“Towards an Understanding of Zoopoetical Empathy”, I turn to the philoso-
phies of Simone Weil and of Iris Murdoch for the workable concepts with which 
to undertake a phenomenology of zoopoetry. Weil’s account of intersubjective 
encounter does not focus on the need for our feelings or perspectives to match 
up with those of the other. Instead, she proclaims that for a truthful perception 
of the other, we have to be “penetrated by the object”, which is only possible 
when our selves or egos dissolve (Waiting 111). According to Murdoch, the art-
ist’s task is that of presenting others in their otherness through a process of 
unselfing, whilst instigating that same process in spectators of their art in turn 
(“Sovereignty of Good” 353). I show that this process of unselfing is visible in 
zoopoetry. This argument continues in chapter 6, “Four Poetic Case Studies”, in 
which I will show how the aforementioned zoopoetical techniques are all aimed 
at lessening the presence of the human voice. As such, they amount to a form 
of poetical unselfing, able to create less anthropomorphised presentations of 
anymals and reach for a presentation of anymals “as themselves”. Consequently, 
the practice of ‘feeling with’ evoked through zoopoetry appears to be far more a 











21The majority of zoopoetical studies attend to poetry written in English and 
are produced by Anglophone poets or researchers. In line with this trend, this 
project’s structure and related questions have been directed by the work and 
evaluation of the work of Ted Hughes, Les Murray, Elizabeth Bishop, D.H. 
Lawrence, Meghan O’Rourke, Judith Beveridge, and Mary Oliver. However, 
I also decided to include Dutch poetry as it has yet to be evaluated through 
the frame of zoopoetics, even though there are excellent examples of Dutch 
zoopoems such as those written by Judith Herzberg, Joke van Leeuwen, and 
Frederike Harmsen van Beek (which appear in group 4) as well as by Vasalis and 
Ida Gerhardt (which appear in group 2). Their work may open up new material 
and topics different from Anglophone poetry in certain ways. The zoopoetical 
work of Judith Herzberg, for instance, embodies the technique of questioning 
and hesitating, and Harmsen van Beek’s fragmented phrases inhibit an anthro-
pomorphist view of the anymals she presents. Setting out on this evaluation 
of poetry, however, felt like entering hazardous territory. On this trek, the fact 
that I share a linguistic history and landscape with the poets has proven advan-
tageous, allowing me to honour their specific grammar and choice of words. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the translations of the Dutch poems are my own. 
I hope that the translations make these poems accessible to a wider audience. 
Methodologically speaking, the chapters exhibit a hermeneutical move-
ment. The chapters in which anymals and poetry are theorised (especially 
chapter 1) alternate with more interpretative chapters, which revolve more 
closely around the poetry (especially chapter 3). This circular motion is not 
only evident in the chapters; the endeavour to redefine zoopoetical empathy 
also has a hermeneutical character. It is through the poems that I distinguish 
the zoopoetical tools and, in turn, these tools shape my definition of zoopoeti-
cal empathy. In the concluding chapter, I argue for a definition of zoopoetical 
empathy which, quite unlike the default definition of empathy, is premised on 
selflessness. It is important to note, though, that it is only through the poems 
that the elements of this definition are substantiated. 
As I have mentioned above, the field of animal studies is wide and offers 
various views and methods for research into anymal lives. It is not possible to 
address all of these approaches in a demarcated project like this. That being 
said, it might strike readers as odd that I do not engage in discussions concern-
ing animal ethics, especially since time is against us all, species are dying out, 
and systemic cruelty against anymals is far from being a thing of the past. I 
hope, however, that the zoopoems, as well as my interpretations and reflections 
on zoopoetical empathy, convey an appeal to honour and feel with individual 
















THE PROBLEM OF 
ANYMAL MINDS
1.1  Wittgenstein’s lion and 
Nagel’s bat
T he problem of other minds is a topic in philosophy that concerns the existence, knowability, and communicability of minds other than one’s own. It is closely connected to scepticism, for it calls into question our 
basic intuitions in dealing with other minds on a daily basis. Scepticism with 
regards to other minds is known for shaking the fundaments of our knowledge, 
in that it ultimately considers the possibility of humans being philosophical 
zombies. Even though this possibility seems far-fetched, the sceptical stance 
is hard to counter. On what grounds can I draw similarities between my own 
experiential life and that of another person? The arguments for doing so (simi-
larities in behaviour or giving the same names to feelings) all lack the common 
ground of a shared experiential life. So, some philosophers opt for a way out of 
scepticism by taking the route of common sense and only start doubting when 
there is reason for doubt.6
When the other minds in question are anymal minds, there always seem to 
be more than one reason for doubting their experiential life, which makes the 
sceptical stance even more difficult to refute. Countering the sceptic by point-
ing to similarities in behaviour between humans and anymals (and therefore 
perhaps similarities in our experiential lives) feels inappropriate: I (human 
animal) might be anthropomorphising anymals by ascribing certain mental 
states to them. And even if anymals are communicating with us, how can I ever 
say: “I know what they are feeling or experiencing”, or even “I know what it is 
like to be them”? 
We can refer to this problem in several ways. We can, for instance, use the 
phrase “the problem of animal minds” (James 33), which is short and straight-




























forward but implicitly draws a line between humans and other anymals. For 
this reason, the philosopher Kristin Andrews writes about “the problem of 
other animal minds” (Animal Mind). However, this suggests that humans are 
the standard against which anymals are seen as other. We might then refer to 
“the other species of mind problem” (Allen and Bekoff), which leaves the pos-
sibility open that non-anymal species, such as trees or plants, have minds too. 
For this study, this latter phrase is not sufficiently specific. To avoid all of the 
hitches mentioned above, I prefer “the problem of anymal minds” using the 
word ‘anymal’ as explained in the “Note to the Reader”. 
Two classic (and perhaps even overused) illustrations of the problem 
of anymal minds are offered by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Thomas Nagel. 
Wittgenstein suggests that the experiential world of a lion is fundamentally 
ineffable: “If a lion could talk,” he writes, “we could (könnten) not understand 
him” (223). According to Wittgenstein, the world of a lion cannot be compared 
to our world and since the boundaries of our language form the boundaries 
of our world we cannot enter a lion’s world. The “könnten” in the original Ger-
man leaves more room for doubt than “could”, in that “könnten” could also 
mean ‘might’.7 Even if that statement is perhaps not as definite as it sounds 
in English, Wittgenstein puts into words an issue concerning anymal minds 
in sceptical philosophy: that the incommensurability of our separate worlds 
inhibits our expression of them.
The other famous illustration is given by Thomas Nagel in his article “What 
Is It Like to Be a Bat?” (1974), which is central to the next section of this chapter. 
Its influence cannot be underestimated: so much is indicated by the fact that 
philosophers, biologists, and anyone else reacting to the problem of anymal 
minds still have the need to agree to or challenge its conclusions. Research-
ers see it as a pivotal text, for it captures the problem of anymal minds at the 
intersection of animal studies and theories of consciousness. The article’s main 
question is whether subjective experience is ultimately ineffable, especially 
when others have a different bodily makeup. This query is often answered scep-
tically. The writer Jenny Diski, for instance, takes the position of the sceptic by 
referring to Nagel:
When Thomas Nagel sets out to show that we can’t possibly know what 
it is to be a bat, he isn’t making any claim about what bats are, or what we 
are. Only what we aren’t and therefore can’t know. We don’t do sonar. How 
can we imagine being a creature whose being in the world is based on pos-



































































sessing such an unfamiliar mechanism to apprehend their environment? 
We can analogise about the sonar we use for finding what we can’t see, but 
those are machines that compensate for the senses we rely on. The world of 
the bat is not our world, not even accessible to our imagination, nor even 
our language. We can, he says, only imagine what it would be like for me to 
be you, not for you to be you. This isn’t an ethical distinction between bats 
and me, or you and me, but an abyss of knowledge that we simply can’t 
cross. (73) 
 
The unbridgeable ‘abyss of knowledge’ – an image that we came across already 
in the Introduction and will come across in the following chapters – chimes 
with the wonder we feel when we look at our dog or cat: “What do I know 
about their mind? What is the shape of their thoughts?” Faced with minds so 
ostensibly different from one’s own, even when it comes to one’s companion 
anymal, it would seem that the only apt answer to these questions is given in 
the sceptical stance, which refrains from making knowledge statements about 
anymal minds. 
It is possible, however, to have a different take on the problem of anymal 
minds, which begins by focusing on our similarities rather than our differ-
ences. That said, choosing to think along this trail is more daunting because 
it does not relate to the abyss intuitively sensed when encountering anymal 
minds. The philosopher Bernard Rollin’s reaction to Wittgenstein’s lion serves 
as a starting point for exploring this alternative path. For Rollin, the claim that 
we could not understand a lion if it spoke ... [is] implausible. I venture to 
suggest that our forms of life are not all that dissimilar: both the lion and 
I have interests in eating, sleeping, sex, avoiding encroachments on our 
environments, and so forth about which we could doubtless make small 
talk. (142)
Surprisingly, it might be possible to agree with both Diski and Rollin at the 
same time. We understand what Diski is saying in that there appears to be 
an otherness in anymals that we simply cannot re-enact or approximate, but 
simultaneously, we might agree with Rollin because we can see the similari-
ties between lions and humans as well. It seems that we can move back and 
forth between the sceptical and interpretive stance regarding anymal minds. 
This back and forth reflects our wonder at seeing a mind that we can view as 
both alike and different from our own. Some of our conclusions regarding the 
knowability of anymals minds, it follows, rest upon our own attitude.
27The fact that much depends on our disposition can also be learned through 
Rollin’s remark; the unbridgeable abyss assumed by Diski depends, at least 
partly, on our presuppositions. For instance, Diski claims that we do not do 
sonar and can therefore never know what it is like to employ such an ‘unfamil-
iar mechanism’. Although we do not have a bat’s sonar equipment, it is possible 
to in fact use a kind of sonar in daily life. I shall give an example of this here. 
Whether one views it as a fully fledged instance of echolocation is a matter of 
zeroing in on similarities or enlarging differences. When we find our way in a 
room in the dark, we move cautiously. It is by making sounds and concentrat-
ing on how they resonate that we come to know that a wall is near or far. Why 
would we not accept this as an instance of echolocation?8 Furthermore, how-
ever commonsensical the notion of an “unbridgeable abyss” may sound, we do 
seem to cross it on a daily basis in our interactions with anymals. When a cat 
turns her ears backwards and enlarges her eyes, for instance, an experienced cat 
owner will know for certain that the cat is something like ‘annoyed’ or ‘angry’ 
and understands immediately that the appropriate response to this behaviour 
is to back off. Is it not possible that in such moments we know partly what it is 
like to be a cat? 
The question of whether concrete interactions with anymals or folk psy-
chology concerning anymal minds should be taken seriously and deserves a 
place in scholarship is still debated.9 Pending the outcome of this debate, it 
is in any case safe to respond to Diski that even if a cat’s world differs from 
my own, this does not mean that we do not also share and co-create a world. 
Although it is possible to remain sceptical about the knowability of what it is 
like to be a cat for a cat, to suggest that there is an unbridgeable abyss instead of 
an in-principle accessible world is to make an assumption, not state a fact. Any-
mals and human animals respond to each other successfully in apt ways; rather 
than starting by emphasising our differences, there is nothing at all unscien-
tific about studying our similarities (Andrews, How). Or, even more crucially, 
we might question whether our dissimilarities create an abyss or even wonder 
whether similarities are not in the least required to attune our behaviour to 
each other (on a more fundamental level still, we might ask whether attuned 
8 Diski’s statement goes beyond the scope of Nagel’s argument. Nagel is not concerned with the epis-
temological problem of knowing what it is like to be a bat. Rather, he concentrates on the difficulty of 
forming a concept of what it is like to be a bat. Diski only refers to the epistemological problem, thereby 
stretching Nagel’s argument. In fact, Nagel refers to people using echolocation in daily life. In Nagel’s 
line of thought, however, in forming a concept of the subjective experience of someone else, it does 
not suffice to echolocate yourself through a dark room. This does not give you the subjective experi-
ence of bats echolocating their way through the air. 
9 For a discussion of the use of folk psychology for interpreting anymal behaviour, see, for instance, 



























28 behaviour is the same as successful communication). A lion’s world and a bat’s 
world may only be inaccessible when leaning back in epistemological scepti-
cism. When we deviate from this line of thought, though, we understand that 
the possibility of engaging with their worlds depends on our willingness to 
scrutinise the assumptions that make incommensurability so attractive. At 

































































1.2 “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” 
A s I have said, most theorists of anymal minds – be they biologists, philosophers or literary critics – begin their writings with a reference to Thomas Nagel’s famous article “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, as 
have I. The article expresses succinctly the great difficulty we face in ascribing 
experiential lives to others, which involves rendering their subjective experi-
ence in words. 
Oddly enough though, Nagel did not intend to ignite an anymal minds dis-
cussion. He merely uses the bat as an example with which to show that there 
is something like being a bat. At the same time, however, it is immediately 
clear that for Nagel we cannot and will never know what it is like to be a bat. 
Expressed in Nagel’s terminology: the bat example shows us that even though 
subjective experience is real, it is overlooked by the theories of consciousness 
that were mainstream in the 70s when Nagel penned the article. This is partly 
down to the fact that we cannot form a concept of bats’ subjective experience – 
we can neither do so of humans’ subjective experience for that matter.10 
Bats are an apt example with which to demonstrate this, Nagel argues, 
because their experiential lives differ completely from ours, mainly due to their 
ability to echolocate. Yet, at the same time, he assumes that bats, being mam-
mals, are close enough to humans in the phylogenetic tree to ascribe conscious 
experiences to them. Nagel presents the reason for choosing the bat as an exam-
ple by way of a truism: “anyone who has spent some time in an enclosed space 
with an excited bat knows what it is to encounter a fundamentally alien form 
10 In the first footnote to his article, Nagel mentions some leading philosophers who represent the two 
then-prevailing theories of consciousness. These theories are identity theory, according to which brain 
and consciousness are identical, and physicalism (or materialism), which holds the view that somehow 
the mind is reducible to the brain. 
30 of life” (438). With this aside, Nagel assumes that he has sufficiently substanti-
ated his choice of a bat and proceeds to tell us what he actually cares about: the 
incompleteness of theories of consciousness. Even if Nagel does not consider 
his example to be the focal point of his argument it still is, however, central to 
his text. If his selection is based on the wrong assumptions, then the whole of 
his argument might fall down. Let us first consider Nagel’s argument more 
thoroughly before coming to the role that the bat example plays in it.
According to Nagel, subjective or phenomenal consciousness is such an 
intricate matter for two reasons. On the one hand, it cannot be reimagined by 
someone else for our imagination is bound to a single point of view. On the 
other, it cannot be an object of science for its phenomenality escapes the lan-
guage of objectivity. Imagine that I see the colour blue. Scientists can look in 
my brain to establish whether the primary and secondary visual areas show 
activity. On this basis they can offer a description of my brain activity. How-
ever, they cannot see my experience of the colour blue. They will not find a blue 
picture in my head and, even if they would, they still would miss my specific 
experience of it in their descriptions. Philosophers who claim that there is a 
problem of other minds call the description of the brain activity ‘the third-
person perspective’ and my actual seeing of the colour blue ‘the first-person 
perspective’. We have individual subjective experiences from this first-person 
perspective; the way that I see a colour or the way that I experience sadness. 
These experiences are called ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’). They are ineffable since 
everyday and (even more so) scientific language aims at shared understanding, 
which results in purposely omitting the most individual experiences. 
If we were to describe these experiences as if they were physical, objective 
processes (or: from a third-person perspective), then we would leave out the 
‘what it is like for me’, which is the essence of experience. When we say that the 
sciences strive for objectivity, we need to assume that subjectivity has no place 
in them. Conversely, the sciences’ inability to capture the subjective standpoint 
(the first-person perspective and its qualia), has led some philosophers to deny 
the existence of the first-person perspective, arguing that subjective experi-
ence is as effable as any other physical fact. Consequently, they also deny that 
there is a problem with knowing other minds.11 
11 Daniel Dennett proposes “heterophenomenology” as a method with which to capture the first-per-
son point of view without abandoning the third-person perspective (Consciousness). In this method, 
a researcher narrates (from a third-person perspective) the subject’s phenomenology, addressing not 
only the subject’s own reports of how he is feeling or what he is thinking, but also behaviour, bod-
ily responses, what is shown in MRI tests, and any other data related to the subject’s experience. 
Above all, Dennett wants to avoid Descartes’ conception of subjects as being able to give infallible and 





















































































Note that the designations ‘first-person perspective’ and ‘third-person perspec-
tive’ are common in literary theory as well as philosophy. We refer to a narrative 
written from a first-person perspective when the reader sees events through the 
eyes of the ‘I’ in the story. A narrative is written from a third-person perspective 
when the author uses the pronoun ‘he’, ‘she’, or in rare cases ‘they’ to describe 
the protagonist(s) and the reader gets to know the protagonist(s) through 
descriptions seen from the narrator’s perspective. In the consciousness debate 
these terms are used in a largely similar way, but there are also differences. In 
philosophy, a first-person perspective describes what something is like to me 
– my subjective experience from the inside – whereas a third-person perspective 
describes the world seen from the outside. In novels, the third-person perspec-
tive, although it belongs to an outsider, may still include a character’s inner 
experiences. An omniscient narrator in a literary work, for instance, knows 
what it is like for someone to be that someone, even though the narrative is 
written from the third-person perspective.12 
Whether we regard these descriptions as truthful insights into the minds 
of others depends on whether we believe that imagination can surpass the cage 
of our own mind and that characters in novels live independently from their 
creator and are comparable to humans in real life. Again, we might easily leave 
these matters aside when the others are humans, but Nagel’s aim is to explore 
specifically the boundaries of our conceptual abilities and not leave other mind 
matters aside. 
To establish a clear view of these boundaries, Nagel invites us to imagine 
being a creature with experiences of the world that are very distinct from our 
own, namely a bat. Bats are like us in that they have experiences, he claims, 
but they are also vastly different, not least because they hear the world by way 
of echolocation. He argues that if we could reduce the mind to the body, there 
would be nothing more to say about the conscious experience of being a bat 
than an enumeration of its measurable, material parts. In principle, we could 
reproduce those parts. From a materialist perspective, the only thing that one 
would have to do in order to have bat-like experiences would be to create an 
ultrasound device for human beings and rewire our brains to match the bat 
device. However, even such a device would not go past the privateness of sub-
jective experience, for even then, according to Nagel, this would only provide 
12 The close relation between novels (and indeed narratives in general) and empathy has been widely 
studied. See, for instance, Aristotle (1902); Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge; Zunshine; Hammond and 
Kim; Walton; and John, “Empathy”, as well as research based on empirical data: Coplan, “Empathic 
Engagement”, Keen (2010, 2019), and Caracciolo (2016). 
32 an answer to the question what it would be like for me to “fly around at dusk 
and dawn catching insects in one’s mouth”. 
… In so far as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what 
it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the ques-
tion. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine 
this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources 
are inadequate to the task. (439) 
Sticking to the thought experiment, Nagel shows that mimicking the sen-
sory input and behaving like a bat would not be enough to describe a bat’s 
consciousness. At first reading, Nagel’s choice of a bat as his example seems 
confusing, since his point is that humans’ subjective experience has no place 
in a reductionist theory of consciousness. According to Nagel, however, a crea-
ture with sensory experiences beyond our ken shows us all the more clearly 
that we are confined to the cage of our own mind. He assumes that readers will 
immediately accept that we never can see the world from the point of view of a 
bat. In trying to imagine experiencing the world from whoever’s point of view, 
we will only experience what we ourselves would experience if we were in their 
place. In the language of recent discussions about empathy and knowing what 
others’ experiences are like, the imaginative process that Nagel describes in the 
quotation above would be seen as an instance of what is called ‘imagine-self’ 
perspective taking: I imagine what it is like for me to fly around. In contrast 
with this, Nagel thinks that ‘imagine-other’ perspective taking, in which I am 
imagining the world from the other’s point of view, to be an impossibility.13 
Because the imagination is limited to the resources of the mind, says Nagel, we 
cannot imagine the other. 
Before turning to reactions to this seminal article, let me summarise Nagel’s 
argument: if I try to conceptualise a bat’s subjective experience, I must know 
what it is like for a bat to be a bat. I cannot know this by means of the imagi-
nation, for the source of my imagination is my own experiential makeup and 
its range is therefore limited. Furthermore, I cannot capture a bat’s subjective 
experience by way of scientific methods, which, by dint of tradition, assume a 
third-person perspective. According to Nagel, then, it seems that it is impos-
sible to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat.14
13 On the distinction between ‘imagine-self’ and ‘imagine-other’ perspective taking, see Vorauer and 

































































1.3 Attempts to capture the 
“what it is like”
Nagel’s aim in “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” is neither to formulate an answer 
to the titular question, to contribute to the discussion about the problem of 
anymal minds, nor even to underscore his epistemological scepticism with 
regard to other minds.15 Many researchers engaged with different questions 
still refer to the bat example, however, because of its cogence. For instance, 
the philosopher Kristin Andrews reflects on the bat example and reiterates its 
implications:
Thomas Nagel famously argued that we can’t know what it’s like to be a bat 
because humans are so different from bats both physically and socially, and 
the best we can do is to imagine what it would be like for us to be bat-like. 
(Animal Mind 5)
The science journalist Virginia Morell also refers to Nagel. She not only assumes 
that he is right, but that scientists agree about him being right:
14 At the end of the paper, Nagel does speculate about the possibility of what he calls an “objective phe-
nomenology”, which would attempt to describe the experiences of “beings incapable of having those 
experiences” (449). Nagel insists that such a method should proceed without recourse to empathy or 
the imagination and go beyond the point of metaphor or simile, stressing that one would not use the 
simile “red is like the sound of a trumpet” in describing colour to someone who is blind. In my view, 
Nagel dismisses the role of simile and metaphor far too quickly, in a way that assumes another gap, 
namely the gap between objectivity and the imagination. For a critical discussion of the supposed gap 
between metaphor and world, see section 4.3.2 on biosemiotics.
15 It is only in a footnote that Nagel recognises the mind-body discussion’s close connection to the 
problem of other minds. He notes that here too we do not understand what it means for “subjective 
experience to have an objective nature” (448, footnote 14). If we could, then we would not have a 
problem of other minds. 
34 What is it like to be a fish? Or a bird, bat, bee, or tiger? The scientific consen-
sus holds that we will never know exactly what it is like to be any anymal; 
as much as we would like to, and despite all of our intensive studies, we 
can never fully understand another animal’s experience of the world. And 
yet, when the scientists at a 1991 international gathering of ethologists 
were each asked why they had elected to study a particular species, they 
overwhelmingly responded that their primary motivation was the desire 
to know what it was like to be that animal. (49)
Even though scientists say that they are motivated by a desire to explore anymal 
worlds, Morell accepts that someone else’s subjective experience represents a 
final frontier. The biologist Frans de Waal also seems to resign himself to this 
view when he writes: “Nagel did not seek to know how a human would feel as 
a bat: he wanted to understand how a bat feels like a bat. This is indeed beyond 
our comprehension”. De Waal explains this in terms of the other famous illus-
tration of this experiential divide, Wittgenstein’s lion, which was intended to 
demonstrate “our limited ability to enter the inner lives of others” (Smart 9). 
When reading these writers’ works, however, it gradually becomes clearer 
and clearer that they assume that our subjective experience is ‘inner’, fun-
damentally ineffable, and therefore inexpressible in terms of scientific fact. 
Indeed, after endorsing Nagel’s view in the passages I have quoted, they give 
extended examples of the ways in which humans can and in fact do know 
anymal minds. Andrews emphasises that anymals (including humans) are 
different from one another, certainly, but that they “in other ways may be the 
same” (Animal Mind 5). Coming to know these differences and similarities, she 
suggests, entails undertaking research in various scientific disciplines, with a 
keen eye for biases (Andrews, How). 
It is interesting to see that Morell, in the quotation from her book given 
above, rephrases Nagel’s “what is it like” in terms of an attempt to “understand 
the animal’s experience of the world”. Reformulating Nagel in this way leaves 
out the anymal’s subjective experience of “what it is like”, which makes the 
reformulated question answerable in principle. And indeed, Morell continues 
by giving the example of a neuroscientist with “the urge to enter … the mind 
of fish”. His “journey to understand the minds of fish”, she writes, “has taken 
him into the very cells of a fish’s brain where the decisions of life and death are 
made” (49). Finally, Frans de Waal points out that Nagel contradicts himself 
in putting his trust in science when it comes to the search for a bat’s subjective 
experience. For it is science that has taught him something about the use of 
echolocation in bats and thus allowed him to know something about what it is 
































































































De Waal, Andrews, and Morell stand as examples of how researchers think 
that they can tackle Nagel’s problem: in order to experience what, say, a dol-
phin is experiencing, they take it to be enough to describe their behaviour 
through tests. Here too it shows how scientists vacillate between the sceptical 
and interpretative stances, wavering between claiming that one cannot know 
anything about the “what it is like” (De Waal’s “this is indeed beyond our com-
prehension”) and asserting that consciousness is not entirely tucked away in 
a mysterious inner world and that tests do tell us something about subjective 
experience. This back-and-forth movement indicates that the definition of 
subjective experience might be unclear, that assumptions in the problem may 
be wrong, or indeed both. I discuss the latter possibility at the end of this sec-
tion.
Rather than describing anymal consciousness from a third-person point of 
view in the hope of capturing “what it is like” from the first-person perspec-
tive, we might instead question the assumptions on which Nagel builds his 
argument. This is the approach taken by the philosopher Daniel Dennett, for 
instance in his study Consciousness Explained (1991). Dennett claims that Nagel’s 
famous sentence “I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat” is based on 
Cartesian dualism. According to Dennett, the Cartesian view works with the 
false assumption that there is some kind of place in the brain where all of our 
experiences come together in a non-material mind: 
Cartesian materialism is the view that there is a crucial finish line or bound-
ary somewhere in the brain, marking a place where the order of arrival 
equals the order of “presentation” in experience because  what happens 
there is what you are conscious of. (107)
It is this assumed boundary somewhere in the brain that makes Nagel’s phrase 
“what it is like for a bat to be a bat” possible, since it expresses the conviction 
that experiences and the bat are divided. For Dennett, this distinction between 
experiences on the one hand and the person having the experiences on the other 
reflects Descartes’ idea of the soul, which centres on experiences in the brain 
and is therefore nothing more than a modern version of the old mind-body 
dualism. However, no one has ever located this central place, either in the brain 
or anywhere else. From which it follows that ineffable, private, and subjective 
experience – closed off behind some sort of boundary – does not exist (“Ani-
mal Consciousness” 702). According to Dennett, the problem of other minds is 
based on untenable Cartesian presuppositions. In short, he holds that there is 
no such thing as a problem of other minds and a bat’s subjective experience can 
36 be the object of science. What is more, like De Waal, Dennett argues that even 
Nagel himself leans on science in approaching others’ subjective experience: 
 
[I]f a few such facts can establish something about bat consciousness, would 
more such facts not establish more? He has already relied on “objective, 
third-person” scientific investigation to establish (or at least render ration-
ally credible) the hypothesis that bats are conscious, but not in just the way 
we are. Why wouldn’t further such facts be able to tell us in exactly what 
ways bats’ consciousness isn’t like ours, thereby telling us what it is like to 
be a bat? (“Animal Consciousness” 693-694)
Dennett’s criticism of Nagel helps to understand why it is possible to move 
back and forth between scepticism and interpretation. First of all, Dennett 
claims that the image of a Cartesian theatre with a conscious tiny you as the 
spectator is very attractive and “keeps coming back to haunt us – laypeople 
and scientists alike – even after its ghostly dualism has been denounced and 
exorcised” (Consciousness 107). This image of a hidden, conscious, and tiny you, 
which is implicit in the problem of other minds, is what creates an abyss. This 
is because the self behind the boundary is, for Descartes and Nagel, ultimately 
beyond our ken. Second, if consciousness is understood in a Cartesian way, 
then our bodies become machines in which our minds are encaged, instead of 
being minds in action. When minds are seen as hidden, falling back on scepti-
cism seems obvious, because no amount of work will bring others’ experiential 
worlds nearer. However, if the others in question are similar to us, we common-
sensically assume our arguments from analogy to be correct without a second 
thought. 
Thanks to Dennett’s tracing of the Cartesian remnants in Nagel’s work, 
we now can formulate five claims that recur in discussions of the problem of 
anymal minds. They are connected in that they presume or follow from one 
another: 
1. Selves and experiences are distinct;
2. There is an unbridgeable gap between selves;
3. This gap is only credibly crossed when the selves in question are similar;
4. Neither the imagination nor the sciences can bridge the gap between minds 
(though for different reasons); and
5. Subjective experience is ultimately ineffable.
The assumed unbridgeability of the gap between minds depends to a sig-

































































37involved are similar, this boundary is taken to determine the inadequacy of 
both my imagination and attempts to infer other minds by way of analogy.
For Dennett, there is no line or boundary hiding mysterious, ineffable 
qualia. A third-person perspective can therefore offer us a view on subjective 
experience. In fact, he sees science as the only place in which we should be look-
ing for answers, even if we wish to glimpse others’ individual subjectivities. 
Dennett writes dismissively about Elizabeth Marshall Thomas’ biographical 
account of her life with her dogs, The Hidden Life of Dogs (1993): 
If you want to believe in the consciousness of dogs, her poetry is just the 
ticket. If you want to know about the consciousness of dogs, you have to 
admit that although she raises many good questions, her answers are not 
to be trusted. (“Animal Consciousness” 692) 
Dennett speaks about poetry in a derogative manner, positioning the field in 
opposition to science. Although he might see the binary of immaterial soul 
versus material body as untenable, this passage suggests that another binary 
is still very much alive: that of science versus poetry. This makes it all the 
more remarkable that Dennett, perhaps unintentionally, nuances these sharp 
remarks about Thomas’s book by praising Herman Melville’s Moby Dick for 
raising exemplary scientific questions. Dennett is right to stress that we need 
a non-binary approach to anymals if we are to be able to enter their worlds. 
However, we also need to address other binaries that close off anymals’ worlds 
and tackle existing conceptual paradigms head on. When taking the experienc-
ing anymal seriously as a body-mind, poetry figuring anymals can no longer 
be seen as “a healing lotion, an emotional massage, a kind of linguistic aroma-































1.4  Feeling what it is like:  
The empathy debate
T he phrase ‘knowing what it is like’ has to do with the epistemologi-cal and conceptual problem of anymal minds. The idea of imagining taking a different perspective ultimately goes beyond forming a con-
cept of knowing what it is like. When we undergo the sadness that someone 
else is experiencing (because they have told us about sadness in their life, for 
instance), we experience rather than merely know what the emotion is like for 
them. Experiencing an emotion that is “more appropriate to the state or situ-
ation of someone other than the person who experiences it” is called empathy 
(Maibom, Empathy 2). Empathy is regarded as a bridge between minds. Indeed, 
when you and I experience the same emotion, we inadvertently refute the scep-
tical position, for at that moment we understand what it is like for someone to 
be that someone (that is, within the scope of the emotion in question). 
The subject of empathy is widely discussed amongst various scholars, from 
philosophers and psychologists to neuroscientists and aesthetic theorists. It is 
such a thought-provoking subject, I would suggest, because the idea that we 
can undergo each other’s experiences contrasts with the atomised social world-
view which has prevailed for many years.16 The groundbreaking discovery of 
mirror neurons in 1991 seemed to indicate that empathy is hardwired in us and 
that empathetic skills are not acquired through reasoning, but in a rough form 
given to us by nature. Apparently, we do not function as separate islands, but 
are connected to each other at even a neuronal level.17 ‘Feeling with’ may not 
16 See for a discussion and definition of social atomism: Taylor.
17 Giacomo Rizzolatti and his colleagues have found that neurons in the brains of macaque monkeys 
fired both when they performed a given action and when they saw a researcher performing the action. 
In 1995, Rizzolatti coined the term ‘mirror neurons’ for this phenomenon. Since then, we have learned 
that humans and songbirds also mirror others at a neuronal level (see Rizzolatti et al.). Furthermore, 

































be a mere possibility, but the way in which we start our lives and a fundamental 
part of how we learn. If so, then we need to rethink our ideas about having to 
cross an abyss to know what it is like to be another person.
Empathy can be said to bridge the gap between selves, thereby refuting 
claim 2 in the list presented in section 1.3. However, this does not imply that 
the other claims fall down too. In broad strokes, discussions in the empathy 
debate focus on the need for similarities between separate selves for real empa-
thy. As such, they often turn on the extent to which qualia must match up. This 
has resulted in a number of attempts to conceptualise the fine line between 
projection and empathic accuracy. The role of cognition in these discussions is 
intricate: some researchers claim that cognition is a necessary prerequisite for 
empathy (Coplan and Goldie; Maibom, “Introduction” and 2019); were that not 
the case, I would just experience emotional contagion, not empathy. Others are 
not so strict (Zahavi, “Phenomenology”; Currie). 
For my line of thought, it is instructive to dwell on the main distinctions 
that are made in the empathy debate before turning to how poetic figures 
of anymals deconstruct them. The default definition of empathy concerns 
humans and accuracy in matching emotions. At a fundamental level, however, 
there is disagreement about whether it is best to strive for unity in finding a 
definition of empathy (Preston and De Waal 2) or more specificity, as befits vari-
ous fields of inquiry (Coplan “Understanding” 5). The many different strands 
of this debate might seem off-putting to those interested in empathy, but it 
may also be that the incompatibilities among various definitions of empathy 
are somewhat exaggerated, as the philosopher Heidi Maibom argues (“Intro-
duction” 1). As a solution to the divisions with which the debate is riven, she 
puts forward Martin Hoffman’s general characterisation of empathy, which 
applies to both its cognitive and affective forms: “an emotion that is more 
appropriate to the state or situation of someone other than the person who 
experiences it” (“Introduction” 2). 
Distinguishing cognitive from affective empathy is standard practice in the 
empathy debate. Whereas cognitive empathy is thought to include all forms of 
understanding others by mentally assuming their perspective, affective empa-
thy involves instances of “emotion-matching, other-oriented and other-caused 
emotional states” (Maibom “Introduction” 1). Following from these generic 
forms of empathy is the contrast between other-caused and -oriented emo-
tional states, which we know are caused by others, and instances of emotional 
states that we ‘forget’ are caused by others. This is because they either blur the 
distinction between oneself and another or focus more on one’s own distress 
40 caused by someone else’s pain, as is the case with personal distress.18 Maibom 
is quite definite that it is cognition that turns these self-oriented emotions into 
other-oriented emotions. Maibom suggests that it is only by way of a thought 
process that I am able to become aware of the reason that I am feeling what I 
am feeling and conclude that it is because of someone else (“Understanding” 
5). She claims that affective empathy, sympathy, emotional contagion, and per-
sonal distress are all emotional states that one can label as empathic (Routledge 
Handbook 22). 
Amy Coplan’s position is less inclusive. She wishes to reserve the name 
‘empathy’ for a “high-level process”, which she defines in the following way: 
[E]mpathy is a complex imaginative process in which an observer simu-
lates another person’s situated psychological states while maintaining a 
clear self-other differentiation. To say empathy is ‘complex’ is to say that 
it is simultaneously a cognitive and affective process. (“Understanding” 5) 
Empathy is affective in the sense that it entails experiencing an emotion, but 
it must also be a cognitive process if we are to distinguish it from emotional 
contagion: 
One of the key differences between emotional contagion and empathy is 
that contagion is a direct, automatic, unmediated process. Empathy is never 
fully unmediated since it requires perspective-taking. Roughly, perspec-
tive-taking is an imaginative process through which one constructs another 
person’s subjective experience by simulating the experience of being in the 
other’s situation. (“Understanding” 9)
For Coplan it is out of the question that perspective taking and imagining what 
it is like for another in her situation might be a cognitive process. Empathy 
cannot be unmediated, for that would blur the distinction between oneself and 
another. Acknowledging the other, who has “his own unique thoughts, feel-
ings, desires and characteristics … prevent[s] one from losing sight of where the 
self ends and the other begins and where the other ends and the self begins” 
(16). And thus, finally, empathy requires that selves are similar, according to 
Coplan, because “the more unlike the target we are, the more difficult it is to 
reconstruct her subjective experiences” (“Understanding” 13).
18 Distinctions between self and other are blurred, for example, in cases of emotional contagion – I 

































































41What becomes clear in both Maibom’s and Coplan’s approaches is that cogni-
tive processes are indispensable for experiencing empathy (since otherwise we 
cannot distinguish our experience from someone else’s). From this follows the 
need for separate selves and finally for the emotions of these separate selves to 
match up by imaginatively taking one another’s perspective. Here we can see 
that the themes of Nagel’s discussion of the bat example are present in these 
modern definitions of empathy as well.
Despite presenting empathy as a bridge between minds, these definitions 
presuppose the idea of separate, matching selves, which again reinforces the 
sceptical attitude towards other minds with which I started this chapter. This 
scepticism is based on Cartesian dualism. Even though the idea of a free-
floating Cartesian spirit is becoming ever-less tenable in a world in which the 
brain’s functions are more and more assessed, it would seem that we find it 
hard to discard the terminology that comes with it. In Coplan’s view we host 
high-level processes, which deserve the label of empathy, and low-level processes, 
which are automatic mirrorings. It is no coincidence that the former processes 
are connected with thinking and the latter with the body – again a reflection 
of Cartesian dualism.19 We say that we ‘have experiences’, that we ‘cannot access 
other minds’ (which are apparently hidden, somewhere behind a boundary), 
that we ‘deduce a mind from behaviour’ – all these expressions assert an ‘I’ that 
is separate from experiences or even a mind separate from a body.
19 De Vignemont and Jacob refute the idea of there being a high-level versus a low-level process in a 
way that reflects critique on Descartes’ distinction between res cogitans and res extensa. They argue that 
although mirroring pain is related to so-called low-level processes, experiments by Cheng et al. have 
shown that medical practitioners do not mirror a patient’s pain if they believe the pain is meant to 
heal the patient or a painful body part is anaesthetised. These experiments show that body and mind 
































1.5 Phenomenology and poetry
T he task of challenging scepticism concerning other minds starts with methodically throwing Cartesian binaries overboard. The school of phenomenology has the edge in that department. In recent years many 
researchers have pointed out that we are already in relationships with anymals 
(Gruen), that we do not exist in separate universes but share a world, as the phi-
losopher Elisa Aaltola has put it: “[m]inds enmesh; how others feel and think 
affects my own mindedness and vice versa. Nobody is locked into their private, 
internal spheres but rather they experience things with and as a result of each 
other” (Varieties 47). These formulations of embodied empathy can be traced 
back to phenomenology. Aaltola shows us how embodiment necessarily denies 
the problem of anymal minds: 
‘The problem of opacity of other minds’ is often argued to limit empathy 
…, as it is presumed that the mental states of others are, indeed, hidden into 
private subjectivity and that any empathic understanding of them is bound 
to be projective. As suggested earlier, such criticism is also common in the 
context of other animals, as claims of empathic understanding are often 
dismissed as pure anthropomorphic projection, wherein one misleadingly 
transports a human self into a pig or a dog. Here, the human is the reference 
point against whose image all understanding of non-humans is reflected 
– the presumption that we cannot “know” dogness or pigness, and that in 
claims of such knowledge, we are merely seeing ourselves mirrored in these 
animals. Such a take on empathy stems from a misconception, according to 
which “selves” are wholly isolated from others, their inner realms inacces-
sible. The solution is to replace this misconception with noting that we are, 
























ing mindedness – something that also applies in relation to other animals. 
(Varieties 105)
Note that the presuppositions I enumerated in response to Nagel’s article are 
critically addressed in the quotation above: selves are not to be seen as atoms or 
islands, we are fundamentally connected, and mindedness is embodied. Thus 
subjective experience is effable and imaginable, including when the others are 
anymals. 
Many phenomenologists start by refuting the Cartesian body-mind dis-
tinction and developing a vocabulary that befits this new worldview. A passage 
from one of the most famous phenomenologists, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
serves as an anticipatory response to Nagel’s conclusion. In his posthumously 
published Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France, Merleau-Ponty commits 
to neither materialism nor dualism: 
the organism is not a sum of instantaneous and punctual microscopic 
events; it is an enveloping phenomenon, with the macroscopic style of an 
ensemble in movement. In between the microscopic facts, global reality is 
delineated like a watermark, never graspable for objectivizing-particular 
thinking, never eliminable from or reducible to the microscopic. (207)
A watermark – the word that stands out in this paragraph – can neither be 
seen under a microscope, because we would lose the form that gives the body 
direction out of sight, nor is it a free-floating idea of a mind setting a body in 
motion. Merleau-Ponty thinks both views on nature fall short of how nature 
works. On Descartes’ view, nature develops, moves, and envelops automatically 
and mechanically, pushed forward by causes. Humans are the only exception 
to this, because of the res cogitans, which is immaterial. The rest of nature can 
only be grasped mechanically. According to Merleau-Ponty, however, this can-
not explain how our behaviour is structured. By viewing the body not merely 
as a mechanism that has to be put into motion by a mind, Merleau-Ponty paves 
the way for a view on the body-mind problem, since he explains that the body 
must be seen as “a take on the exterior world. It follows from this that there is 
no difference between the organization of the body and behaviour, since the 
body is defined as the place of behaviour”. The idea of the body being a “take 
on the exterior world” – Arnold Gesell’s phrase – is meant to clarify that for 
Merleau-Ponty there is no distinct boundary between behaviour and mind. 
There cannot be, for our minds are embodied: “thus there is an indivision of 
my body, of my body and the world, of my body and other bodies, and of other 
bodies between them”. From this it follows that our subjective experience does 
44 not hide inside of our brains; it is present in a shared social world, since there is 
no boundary in our brain that determines “where behaviour begins and where 
mind ends” (Nature 146, 279, 207). 
This idea truly breaks with the Cartesian tradition. No body can be seen as 
merely a machine controlled by a separate mind. In abandoning Cartesian dual-
ism, we need to think of the bodies that we encounter instead as body-minds. 
This may seem strange, since our cultural jargon reflects a division between 
the two. As we go about our daily lives, however, we trust that others are body-
minds. Ask anyone who works in relation to others: a teacher, for instance, who 
knows if a student does not understand her merely by looking at their expres-
sion, or a dog owner who unthinkingly adapts the route of his walk in response 
to the dog’s unmistakable communications, conveyed through the leash.
Hence, if we are not the self-encapsulated islands that Descartes thought 
us to be, then the idea that matching is a prerequisite for empathy falls away. 
This claim is put forward by the contemporary phenomenologist Dan Zahavi. 
He says that we do not really know what must match up with: in any case, one 
must have feelings somewhat like the target’s feelings, but to what extent? 
Can our feelings be similar when we are dissimilar? Or can the empathiser 
understand the target even when they did not go through the same experi-
ence? Almost casually, Zahavi remarks: “After all, everything else resembles 
everything else in some respect” (“Phenomenology” 36). This suggests that 
the notion of similarity and consequently matching is vague; at an epistemo-
logical level, everything else is indeed like everything else or as different as 
you choose. In view of this, the question becomes what the notion of match-
ing contributes to the discussion about empathy. When we decide that some 
creatures are distinctly dissimilar and that we cannot know them because of 
their dissimilarity, the decision takes place at an epistemological level. As such, 
the idea of matching tells us only about our distinctions, not necessarily about 
the world.20 Zahavi proposes a solution that starts by focusing on moments at 
which we do know what is going on with someone else: 
We can see the other’s elation or doubt, surprise or attentiveness in his 
or her face, we can hear the other’s trepidation, impatience, or bewilder-
ment in her voice, we feel the other’s enthusiasm in his handshake, grasp 
his mood in his posture, and see her determination and persistence in her 
actions. (“Phenomenology” 40)

































































45Seeing instead of inferring other’s elation, doubt, or indeed any emotion is the 
necessary outcome of the mind and body’s indivisibility. Zahavi’s argument in 
this passage has become known as a direct perception argument concerning 
other minds. This argument proposes that since we do not have a mind separate 
from our body, our intentions and feelings are not expressed in our postures 
or facial features. Indeed, bodily stances and behaviours cannot be seen apart 
or otherwise separated from our feelings. Furthermore, Zahavi states that the 
way to learn about other people’s minds (even those that we deem dissimilar 
to our own) and undergo their experiences (even those that we have not had 
ourselves) is simply to “spend time together” (“Phenomenology” 37).
Apparently, if we put aside the idea of empathy taking place within some-
one’s body, but rather focus on the space between ourselves and the other, then 
it is possible to attain “an expressive understanding” thanks to “bodily prox-
imity” (“Phenomenology” 42). This gives rise to a very different definition of 
empathy, in which the need for matching emotions and separate selves has 
been taken out of the equation. In fact, in phenomenology the prerequisite of 
proximity outweighs similarity. Aaltola points out that phenomenology has 
a huge advantage over our default definitions of empathy in that it does not 
diminish anymals’ alterity in order to fit any matching: embodied empathy 
involves openness towards and the recognition of difference, allowing us to 
acknowledge the alterity of other animals (Varieties 121). The fact that empathy 
is about proximity rather than about similarity calls for another understand-
ing of empathy, no longer premised on matching emotions. What is more, 
leaving behind the Cartesian divide, which entails a conception of atomistic 
selves projecting themselves onto others, paves the way for empathy with any-
mals. Indeed, for Merleau-Ponty, anymals and humans share the landscapes 
that they inhabit. In his philosophy, bodies no longer present an abyss that we 
simply cannot cross: 
Now why would this generality, which constitutes the unity of my body, not 
open it to other bodies? The handshake too is reversible; I can feel myself 
touched as well and at the same time as touching … Why would not the 
synergy exist among different organisms, if it is possible within each? Their 
landscapes interweave, their actions and their passions fit together exactly: 
this is possible as soon as we no longer make belongingness to one same 
“consciousness” the primordial definition of sensibility, and as soon as we 
rather understand it as the return of the visible upon itself, a carnal adher-
























46 “Interweaving landscapes”: this phrase is a far cry from the I-other distinction 
in Nagel’s account and standard definitions of empathy. For Merleau-Ponty, 
even consciousness is not fixed to a brain but rather emerges through an 
exchange between the subject and its Umwelt (a notion I address in chapter 3). 
The notion of interweaving landscapes and bodies open to manifold relations 
with the world requires scrutinising the ways of researching others’ experi-
ences and especially claims that selves are separated by an unbridgeable abyss. 
Empathy, as Zahavi understands the notion, has far more to do with our atti-
tude than with the other belonging to the same species; he claims that empathy 
is a state of perception. It is a trained mode of perception, however, in that we 
only see body-subjects when we “treat … bodies as a field of expression for their 
experiences”, as Max Scheler proposes (qtd. in Aaltola Varieties 108). Reading 
and interpreting zoopoems offers a way to train our perception, as will become 
clear in the following chapters. 
Let me conclude this section with three observations. Firstly, the notion of 
‘openness’ is absent in the standard definition of empathy, whereas phenom-
enology emphasises it time and again. Phenomenological thinkers underscore 
the idea that empathy is a matter of training the ability of perception in the 
subject rather than matching one’s affect with the object’s. Perception, as the 
Merleau-Ponty scholar Louise Westling writes in referring to James Gibson “is 
not the achievement of a mind in a body but rather of a whole organism in its 
explanatory movement through the world” (Logos 7). A consequence of under-
standing the mind as embodied is that meaning is no longer merely something 
that humans add to the world. If we see ourselves as organisms who, rather 
than being siloed off from the rest of nature, find their way in the world in an 
expressive, perceiving manner, then we must look for the – already existing – 
relations we have with anymals’ expressive embodied behaviours. 
Secondly, spending time together is more important for embodied empa-
thy than in the standard definition of empathy. It is through bodily proximity 
that we can simultaneously enjoy each other’s alterity and vicariously undergo 
each other’s experiences. My subsequent question is whether we can enjoy such 
bodily proximity through reading zoopoetry. This idea has been put forward 
by John Coetzee in his novella The Lives of Animals, which is the subject of the 
final section of this chapter.
Lastly, following up on the idea of meeting anymals through reading zoo-
poetry, it is important to note that in phenomenology the way to train openness 
and see connectedness is to engage in the visual arts and poetry. However, 
even though phenomenological thought has become increasingly important 
in empathy studies, work in this field does not reflect the significance that 

































































47empathy debate poetry does not generally receive much attention. Instead, 
narratives are the standard choice for thinking about empathy through lit-
erature. Poetry, however, suffers less from the anthropomorphism inherent in 
narratives – a claim I defend in the next chapter – in that rhythm, rhyme, and 
inventive imagery are favoured over character development, plot, and propo-
sitional language. 
In phenomenology, poetry, anymality, and empathy are closely linked. In a 
chapter with the telling title “Language is Everywhere” from her monograph 
The Logos of the Living World, Louise Westling articulates these connections in 
the following way: “we are embodied creatures caught up in a world that is 
full of meaning and language. For [Merleau-Ponty], ‘the whole landscape is 
overrun with words’” (101). When all of nature carries meaning, then we must 
indeed “learn to speak with nature in its own language”, as the biologist Jesper 
Hoffmeyer has put it(qtd. in Westling 143). Poetry sets an example by way of 
de-binarised reflections, by seeing anymals as a whole, without charging them 
with the need for character development. Furthermore, both phenomenology 
and poetry are attentive to the world as it is given in experience. In this way, 
both fields seek to grasp not only what experiences are but also how they are 
experienced. Unfolding how something is experienced calls for hyper-concrete 
words and phrases, rather than abstract terminology, and demands staying as 
close as possible to the individual. As Luke Fischer explains: 
A certain person tends to walk with a lightness of step, to hold a cup in a 
delicate manner, to speak eloquently and with a tone that seems to echo 
the person’s gait. Another person walks with a heavy gait, articulates things 
more slowly – his intonation has a reflective physiognomy and he proceeds 
with tasks at a measured pace, etc. In each case, a distinctive how is reflected 
in many variations across different forms of manifestation or Leiblichkeit. 
The attempt to conceptualize these phenomena inevitably remains to a cer-
tain extent generic. In the Lebenswelt, however, we often note that a person 
has a specific gesture or manner which is absolutely typifying and singular. 























48 It is this thisness that poets try to save from abstraction, I would say.21 Which 
means that, in the case of zoopoetry, the possibilities of language are pushed 
to its limits on account of the alterity of anymals’ thisness. Poetry uses language 
in a way that philosophy ideally would too – a way that would “not try to hold 
things as with forceps,” as Merleau-Ponty has it, “or to immobilize them as 
under the objective of a microscope, but to let them be and to witness their 
continued being” (Visible 101). This is why poetry, as Luke Fischer claims, “in 
certain respects … can address a philosophical problem better than philosophy 
itself” (1). 
I start my quest to grasp the relation between zoopoetry and empathy with 
one of the pivotal texts in animal studies, The Lives of Animals (1999) by John 
Coetzee.22 To my mind, this metafictional novella is a phenomenological inves-
tigation into how anymal lives can be rescued from scepticism through the 
study of poetry. Both directly and indirectly, it questions many of the binaries 
with which we subconsciously work.
21 This view is shared by the poet Elizabeth Bishop, who writes the following to Donald Stanford: “Have 
you ever noticed that you can learn more about other people – more about how they feel, how it 
would feel to be them – by hearing them cough or make one of the innumerable inner noises, than 
by watching them for hours? Sometimes if another person hiccups, particularly if you haven’t been 
paying much attention tot him, why you get a sudden sensation as if you were inside him – you know 
how he feels in the little aspects he never mentions, aspects which are, really, indescribable to another 
person and must be realized by that kind of intuition. Do you know what I am driving at? Well if you 
can follow those rather hazy sentences – that’s what I quite often want to get into poetry …” (One 18) 
22 Not only is Lives influential in the anymal rights movement (see for instance Peter Singer and Randy 
Malamud); it has also shaped the course of many investigations into the relationship between poetry 

































































1.6  “Walking flank to flank”: 
The boundless imagination in 
The Lives of Animals
H olding onto a first-person perspective in a reductionist account of consciousness seemed scientifically unviable, according to Nagel. In Science and Poetry, the philosopher Mary Midgley advocates for “The 
Return of the First Person” (117). That said, it is not that easy to assert the real-
ity of the first person without lapsing into the mystery of an ineffable quale. 
Embodiment, as it is celebrated by phenomenologists, must be the essential 
part of such a plea. 
John Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals gives us a thought-through account of 
what it means to regard anymals not merely as mysterious, mechanical, or 
alien, but as body subjects. The protagonist Elizabeth Costello claims that in 
order to see anymals like humans we need the power of poetry. In the novella 
(if that is the right way to label the book, as I will discuss shortly) Costello 
gives two lectures at the philosophy faculty where her son and daughter-in-
law work. The character makes an appearance in three of Coetzee’s works: Slow 
Man (2005), Elizabeth Costello (2003), and The Lives of Animals (2000). Perhaps call-
ing her a ‘fictional character’ does not entirely do her justice. Given that she 
outlives the boundaries of three books, Costello is not a fictional character in 
the same way as, for instance, Anna Karenina is. She is often considered to be 
Coetzee’s alter ego, which may be interesting in itself. Still, the character of 
Elizabeth Costello is more than that; by showing that the boundaries between 
poetry and world are not easily drawn, she embodies the novella’s theme. The 
Lives of Animals (hereafter Lives) is neither an academic essay nor a recording 
of Coetzee himself speaking.23 One might say that it is an example of ‘inter-
23 This again shows the hybridity of the multi-layered work, given that Coetzee originally presented 
Lives as a lecture, held as part of the Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Princeton University, 15 and 
16 October 1997). 
50 genre-ality’. This becomes important when talking about the possibility of 
empathy, which I will address later on.
In Lives, Costello is the main guest at a conference. An esteemed novelist, 
she is free to talk about whatever she prefers. Her lectures and the discussions 
that follow comprise the main part of the novella. On the first day of the confer-
ence she talks about “The Philosophers and The Animals” and on the second 
day about “The Poets and The Animals” (the division brings to mind the old 
quarrel between philosophy and poetry).24 Thomas Nagel’s bat example plays 
an important role in the first lecture. Costello finds Nagel’s conclusion, namely 
that “I cannot know what it is for a bat to be bat-like”, “tragically limited”. She 
rejects the idea that our imagination is limited because we are restricted to my 
own minds. It may indeed be the case that the mind’s resources are inadequate 
to let us experience what it is for someone to be that someone. According to 
Costello, however, we are not restricted to the resources of our own minds. 
Whereas Nagel assumes that “our own experience provides the basic material 
for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited”, Costello states that 
“there is no limit to the extent to which we can think ourselves into the being 
of another. There are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination” (Coetzee 41, 
439, 48-49). 
How does Costello substantiate her view? She disagrees with the idea that 
‘thinking’ is a sufficient or even necessary tool for getting inside someone else. 
The sympathetic imagination does not start in one’s mind and has nothing 
to do with matching mental states. Conversely, Costello frequently presents 
‘embodiedness’ as the starting point for shipping oneself into another being’s 
existence. In this example, she opposes Descartes by saying:
To thinking, cogitation, I oppose fullness, embodiedness, the sensation 
of being – not a consciousness of yourself as a kind of ghostly reasoning 
machine thinking thoughts, but on the contrary the sensation – a heav-
ily affective sensation – of being a body with limbs that have extension in 
space, of being alive in the world. (46) 
“Fullness”, a “sensation of being”, is the phenomenological interpretation of 
embodiedness. It comes with the idea of connectedness; that we share the feel-
ing of the space around us with other creatures. This shared feeling, however, is 
not the reason that Costello points out that there are “no bounds to the sympa-
thetic imagination”. Here it becomes evident that refuting Cartesian dualism 
24 In his dialogue The Republic, Plato writes: “There is from of old a quarrel between philosophy and 
























































































































necessarily entails seeing the body differently. Contrary to Nagel’s assump-
tions, Costello suggests that there is no abyss, line, or boundary that we cannot 
cross. This attitude, it would seem, results from adopting a phenomenological 
worldview. In order to experience the living being of another anymal than our-
selves, Costello does not ask us to focus on the limits of our imagination and see 
whether we can feel the cage of our own mind. Instead, she “urges [us] to read 
the poets who return the living, electric being into language; and if the poets 
do not move you, I urge you to walk, flank to flank, beside the beast” (Coetzee 
49, 114). 
Costello’s recommendation that one should read poetry in order to be able 
to put oneself in the hooves, claws, or paws of an anymal has everything to do 
with the bodily experience that poetry brings about. Taking Ted Hughes’ poem 
“The Jaguar” as an example, she claims that 
[b]y bodying forth the jaguar, Hughes shows us that we too can embody 
animals – by the process called poetic invention that mingles breath and 
sense in a way that no one has explained and no one ever will. He shows us 
how to bring the living body into being within ourselves. When we read 
the jaguar poem, when we recollect it afterwards in tranquillity, we are for 
a brief while the jaguar. He ripples within us, he takes over our body, he is 
us. (Coetzee 89) 
When we read this, we might easily miss how, in one sentence, Costello equates 
embodying a poetic figure of a jaguar with embodying anymals in real life. 
She says that Hughes shows us that we can embody anymals, not just poetic 
anymals. In the passage from Aaltola’s Varieties of Empathy that I quoted above, 
“becoming them” is still put between inverted commas. Through reading “The 
Jaguar”, however, we simply read that he is us – without hesitation. “Walking 
flank to flank” with an anymal, Costello suggests, can evoke the same experi-
ence as reading a poem that engages with an anymal. Whereas Nagel distrusts 
our imagination and strives for a method that turns away from it to what he 
calls an objective phenomenology, Costello assumes that the practices of walk-
ing with a jaguar and imagining a jaguar whilst reading Hughes’ poem are 
equally able to teach us what it is like to be a jaguar. 
This view on the power of literature is accepted when humans are the 
protagonists in a narrative (Nussbaum Love’s Knowledge). When reading Anna 
Karenina, we might be inclined to say that we can feel the eponymous charac-
ter’s distress, inner conflict, and loneliness. Even more so, when we read a novel 
about an Irish miner who stands up against injustice in the 1980s, it is not at 
all strange to say that, after having read the novel, we partly know what it was 
52 like to be a miner in Ireland at that time. We claim that we are able to empathise 
with a purely fictional character and do not hesitate to think that we, through a 
narrative work, can successfully empathise with a real person, such as a miner. 
Costello claims that poetry (specifically, poetry that offers accounts of an 
engagement with the anymal) can do the same for anymals. Zoopoetry, she sug-
gests, engages us with the lives of anymals as much as a real-life encounter with 
an anymal would. We might therefore think that Costello gives us a definition 
of empathy with anymals, but the word ‘empathy’ does not occur in Lives. This 
may be a deliberate way of avoiding sceptical questions about matching and 
inter-species boundaries. “Sympathetic imagination”, one of the wordings that 
Costello does use, perhaps comes closest to our standard definition of empathy, 
with its matching emotions and separate selves. Still, there are important dif-
ferences.
Before I go into these differences, let me first list the descriptors that Cos-
tello uses instead of empathy. In her first lecture, “The Philosophers and the 
Animals”, Costello makes use of the following alternatives:
Knowing what it is like (43)
Thinking our way into the life (44)
Think oneself into the place (47)
Sympathy that allows us to share at times the beings of another (48)
Think ourselves into the being of another (49)
Sympathetic imagination (49)
Think my way into the existence (49)
In her second lecture, “The Poets and the Animals”, she refers to these: 
Feeling his way toward (85)
Imagine our way into that way of moving (85)
Inhabit that body (86)
Embody (animals) (89)
Bodying forth the animal (89)
Bring the living bodies into being with oneself (89)
What emerges from this list are the various ways in which Costello gives words 
to the phenomenon of ‘feeling with’. The “Philosophers and the Animals” 
emphasises thinking, which appears in four of the seven descriptions. The list 
of concepts drawn from this second lecture indicates a shift towards embodi-
ment. As I mentioned above, Costello invokes two ways of knowing what it is 

































































53flank to flank”. Both of these approaches are a far cry from Nagel’s exertions. 
In addition, they both include the body – not as an entity that encloses the 
subjective experience, but as a living being with whom we can engage. Cos-
tello urges us to let go of the idea that “knowing what it is like to be someone 
else” has anything to do with being alike or sharing common or matching 
thoughts or feelings. Hughes’ poem succeeds in bodying forth the jaguar, Cos-
tello proposes, because he does not write about a jaguar, but offers a “record 
of an engagement with him”. This engagement must be taken as a lived bod-
ily engagement. Costello states that “poetic invention … mingles breath and 
sense in a way that no one has explained and no one ever will” (Coetzee 86, 
89). Although this is a bit of a categorical remark about the mystery of poetry, 
I will nevertheless try to come closer to an explanation of how poetry presents 
anymals. I take Costello’s own emphasis on the role of the body in “Poets and 
the Animals” as a starting point.
Despite the fact that Costello does not use the word empathy, if we juxta-
pose “knowing what it is like” and embodying an anymal, we inadvertently 
enter the empathy debate. In recent discussions of empathy, most researchers 
begin with a distinction between sympathy and empathy.25 Sympathy is usu-
ally understood as ‘feeling for’ whereas empathy is understood as ‘feeling with’. 
The distinction is important, because to be truly able to feel what someone else 
is feeling requires a match – to some extent and in some way – between those 
feelings, whereas sympathy does not require that someone feels the same. 
Discussions about the possibility of empathy usually centre on questions of 
whether I (the empathiser) have enough in common with the target to be able 
to say that our feelings match. I will come back to this in the following chapter. 
For Costello, however, being alike (enough) is not required if one is to feel 
with an anymal: “The question to ask should not be: Do we have something 
in common – reason, self-consciousness, a soul – with other animals?” This is 
because Costello holds the view that knowing what it is like to be someone else 
depends on sympathy or, as Costello puts it: “the heart is the seat of a faculty, 
sympathy, that allows us to share at times the being of another. Sympathy has 
everything to do with the subject and little to do with the object, the another”. 
In this quotation we can recognise the dictums of phenomenology. Similarity 
has nothing to do with sharing the lives of others. It is in “opening our hearts”, 
Costello suggests, that we experience somebody else’s being. In addition to 
open hearts, we need the imagination, with its unlimited range. Unlike Nagel, 
Costello sees no reason that our imagination should be bound by our experi-























































54 ential lives. We need poetry, then, because in poetry the boundlessness of the 
imagination is shown and exercised through bodily engagement: “When we 
read the jaguar poem, when we recollect it afterwards in tranquillity, we are 
for a brief while the jaguar. He ripples within us, he takes over our body, he is 
us” (Coetzee 47, 48, 89). 
We may react to Costello’s remarks, as Dennett might, by saying that they 
obscure rather than clarify what poetry has to offer. However, it is worth noting 
the central motifs of Costello’s lectures: opening up of our hearts rather than 
finding similarities (between species), the need for poetry to guide us into the 
lives of others, and the abandonment of the Cartesian binary of mind versus 
body. Dennett suggests that the Cartesian dualism haunts laypeople and sci-
entists alike. Lives probes into the possibilities of what it would mean to leave 
that binary behind. Without the mind- versus-body distinction, what words 
would we use? How would our worldview change? And would we be able to 







































































“R ead the poets who return the living, electric being to language” is Elizabeth Costello’s advice to those who seek a way to come closer to an anymal’s world. “And if the poets do not move you”, 
she expands, “I urge you to walk flank to flank beside the beast” (Coetzee 114). 
This addition is remarkable, for it juxtaposes the experience of walking next 
to an anymal in real life with the experience of reading about an anymal in a 
poem.26 What is it about poetry that makes it especially well-suited to “body 
forth” an anymal, as Costello puts it? It is this question that I want to explore 
in this chapter.
Costello explicitly refers to poetry being able to open us up to engagements 
with anymals and not, for instance, to novels, the visual arts, or any other art 
form. And even within the domain of poetry not all poems succeed in bodying 
forth the anymal, according to Costello. Her example of a poem that succeeds in 
this regard is Ted Hughes’ “Jaguar” because it does not represent a jaguar, but 
instead invites us to engage with a jaguar (86). Poetry can use anymals as stand-
ins for humans or present anymals in a sentimental way. The poems that make 
it possible to “walk flank to flank” with anymals, however, are those that open 
26 It is also remarkable that the injunction to “read the poets” comes first, whereas one would expect 
real-life experiences to be ranked above literary experiences. Martha Nussbaum, for instance, affirms 
the priority of ‘real’ experiences when she advises us to go on safari and if we are unable to do that, we 
should watch films about anymals (“Wat”). On a side note: her remark about watching films (docu-
mentaries?) figuring anymals is out of line with one of her leading ideas: that novels train empathy 
(see Nussbaum Love’s Knowledge). Apparently, the apt art form for training empathy differs when the 
others with whom we are empathising are anymals. In addition to Nussbaum’s advice being unsub-
stantiated, her suggestion is inadequate in that wildlife documentaries often portray (the lifespan of) 
anymals in a thoroughly anthropomorphised manner. For instance, Alison Sealy and Lee Oakley have 
argued that in the documentary Life, the wildlife researcher David Attenborough depicts anymals 













up a space for engagement. The activity of “walking flank to flank” implies 
that we are neither looking at the anymal from an often indifferent standpoint, 
from which we try to classify it, nor represent anymal symbolically. The iambic 
rhythm of Hughes’ poem mimics the “thrust of the jaguar’s heel”; attending to 
this rhythm, we sense that we walk alongside the anymal. Feeling our flanks’ 
proximity to the anymal’s, we forget our classifications and symbols.
Since rhythm mimics motion and is especially characteristic of poetry, 
researchers writing about anymal poetry have followed up on Costello’s 
remark by suggesting that rhythm, above all else, is the distinctive means by 
which poetry bodies forth an anymal.27 In exploring poetry’s capacity for ‘bod-
ying forth’, my aim in this chapter is to present other poetic tools that draw us 
into engagements as well. Bringing an electric being to life certainly requires 
a poet’s attention to rhythm. Still, an “electric being” is more than a moving 
body described from a third-person perspective. My question is whether we, 
through poetry, engage with the anymal’s whole electric being, including 
its mind.28 I am aware that my suggestion – that there are a fuller range of 
poetic tools for bringing a mind to life, in addition to that of mimicking bod-
ily motion through rhythm – seems to reinforce the mind-body dualism. My 
argument, however, is that in poems rhythm, sound, words, word order and 
images more often than not support each other in a way that is seldom seen in 
novels. Hence, although my discussion focuses on how thought processes are 
depicted, this emphasis goes hand in hand with the insight that these thought 
processes are interwoven with poems’ more bodily aspects. 
This chapter engages with an eco-linguistic discussion that takes place 
largely in the study of narratology. A central question in this conversation is 
that of whether human language and especially human narratives have inal-
ienable anthropomorphic features. Monika Fludernik argues for precisely this 
idea: “In my model there can therefore be narratives without plot, but there 
cannot be any narratives without a human (anthropomorphic) experiencer of 
some sort at some narrative level. Fludernik denies human beings the possi-
bilities of having experiences that go beyond their own bodily constitution or 
writing narratives without a human-like experiencer. For Fludernik, bodily 
27 See for instance Michael Malay; Onno Oerlemans.
28 Here, my interpretation differs from that of Oerlemans, who writes that Costello “valorizes poems 
that dwell on the physical beings of animals, rather than imagining and portraying their mental life 
or consciousness” (20). Unlike Oerlemans, I think that Costello leaves room for seeing anymals as 
psycho-physical wholes. Oerlemans’ remark adheres to a dualist paradigm of mind versus body. As I 
have argued in the former chapter, however, I think that Lives is best grasped as a phenomenological 




























boundaries form “the rock-bottom levels” of understanding (9).29 Within nar-
ratology especially, Fludernik’s work has prompted many researchers to argue 
the opposite case, resulting in Jan Alber’s “Unnatural Narratology” research 
school, among other ventures. In addition, Marco Caracciolo argues for “a 
resistance to an anthropomorphic understanding of character” (“Notes” 3). In 
so doing, he takes up Andrew Goatly’s account of what he calls “Green Gram-
mar”, which develops grammatical tools that make it possible for language to 
keep pace with new scientific findings (“Green Grammar” 543-558). Central to 
Goatly’s findings is the idea that humans are not the centre of the world. On 
this view, the use of transitive verbs that take the subject as an agent and an 
object as a passive entity – in short, the grammar of most Western languages 
– does not do justice to a nature that turns out to be more process-oriented 
than this grammar allows for. Given that Goatly’s tools “undermine dualism 
and anthropocentric assumptions”, Caracciolo explores their applicability to 
an econarratological theory of character (“Notes” 179).
Ecolinguists search for ways in which grammar might give up her favourit-
ism for humans as the only agents. Caracciolo mentions The Echo Maker, a novel 
by Richard Powers, in which the flocking of cranes brings one character to pon-
der the interrelatedness of humans and the birds (“Notes” 181-182). The birds 
have a central role in the novel’s plot. Indeed, the mentally ill protagonist thinks 
that a bird’s brain has been implanted in him. That said, birds’ experiential 
lives remain out of focus. The possibility of narrating a non-anthropomorphic 
mind, it would seem, is not even considered. There are of course novels that do 
portray anymals’ experiential worlds. In some, anymals are even the protago-
nists – think, for instance, of Watership Down by Richard Adams (1974) and Flush 
(1933) by Virginia Woolf. However, the rabbits in Watership Down and the cocker 
spaniel Flush in the eponymous novel are too anthropomorphised to give us 
insights into their minds’ species-specific characteristics. 
Now, returning to Fludernik, the question is if she is right in claiming 
that narratives are necessarily humanoid. Is it true that giving anymals a voice 
means anthropomorphising them? If bodily boundaries are the “rock-bottom 
levels” of understanding, then writing a narrative with an anymal as the pro-
tagonist becomes a suspect, maybe even impossible undertaking. Any attempt 
to open up an anymal world must face up to problems concerning the translat-
ability of experiences and beliefs. It is in giving words to what anymals think or 
ascribing content to anymals’ beliefs that “we run into worries about inappro-
priate anthropomorphism”, Kristin Andrews writes (Animal Mind 109). Novels 
29 See also Steven Pinker: “The body is the ultimate barrier to empathy. Your toothache does not hurt 
me the same way as it hurts you” (qtd. in McFee); for a discussion of this statement, see McFee.
61in which anymals are endowed with a voice grapple with exactly this problem. 
Yet in poetry the issue of “inappropriate anthropomorphism” seems less press-
ing. My claim is that certain poetic tools, which I will call zoopoetical tools, give 
poetry an advantage over novels when it comes to presenting anymals’ voices 
and subjective experiences. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Firstly, I explain why Andrews 
thinks that the practice of ascribing content to anymals’ beliefs is especially 
prone to anthropomorphism. Secondly, I discuss the extent to which one 
solution to this problem (put forward by David Armstrong) might also con-
tribute towards diminishing anthropomorphism in novels and poems. In 
investigating this idea, I contrast paragraphs taken from Adams’ Watership 
Down with Woolf’s Flush and The Dog by Kerstin Ekman (2010). Thirdly, I exam-
ine whether the tools discerned by Andrew Goatly (“Green Grammar”) and 
Marco Caracciolo (“Notes”), supplemented by specific zoopoetical tools, allow 
for more truthful depictions of not only anymals’ observable behaviour, but 
even their minds. The task of giving anymals a voice can be seen as the final 
frontier in fiction or poetry. I conclude that in the tools they use, poets do not 
sidestep the problem of finding words for what anymals think. Far from it: 
they present a new way of looking at thought in which thought processes are 
seen as embodied. My claim is that these poetic tools, in addition to rhythm, 











2.2  Giving words to beliefs:  
de dicto versus de re and the 
relation to anthropomorphism
W hy is it that the practice of giving anymals a voice – or, in other words, ascribing content to anymals’ beliefs – is particularly sus-ceptible to anthropomorphism? Let me begin answering this 
question by way of a detour through an example in which content is ascribed 
to a human belief. 
Suppose that we read the following sentence in a novel: “I have had enough 
of this conversation, she thought exhaustedly. She believed that the pompous 
man was indifferent to her and what she had to say. He did not react to what she 
had said in any way and leaned backwards, apparently distracted by his phone”. 
In reading this, we are perhaps unaware that the novelist has some implicit 
assumptions about thinking, perspective and how a reader ‘enters’ a fictional 
mind. To begin with an assumption to do with the latter issue: it seems to 
go without saying that a fictional character’s thoughts are best conveyed in 
propositions – “I am having enough of this conversation”, “the pompous man 
is indifferent to me”. This is a generally accepted idea about how we think as 
humans.30 Secondly, in this example the fictional character performs a short 
interior monologue and there is no doubt that this thought belongs to her and 
somehow occurs within her mind, hidden from the man. We know this, because 
the man gives us no indication that he knows what she is thinking; he does not 
see her thoughts. Even the exhaustion, which we cannot but imagine by way 
30 In novels, metaphors can serve as a way of avoiding convoluted thinking, as I discuss in chapter 4. 
What is impossible in novels is possible in comics, in which pictures of anymals are sometimes accom-
panied by thought bubbles depicting what they think. This sidesteps the problem of putting words in 
their mouths. See for instance Asterix en Cleopatra, in which Idéfix is shown thinking about a bone that 
he was promised by way of a picture of the bone, even though the picture of the bone is of course still 
drawn from a human perspective (Goscinny and Uderzo 265). Indeed, some graphic novels present 

































































of its physical manifestations, is presented as belonging to a thought process. 
Hence, the qualifications of how the character experiences the man doubtlessly 
belong to her, are formed within her mind, and are invisible – except for the 
reader, who has privileged access to her head. 
Aside from being rather cliché, my fabricated sentences, lifted from a non-
existent novel, do not strike us as an odd example of how thought should be 
presented. This indicates not only that this is a perfectly common way to pre-
sent thinking characters in novels, but also how we think about thinking in real 
life. We have a mind of our own, where thinking in propositions takes place. 
Given that our mind belongs to us, we can easily hide it and we have special 
access to it. However, when reading a comparable sentence from, say, a rabbit 
in Watership Down, we hesitate. On reading that rabbits are hopping around and 
sniffing leaves and grass, no anthropomorphism alarm bell goes off. It is when 
words are given to what a rabbit is thinking that our worries about “inappro-
priate anthropomorphism” begin. But why? Why would describing thought be 
more susceptible to anthropomorphism than describing motion?
As I have suggested above, ascribing content to anymals’ beliefs is another 
way of saying what anymals think. Andrews points out that most anymal cog-
nitivists and psychologists assume that anymals have beliefs about the world. 
Beliefs are inferred from behaviour. A belief becomes especially visible when 
there is a discrepancy between the world and how someone behaves. If I am 
scared because I believe that I am being chased, for instance, this belief will 
incite me to break into a run. If I think (wrongly or rightly) that my belief 
is false, then I will stop running. In this example, the world may not have 
changed, but my belief has altered and thus my behaviour too. It would appear 
that there is a layer of beliefs between the world and myself. It is through false 
beliefs, such as that which got me running, that we learn that people somehow 
represent the world for themselves and that these representations, or beliefs, 
set us in motion without necessarily influencing the world itself. 
Now, the content of my belief need not be described in detail, but it must 
be something along the lines of: “I am being chased”. It is easy for humans 
amongst one another to know what someone believes, because we can ask 
each other and often receive verbal answers. When it comes to anymals we 
infer belief from behaviour in much the same way. Although the word ‘thinks’ 
seems more obvious than ‘believes’ in connection with the following examples, 
it would be safe to suppose that when a dog paws the leash and stands before 
the front door wagging her tail “she believes that we’re going outside” or when 
a cat runs after me when she hears the cupboard door open that “he believes 
64 that he is about to get food”.31 It is only when we try to judge exactly what the 
dog believes – in other words, how she represents the world – we end up with 
anthropomorphism. In developing their position regarding anthropomor-
phism, Andrews and Radenovic refer to an example given by David Armstrong: 
Armstrong asks us to consider Fido the dog, who just observed his master 
burying a meaty bone in the backyard. The problem, as seen by Armstrong, 
is that we cannot conclude that “Fido believes there is a meaty bone buried 
in the yard” because Fido does not have the concept of meaty or bone or 
yard. In order to have the concept bone, it seems, one also needs to have the 
concepts skeleton, joint and so forth. In order for Fido to have the concept 
bone, he would need to know, for example, something about the relation 
between the skeleton and the muscles of a vertebrate, and their function 
in animal locomotion. To have the concept bone, one needs to know things 
about bones, and this requires more concepts. (19)32 
From this quotation we can learn what is entailed by Andrews’ remark about 
the inappropriate anthropomorphism of ascribing content to beliefs. Our 
concepts – such as ‘yard’ and ‘bone’ – are not meaningful on their own: they 
refer to a whole web of concepts that humans share. Humans divide the world 
into squirrels, trees, backyards, and meaty bones but these divisions are made 
against the background of a human web of concepts. How, then, would we 
be able to infer the divisions that Fido uses from his behaviour?33 We might 
only come to know these divisions if we were able to translate the whole of 
Fido’s conceptual web. For our meaty bone can only be called a ‘meaty bone’ 
because we know the referential context in which the words ‘meaty’ and ‘bone’ 
belong. It seems that any description of the content of Fido’s belief is doomed 
31 Although a sceptic might respond to these ascriptions by arguing that it does not follow from the fact 
that the dog grabbed the leash that he believes that he is going outside. Like a well-trained Pavlov-dog, 
it may be a merely automatic reaction to you putting on your shoes. No representations of the world 
are needed.
32 Andrews and Radenovic cite Armstrong’s Belief, Truth and Logic (1973), which indeed uses the example 
of a dog’s behaviour to point out that it is possible to ascribe beliefs to the dog. However, it is Peter 
Stich (to whom Andrews also refers) who reacts to this example and names the dog ‘Fido’ in an article 
named “Do Animals Have Beliefs?” of 1979, not Armstrong himself as Andrews assumes.
33 The issue of the indeterminacy of translation is hardly confined to connections among species. Wil-
lard von Orman Quine has demonstrated this with his thought experiment named ‘Gavagai’, in which 
a linguist visiting a community shut off from the rest of the world notes that every time they see a 
rabbit, they say the word ‘gavagai’. Even though it may seem obvious that one should translate ‘gava-
gai’ as ‘rabbit’, Quine states that many translations are possible: “there go undetached rabbit-parts” 
or “there is rabbitness there” are just two potential renditions. According to Quine, the conclusion 


























65to get bogged down in questions about translatability of his web of concepts 
to human language. 
Andrews writes that in order to preserve the possibility of ascribing beliefs 
to anymals, Armstrong suggests that we can 
attribute beliefs to animals by removing the perspectival aspect of the attri-
bution and indicating the actual state of affairs that the animals’ beliefs are 
about. So, instead of saying something like “Fido believes that there is a 
meaty bone in the back yard”… we could correctly say that Fido believes that 
this thing (pointing at the bone) is there (pointing at the spot in the yard). 
That is, Armstrong suggests that we move from attributing an opaque de 
dicto statement to Fido – one that captures how Fido thinks about the meaty 
bone – to a transparent de re statement one that refers to the objects, proper-
ties, and situations in the world. (Animal Mind 86)
The difference between the two kinds of statement to which Andrews refers 
here – transparent or de re (about the thing) on the one hand and opaque or de dicto 
(about what is said) on the other – has a long history and is important when 
we talk about what someone believes (or another attitudinal verb). Andrews 
explains the difference between these sorts of statement by way of the example 
of Lois Lane, who believes that Superman is stronger than Clark Kent. On a de re 
level, this belief would be impossible, since Clark Kent and Superman are one 
and the same individual. When we take into account the fact that Lane does not 
know that Clark Kent and Superman are the same person, however, then on a 
de dicto level Lane’s belief in Superman’s superior strength is perfectly possible. 
A de dicto description of belief says something about how Lane views the world 
(her perspective), whereas a de re belief is comparable to pointing at the world. 
Another way to explain the difference is to test whether it is possible to 
replace a term with a co-designating term without violating its truth value. To 
test this idea against the example of my made-up passage from a non-existent 
novel: suppose that the pompous man is actually the woman’s father, but she 
does not know this. The narrator cannot say that she thinks her father to be 
indifferent, because that is not what she thinks; she does not know the man 
to be her father. Given the impossibility of replacing “the pompous man” for 
“her father”, it would seem that her belief is de dicto – that it tells us something 
about her view, in this case of the man. It is, however, possible for the narrator 
to use the preposition ‘of’ in the sentence to create a space between the subject 
(the woman) and the object (the pompous man/her father). Andrews writes in 
this respect about Fido’s belief: “While Fido doesn’t believe that the meaty bone 
































































66 former is buried in the latter” (Animal Mind 86). Considering the sentence from 
the novel, we then may read from an omniscient narrator’s point of view: “she 
thinks of her father that he is indifferent, but she does not know him to be her 
father”. This sentence is possible, because the woman’s perspective is left out 
through the use of ‘of’, allowing for her ignorance about the identity of the 
man. 
Why does this distinction tell us something about anthropomorphism? 
Saying exactly what Fido thinks on a de dicto level (that takes his perspective 
into account) is prone to anthropomorphism because we might fill in Fido’s 
beliefs with our own language and corresponding concepts. In articulating his 
perspective (in this case on the bone), we would have to render it in words. This 
gives rise to issues of untranslatability, because it entails reckoning with the 
conceptual web in which Fido’s beliefs are embedded, of which we may have 
little or no knowledge. Removing this perspectival aspect of Fido’s beliefs by 
way of a de re ascription results in statements such as this: Fido believes of the 
meaty bone that it is in the yard. Again, the benefit of this ascription is that we 
do not describe the content of Fido’s beliefs; we only describe the part of the 
world toward which the belief is directed. Accordingly, Andrews writes that a 
de re ascription of belief is ‘perspectiveless’: pointing towards the world does 
not require a language that is bound to a perspective, whether that be a dog’s, 
as in this instance, or for that matter our own perspective (hence the point-
ing). De re ascriptions of belief can be recognised through a replacement test. 
If I, in context of this particular sentence about Fido’s belief, replace ‘meaty 
bone’ with a co-designating term – say ‘fleshy rib bone’ – then that statement 
remains perfectly plausible. This is because a de re ascription makes no claims 
as to how Fido thinks about the bone or the concepts that he uses in thinking 
about the bone. Thus, a de re description of belief tries to seize language capac-
ity to point to things by describing that at which someone’s belief is aimed, not 
how that someone relates to their belief. 
Describing thoughts de dicto is likely to lead to the projection of anthropo-
morphic content onto anymals’ beliefs. If a de re ascription of belief presents a 



























2.3  Presenting beliefs in novels
T he claim that poetry is ahead of prose in avoiding anthropomorphism is not new.In a footnote to her 1936 article “Man and Animals in Recent Poetry”, 
Elizabeth Atkins had already written that contemporaneous poetry had already 
outmoded anthropomorphised dogs such as that of Woolf’s Flush, which I 
discuss in this section (265). In contrast to Flush, poetry of the time describes 
anymals as creatures with intrinsic value without drawing them into a human 
world. It is perhaps more accurate to think of differences in genre and therefore 
differences in affordances than of some sort of race between novels and poetry. 
However, for the sake of the argument, let me assume that there is such a thing 
as progress in literature and that poetry was then and may still be ‘ahead’ of 
prose. This poses the question of whether prose can ever catch up. If a narrative 
structure is inherently anthropomorphic – so much follows from Fludernik’s 
account of narrative – then characters and their thoughts, as inalienable com-
ponents of novels, are anthropomorphic too. What is more, this suggests that 
when it comes to anthropomorphism poetry is by definition ahead of prose. 
In the following paragraph I discuss three passages from novels featur-
ing thinking anymals: Flush by Virginia Woolf, Watership Down by Richard 
Adams, and The Dog by Kerstin Ekman. The trend that I want to bring into 
focus begins with the overt anthropomorphism of Flush, modulates into a 
lesser anthropomorphism in Watership Down, and culminates in the minimal 
anthropomorphism in The Dog.34 In view of the de re/de dicto distinction, my 
hypothesis is that this movement is less a matter of ascribing fewer and fewer 
human faculties or predicates to anymals than of how these anymals’ beliefs 
are presented. 
For an example of the highest level of anthropomorphism, let us attend to 
the following paragraph from Flush:
68 Dogs therefore, Flush began to suspect, differ; some are high, others low; 
and his suspicions were confirmed by snatches of talk held in passing with 
the dogs of Wimpole Street. “See that scallywag? A mere mongrel! ... By gad, 
that’s a fine Spaniel. One of the best blood in Britain! … Pity his ears aren’t a 
shade more curly. … There’s a topknot for you!”
From such phrases, from the accent of praise or derision in which they 
were spoken, at the pillar-box or outside the public-house where the foot-
men were exchanging racing tips, Flush knew before the summer had 
passed that there is no equality among dogs: there are high dogs and low 
dogs. (Woolf 32-33)
We all immediately recognise that dividing dog breeds into a class society con-
stitutes an overt anthropomorphising of a dog’s world or else it is an example 
of “a dog-consciousness so incredibly human”, as Atkins puts it (265). We have 
not seen behaviour in dogs from which we can learn specifically that mongrels 
are looked down upon whereas full-blooded spaniels are held in high esteem. 
Sure, dogs living in groups do know a hierarchy, but that hierarchy is certainly 
not based upon on a dog’s belief that there is such a thing as “the best blood in 
Britain”.
That said, removing references to class society and other hints of human 
frames of reference is not necessarily enough to abate completely worries 
about inappropriate anthropomorphism. This becomes clear in the follow-
ing excerpt from the novel Watership Down, in which the protagonists Hazel 
and Fiver search out a safe place for the small group of rabbits that they lead. 
Although the preamble to the book assures the reader that Richard Adams’ 
novel is about ‘real rabbits’, we instantly come to know that ‘real’ means that 
which is opposed to fables. For even though the rabbits speak ‘Lapine’, a rabbit 
language, and worry rabbit worries, the presentation of their thoughts betrays 
the anthropomorphism of de dicto ascriptions of belief:
34 These examples make clear that J. A. Fischer’s distinctions among different kinds of anthropo-
morphism fall short of fulfilling my purpose in this chapter. Fischer distinguished interpretative 
anthropomorphism from imaginative anthropomorphism. Whereas the first category includes all 
instances of beliefs or intentions being ascribed to anymals, the latter consists of all fictional or imagi-
nary characters (Gods or anymals) that are presented as resembling humans. The latter category is 
truncated on my view. What I am looking for are non-anthropomorphised anymals in poems (and in 
this chapter novels too). It seems that Fischer assumes that imaginative anthropomorphism can never 

















































“Look!” said Fiver suddenly. “That’s the place for us, Hazel. High, lonely 
hills, where the wind and the sound carry and the ground’s as dry as straw 
in a barn. That’s where we ought to be. That’s where we have to go.”
Hazel looked at the dim, far-off hills. Obviously, the idea of trying to 
reach them was out of the question. It might well prove to be all they could 
do to find their way across the heather to some quiet field or copse bank 
like those they had been used to. It was lucky that Fiver had not come out 
with this foolish notion in front of any of the others, especially as there was 
trouble enough already. If only he could be persuaded to drop it here and 
now, there would be no harm done – unless, indeed, he already said any-
thing to Pipkin.
“I don’t think we could get the others to go as far as that, Fiver,” he said. 
“They’re frightened and tired as it is, you know. What we need is to find a 
safe place soon, and I’d rather succeed in doing what we can than to fail to 
do what we can’t” (Adams 63). 
There is no such thing as class society in this excerpt. Moreover, the rabbits 
do not engage in obviously human affairs, whereas in Flush dogs gossip about 
mongrels of poor breeding. It is more ‘rabbitish’ to search for a safe place than 
it is ‘doggish’ to discuss class differences. The rabbits of Watership Down may be 
more leporine than Flush’s dogs are canine, but it is easy to overlook how the 
verbal translation of the detail of what Hazel thinks sets off an anthropomor-
phism alarm. This is even the case when it comes to simple remarks such as “we 
need to find a safe place soon”.
Weaving the distinction between de re and de dicto ascriptions of belief into 
this discussion, we can see that Hazel’s and Fiver’s beliefs are presented de dicto; 
they describe the world from Hazel’s and Fiver’s perspective. We can see this, 
for example, in how the hills are described. Whereas to Fiver they are “high, 
lonely hills”, to Hazel they are “dim, far-off hills”. It would make no sense to 
replace the “high, lonely hills” in which Fiver’s believes with Hazel’s “dim, 
far-off hills”. The descriptions of their thoughts about the hills are therefore 
de dicto: they present the reader with their respective perspectives on the hills. 
Hazel is brave, thoughtful, rational, and empathic. Fiver has prophetic dreams 
and does not care about how those dreams might be communicated to keep 
the group of rabbits together. We come to learn about their specific characters 
precisely through the formulation of their beliefs. Hazel and Fiver see the same 
hills, but evaluate them differently, allowing us to get acquainted with their 
different qualities in the process.
Now, taking away the perspectival aspect of a de dicto ascription of belief, 
therefore, would not be enough to render character: it would take away a 
70 character’s point of view and nullify their typical character traits as a result. 
Distinctive characters, however, are indispensable in a narrative. This leads to 
a conundrum: if de dicto descriptions of belief are undeniably anthropomorphic 
(because they put anymal perspectives into words) and de re ascriptions of belief 
cannot flesh out character, how can a narrative ever body forth an anymal as 
anymal?35 The search, then, is for a description of belief that is both de re and 
captures a unique perspective. The question is whether this type of belief can 
ever figure in a narrative, since traditionally novels are defined in terms of their 
characters’ believability. 
It is exactly this problem that Kerstin Ekman addresses, albeit implicitly, 
in her novella The Dog (1986). Ekman begins and ends her novella by question-
ing its narrative structure. “When does something begin?” she asks on the 
first page and at the end of the tale she echoes her first question with: “When 
does something end?” Ekman answers the first question resolutely: “It doesn’t 
begin”. As human readers, we expect a narrative to have a beginning, middle, 
and an end. When it comes to a dog’s tale, though, the question of when some-
thing begins may be less informative than the question that Ekman poses a 
paragraph later: “Where does a tale begin?” (2). The ‘where’ is more important, 
in this case, because the tale is about a peculiar puppy. Instead of lying against 
his mother’s belly, as a puppy normally would, he rests at the foot of a spruce 
– which has to be explained. We read a novella in a human language, but these 
questions about beginnings and endings prompt us to reflect on how we nor-
mally shape our stories. It also gives Ekman more freedom with regard to how 
to render this dog’s life. As a way of moving to and fro between the anymal and 
the reader, Ekman first describes the dog to us ex negativo: 
The only warmth he got was from his own body. Inside him was empti-
ness. He couldn’t think: warmth, belly, teats, milk. He didn’t remember his 
mother’s belly with its thin, white coat, or her yellow eyes gleaming when 
they all suckled. (2) 
The sentence “He couldn’t think: warmth, belly, teats, milk” tells us a lot about 
the dog. We learn that he is a puppy, still in his neonatal period, but that he 
has now been separated from his mother for too long to clearly remember her 
warmth and milk. The string of nouns following “He couldn’t think” evoke in 
35 In taking this up in future study, the question would be whether this is indeed an impasse for novels 
depicting anymals. It seems that such works are either written from a third-person perspective, in 
which case the conducted dialogue takes place between humans (as in White Fang or Moby Dick for 
instance), or the anymals are given a voice but are consequently anthropomorphised (as in Black Beauty 


























71the reader an image of a canine mother with swollen teats and puppies drink-
ing in her warmth. The puppy cannot think about what he lacks, but he still 
has wants, although they are muted by hunger and cold. Ekman uses this tech-
nique of description ex negativo to level the fixed separation between inside and 
outside. She describes the dog’s whereabouts as he tries to stay alive from a 
third-person perspective. At some point in the novella’s beginning (if it is a 
beginning), however, we read what the dog thinks from his point of view. Our 
anthropomorphism alarm does not go off: 
Slushy waters and sour lingonberries. Feathers in the moss, straggly, odour-
less. Nothing but water in his aching stomach, wet paws in the marsh. Push 
on, push on, slow and soggy. Chew on feathers, suck on bones. Water drip-
ping on nose, stinging eyes and aching belly. Traipse and trudge. Crouch 
with belly to the snow. Push on with nose to the ground. 
Odourless water. Meltwater. Hungerwater.
The moon creeps up on the forest. The night is not silent. It purls and 
ripples, it twitters and rustles. Up, keep going across the patchy ground. 
Body uneasy. Patches of moonlight and snow, patches of shadow and dark 
marshland. 
Sharp branches, paws and claws. Crouching stumps with furry backs 
and ears. Sleeping boulders. Fall asleep on damp lichen, frozen stiff and 
dizzy. Spots before the eyes. Hunger pangs and dull fear. Sleep it off. Sleep 
in the sun. Suck the warm teats. Doze off. Suck. Suck the warmth. (30, 32)
The paragraph ends here along with the dog falling asleep. The opening of the 
next paragraph is again written in the third person. How does Ekman bring 
her readers to trust this description from the dog’s perspective? What would be 
the right interpretation of a sentence like: “Up, keep going across the patchy 
ground”? It could be read as if the dog is encouraging himself, a description of 
what he is doing, or both at once. The effect of the simultaneity of these two 
readings is that whether we read the line as a thought of the dog encouraging 
himself or as a description of what he is doing, the other reading is not erased 
in our imagination. As a result, we treat the dog’s behaviour and thoughts as 
one. 
The neologism ‘hungerwater’ produces a similar effect. The word describes 
how the dog thinks about the water that he comes across. Is this a description 
of a thought de dicto or de re? We might say that it is necessarily de dicto because it 
is the dog’s perspective on the water: it is hungerwater to him. We could equally 
argue, however, that it is a de re description of his thought about the water, since 























72 Thus the term “hungerwater” passes the test for a de re description of a belief, 
namely that the term could be replaced with a co-designating term, salva veri-
tate. Although this may be right, it remains difficult to decide whether the dog’s 
thoughts are indeed thoughts and, if so, whether they are de dicto or de re. Look-
ing at the paragraph again, we can see the cause of this confusion. Thoughts 
normally belong to a subject. Here, however, the subject is purposefully left 
absent.
On the one hand, Ekman’s decision to drop the pronoun might lead one 
to think that these lines are not to be read as thoughts at all, since they do not 
accord with conventional syntax and are therefore neither de dicto nor de re. On 
the other hand, though, we might stay with Ekman’s depiction of the dog and 
learn from how he presents his thought. A key insight may be that thoughts 
and movements belong together, especially in a dog’s world. Achieving this 
effect in a novel is an exceptional accomplishment. The tools that Ekman uses 
are crucial in creating this effect: descriptions ex negativo, pronoun dropping, 
and neologism. I call these tools, along with the others I add in the following 
chapters, zoopoetical tools. They are based upon Andrew Goatly’s conception 
of what he calls “Green Grammar”, which is the subject of the next section. 
After unpacking the idea of green grammar and introducing the ways in which 
zoopoetical tools are used in zoopoetry, I explain in more depth how Ekman 



























2.4  “Green Grammar” and  
its effects on the presentation  
of thought
E co-linguists such as Andrew Goatly have argued for a less anthropocen-tric grammar. Goatly points out that the grammar that we use in both ordinary life and scientific language does not keep pace with scientific 
findings, such as an “active process of matter, or the inseparability of life and 
its environment (537). Goatly writes: 
Equally important is for us to realize that what conceptual features are 
criterial, the distinction between literalness and metaphoricity, is solely 
dependent on social convention. The congruent wordings which represent 
first-order entities/things as nouns and second-order entities/processes as 
verbs are no more natural or consonant with some kind of external reality 
than, say, the representation of things with verbs would be or, in the case of 
nominalization of verbs, representing processes with nouns. Of course, our 
conventional use of nouns to refer to the former and verbs to the latter rein-
forces this permanence-based categorization, for wordings after all ‘confer’ 
a reality, simultaneously constructing and referring to our world. (541)
Our language does not only reflect the world as it is; as Goatly argues, it also 
shapes the world. He gives the example of how we could use nouns to refer 
to processes, which might result in a different worldview because nouns can 
be subjects in our worldview. Goatly seeks to adapt grammar to new scientific 
findings, to establish grammatical structures that favour processes over things 
and leave the subject versus object binary behind by abandoning the transitive 
clause. A transitive clause requires a definite, active subject that does some-
thing to a passive object. Getting rid of the transitive clause in favour of a more 
ergative grammar opens up the possibility of revealing nature’s more proces-
74 sual character.36 Along similar lines and following Goatly, Marco Caracciolo 
searches for ways of opening grammar up so as to include nonhuman others 
more fully. In addition to abandoning the transitive clause in favour of an erga-
tive system, Caracciolo mentions the use of words such as “it” and “there” (thus 
shifting attention from subjects to processes), the use of reciprocal verbs, the 
promotion of places or environments to the position of grammatical subjects, 
and lastly nominalisation (changing a verb into a noun) (“Notes” 179). None of 
these tools are widely used in everyday, scientific, or narrative language. As I 
have mentioned above, Caracciolo gives an example of cranes playing a role in 
the plot of a novel. Attending to a specific paragraph, he shows that the depic-
tion of the cranes benefits from the tools suggested by Goatly. 
What Ekman shows in the passage from The Dog quoted above, however, 
goes much further than describing anymal behaviour or granting anymals a 
role in the plot. The dropping of the pronoun in the paragraph from The Dog 
accords with the ergative system. Verbs become central to the sentences, which 
is consistent with Goatly’s idea of a green grammar focusing on processes 
rather than things. Goatly’s critique of standard grammar is that it privileges 
agents. According to Goatly, the ergative system, in which objects play a more 
active role in processes, aligns more closely with the way in which everything 
is interconnected in nature. Ekman goes even further than displacing agents 
from their central position, though. There is no subject in her paragraph and 
thus no character who needs to be reformulated according to green grammar. 
Nevertheless, we experience the world more or less through the dog’s perspec-
tive. The neologism ‘hungerwater’ plays an important role in this. Although 
novels rarely use neologisms or drop pronouns, these techniques are common 
in poems. Perhaps put more precisely: when these tools are present, the para-
graph becomes more poetic. In fact, if we read the paragraph again, we can see 
that it could be a categorised as a poem. Note that this is the only place in the 
novella where Ekman describes the world from the dog’s point of view and 
that it is exactly here that Ekman uses zoopoetical tools. The outcome could be 
called a poem. This is no coincidence. 
36 In the ergative system, the grammatical object participates in the action initiated by the subject. Also, 
the noun in a single-verb sentence is marked as an object (see Goatly). So, in the phrase ‘I run’, ‘I’ is 
marked as a subject, whereas in a hypothetical English ergative sentence, the phrase would be ‘me 


























2.5  Thinking anymals in poems: 
Introducing zoopoetical tools
W hereas Caracciolo advises novelists to green up their grammar to make room for non-human anymals, it might be safe to say that poetry has more to offer in this respect. Anymals not only figure in 
many poems, but even have a voice. The impasse that novelists face in attempt-
ing to present thinking anymals is as follows. They can choose either to present 
their thoughts de re (which diminishes anthropomorphism, but leaves out their 
specific perspective – an undesirable consequence in a novel) or to present their 
thoughts de dicto (which ends up in anthropomorphism, since we do not trans-
late one discrete meaning but a whole web of beliefs into human language). 
Poems, in contrast, seem able to break this deadlock through the abundant 
use of zoopoetical tools, such as neologisms, pronoun dropping, and rhythm. 
When poets give anymals a voice, they do so in much the same way as Ekman 
in The Dog. Consider for instance the poem “Pigs” by Les Murray:
Us all sore cement was we.
Not warmed then with glares. Not glutting mush
under that pole the lightning’s tied to.
No farrow-shit in milk to make us randy.
Us back in cool god-shit. We ate crisp.
We nosed up good rank in the tunnelled bush.
Us all fuckers then. And Big, huh? Tusked
the balls-biting dog and gutsed him wet.
Us shoved down the soft cement of rivers.
Us snored the earth hollow, filled farrow, grunted.
Never stopped growing. We sloughed, we soughed
and balked no weird till the high ridgebacks was us
with weight-buried hooves. Or bristly, with milk.
76 Us never knowed like slitting nor hose-biff then.
Nor the terrible sheet-cutting screams up ahead.
The burnt water kicking. This gone-already feeling
here in no place with our heads on upside down. 
(36, ll. 1-17)
The first line could be rephrased as “we were all on sore cement”. Given that 
the rhythm here mimics the short snorts made by pigs, however, Murray has 
been lenient with the grammar: in this way pigs – who probably have a more 
articulate feeling of ‘we’  – are accorded more space than received grammar 
would allow for. To be more precise, the pig’s voice (or pigs’ voices) rarely uses 
(or use) the subject pronoun ‘we’, favouring the object pronoun ‘us’ instead. 
Normally, we would use ‘us’ when something is done to us. Here, the pigs/pig 
use(s) ‘us’ in the place of a subject pronoun. This aptly shows how their actions, 
while still being actions, are preordained by the environment they inhabit and 
the horrendous fate that lies ahead, described in the final lines. Dropping the 
subject pronoun foregrounds the fact that these pigs are treated as objects. Fur-
thermore, neologisms help depict a pig mind. For instance, “farrow-shit” may 
be not a full-fledged neologism such as hungerwater, but it serves to open up 
a pig world, since they will experience the dung of their farrows differently. 
Accordingly, it deserves a unique word. The penultimate line “The burnt water 
kicking. This gone-already feeling” horrifically portrays what lies ahead for the 
pigs. Here as well, pronouns are dropped and a neologistic compound (“gone-
already feeling”) captures the sense in which the pigs know what is about to 
happen. We can see how rhythm, neologism, contravention of grammatical 
rules, and a switch from subject to object pronouns all work together in the 
poem to translate a pig’s mind. We might still hesitate and ask whether this 
is an apt translation of how a pig experiences the world. However, to hesitate 
in this way is not the same doubt concerning the extent to which the poem is 
anthropomorphic. 
Do poets merely sidestep the impasse represented by the choice between 
the de dicto versus a de re modes of presenting thought? Or do they show us a 
way out? How we answer these questions depends on whether poets have what 
we are looking for: a de re description of thought that preserves the anymal’s 
point of view, the poetic technique that I outlined above. Not much has been 
written on the de re/de dicto distinction in relation to poetry. Still, it would seem 
that the obvious way to evaluate thoughts in poems would be to argue that 
thought in poems are de dicto. Surely, if poetry does contain thought, it reveals 
how poets think about things. Jesse Prinz and Eric Mandelbaum advance pre-






































































it would be absurd to say, for instance, that Romeo’s claim that “Juliet is the 
Sun” can be replaced by the co-referring phrase: Romeo thinks that “Juliet is 
the star around which Earth orbits”. According to Prinz and Mandelbaum, this 
is because poets “intentionally introduce a filter between mind and world”. 
Poets, they expand, “are interested in ways of expressing things, not just in 
what gets expressed” (63-87, 70, 71). 
This may be a widely held view of what poets do and the most obvious way 
in which to evaluate the de re/de dicto distinction in relation to poetry. Never-
theless, I think that Prinz and Mandelbaum’s account does not do justice to 
what many poets try to establish, specifically when anymals are at stake. Let me 
conclude this chapter with the following passage from an essay by the novelist 
and philosopher Patricia De Martelaere. For me, it precisely delineates a poetic 
paradox, which consists in the longing to reach for reality in text. Her view of 
the essence of writing stands at odds with that of Prinz and Mandelbaum: 
Or concerning the cat. She lies on the mat, curled up in her sleep, purring, 
and submerged in herself, so peculiar, and you would want to draw her 
nearer to you, in language. Like a madman you start writing, from head 
to tail, hair by hair, this cat (not another one), you write: cat and a chain of 
adjectives, like: soft, grey, warm, shiny, and the more you write, the more 
you desire that the words would not describe the cat, but would let her exist 
the way she wholly is. Hundreds of pages you could go on, volumes full of 
the unattainable cat on the mat, and all is nothing, it does not even replace 
the most insignificant motion, the motion with which you go towards the 
cat and caress her, without writing: I caress the cat, without thinking: the 
cat, the cat. Do you caress the cat then? You caress the cat outside of lan-
guage, the cat who isn’t a cat, caressing that isn’t caressing: nothing. The 
language of the writer wants to be like this caressing of the cat. The writer’s 
paradox is that of someone who simultaneously wants to factually caress 
the cat, like it only can happen in motion, and wants to express in words: I 
caress the cat. (20-21) 37
Poets draw anymals into language; they even draw how anymals see the world 
into language. Instead of choosing between presenting thought de dicto or de 
re, we might rather conclude that poets show us that thoughts cannot be fixed 
to subjects as we normally tend to think. Moreover, it can be argued that the 
de re/de dicto distinction does not take into account that beliefs can be about a 
thing in the Umwelt of an anymal. The Umwelt is a notion coined by the biolo-
gist Jakob von Uexküll to refer to an anymal’s subjective world. Despite the 
fact that the adjective ‘subjective’ may evoke an image of an inner world, this 
78 concept levels the subject/object division since, as Von Uexküll explains, the 
Umwelt is a continued interaction between the anymal and its surroundings. 
Subjective experience shapes the anymal’s world. This notion, which is central 
in the next chapter, shows us that what Ekman and Murray achieve might be 
summarised as a de re description of embodied thought in terms of the Umwelt, 
which results in non-anthropomorphised anymals. In this way, even the elec-
tric being of thinking anymals has a place in poetry. 
37 Of over de poes. Ze ligt op de mat opgekruld te slapen en te spinnen, zo in zichzelf verzonken, zo 
vreemd, en je zou haar in taal naar je toe willen halen. Als een razende begin je te schrijven, van 
kop tot staart, haartje voor haartje, déze poes (geen andere), zoals ze zo ligt te slapen (niet anders), 
je schrijft: poes, en reeksen adjectieven daarbij, zoals: zacht, grijs, warm, glanzend, en hoe meer je 
beschrijft hoe meer je zou willen dat de woorden de poes niet zouden beschrijven, maar haar hele-
maal, zoals ze is, zouden doen zijn. Honderden bladzijden kun je zo doorgaan, boekdelen vol, over de 
onbereikbare poes op de mat, en het is allemaal niets, het vervangt zelfs niet het meest onbetekenende 
gebaar, het gebaar waarmee je naar de poes toegaat en haar streelt, zonder te schrijven: ik streel de 
poes, zonder te denken: de poes, de poes. Streel je dan de poes? Je streelt de poes buiten taal, de poes 
die geen poes is, een strelen dat geen strelen is: niets. De taal van de schrijver wil zijn zoals dit strelen 
van de poes. De paradox van de schrijver is die van degene die tegelijk écht de poes wil strelen, zoals 



































I n the previous chapter, I commented on Ekman’s The Dog and, following Goatly and Caracciolo, discussed the techniques of pronoun dropping, nom-inalisation, neologism, and description ex negativo. These zoopoetical tools 
serve to diminish anthropomorphism and open up the possibility of depicting 
the dog’s thoughts as embodied. Following on from that discussion, in this 
chapter I examine how zoopoetical tools reach beyond the words of a text and 
shape the entanglements of reader and poem, human and anymal. 
The notion of Umwelt, which I introduced in the former chapter, will prove 
helpful again in this undertaking. The biologist Jakob von Uexküll coined 
the term to show, on the one hand, that there are as many perspectives on the 
environment as there are anymal species and, on the other, that a perspec-
tive manifests itself in the world (as being enclosed in a private mind). This 
paradigm shift, through which anymals went from being seen as mindless 
machines to carriers of meaning, calls for new terminology. The term Umwelt 
is one response to that call (Uexküll 215), as is the phenomenologist Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion body-subject and consciousness as “a take on the 
exterior world” (Nature 146). Another is the word “commingling”, which the 
philosopher John Haugeland has used to refer to the lack of essential distinc-
tions between mind, body, and environment (Having 208).
These theorists’ terminological innovations are useful when broaching 
the connections between zoopoetry and empathy, since the poets I discuss are 
engaged in the same quest to preserve the experiential world of anymals in 
language. Furthermore, we see the same push towards a paradigm shift in the 
tools deployed in poetry; poets do not deem subjective experience – even that 













A remark that Uexküll makes in the preface to his famous A Foray into the Worlds 
of Animals and Humans serves to lead us into this chapter. “Certain convictions”, 
he claims, “are able to bar the entrance to those worlds [Umwelten]” (41). Of these 
convictions, the ideas that anymals are automata and best understood when 
dissected are the most prohibitive. For Uexküll, it would appear that our pas-
sage into a given anymal’s Umwelt is precluded by neither a lack of imagination 
nor any physical incompatibilities between humans and anymals; it is simply 
a matter of humans cleaving to the wrong convictions. I argue that whereas 
these convictions often bar the way into anymals’ worlds, zoopoetical tools can 
open them up. Attending to anymals in ways that fall outside of the machine 
paradigm indeed demands a new language, as well as tools that exemplify a 
new paradigm of nature as commingled and entwined. 
In the previous chapter I introduced the techniques of pronoun dropping, 
nominalisation, neologism, and descriptions ex negativo; in this chapter I will 
deepen this examination of zoopoetical tools by way of an analysis of what I 
am calling ‘questions and hesitations’, ‘commingling words’, rhythm, and 
metaphor. Whilst keeping Uexküll’s remark about convictions having conse-
quences in mind, I explore these zoopoetical tools’ effects. They not only relate 
to the notions of entanglement and wholeness that I have mentioned above; 
they also suggest that reducing anthropomorphism need not necessarily result 
in anymals being presented as unknowable, mystified objects. Poets, especially 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, often mystified the anymals with 
which they were concerned out of reverence (Atkins). When poets started using 
zoopoetical tools, however, they began finding ways to enter anymal worlds 
whilst still circumnavigating anthropomorphism. In short, I show how these 
tools direct us towards openness, help make it possible to present the anymal 
as a whole, and instigate growth by using rhythm and metaphor to reach across 
the boundaries of words on paper. 
There are probably more zoopoetical tools than I discuss in this chapter. 
My aim is not comprehensive enumeration, but rather to show why and how 
some poetical tools and tropes are helpful when it comes to seeing anymals as 
agents with experiential worlds. In this sense, discussing the poems and tools 
works in two ways. At one level, by exploring how zoopoems use tools I gradu-
ally come to explicate the characteristics of the poems in the fourth category of 
zoopoems that I delineated in the Introduction to this study, in which anymals 
are set forth in their alterity. At another level, this discussion leads me to an 
understanding of what is needed to present anymals as themselves. The Dutch 
poet and anthologist Guus Luijters writes that poets’ true artistry comes out 
in their zoopoetry (26). Although he does not explain this statement, I think 




































































poetical tools in anymal poems. For these techniques, I have suggested, reduce 
anthropomorphism and envision nature as commingled and entwined.
3.2  Questions and  
hesitations: Openness 
3.2.1  Questions: Opening up mind and world
O ne of the most important traits of a poet, John Keats proposed, was a “negative capability” whereby “man is capable of being in uncertain-ties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & 
reason” (Keats). Keats scorns the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge for searching for 
a higher truth in poetry through the exercise of reason (Keats). It may seem a bit 
of a Romantic cliché to place knowledge in opposition to mysteries, and poetry 
in opposition to fact and reason. That said, Keats’ more subtle observation – 
that poetry allows for uncertainties, doubt, and questioning – has value for my 
purposes in this chapter. Zoopoetry often expresses uncertainty in the form of 
questions and hesitations. As I discuss in this section, it does so in roughly two 
ways. In the first, questions and hesitations serve to examine how we can come 
closer to the anymal; in the second, they create or enhance the anymal’s alterity. 
In many of her zoopoems, the poet Judith Herzberg poses questions in the 
first of these two modes. In “The Well-Known Masonry Nests” there are three, 
maybe even four questions in the first two quatrains: 
The Well-Known Masonry Nests
Is it not somewhat presumptuous 
to put oneself in a swallow’s position?
What is this phenomenon
“imagining oneself into” to aim for this.
But then: how else to name it
to recognise this thinking in vain
86 again and again searching for the spot where
year after year there used to be your nest.
This awake not able to believe
You fly to it, by it, right at 
the place, but clean and closed and plain 
where access was always gained.38 (11, ll. 1-12)
We can extract the following questions:
1. Is it not somewhat presumptuous to put oneself in a swallow’s position?
2. What is this phenomenon of “imagining oneself into”? and, if we do not 
take 2 and 3 to be one question; 
3. What does it mean to aim for this? And then; 
4.  How else to name it (when recognising this thinking)?
With this fourth question, Herzberg partly answers the first three questions: 
we do not have another name by which to recognise this swallow’s thinking. 
This question rhetorically sweeps away the human/anymal divide. In ‘answer-
ing’ three questions by means of a fourth question and whilst also leaving the 
questions open, the poem affects our understanding. By giving a poetic answer 
in the final lines, Herzberg does not dismiss this preparatory questioning as 
unimportant or redundant. Rather, it serves to probe tentatively possible ways 
of coming closer to the swallow’s life. Whereas an answer framed in terms of 
a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ would compromise the difficult task of identifying with 
the swallow, Herzberg’s probing and weighing of possible connections with 
the swallow’s experiential world eventually affords us an expansive picture of 
38 De Bekende Gemetselde Nesten
 Is het niet tamelijk aanmatigend 
 zich in een zwaluw te verplaatsen
 wat is dit voor een fenomeen
 ‘zich in te leven’ dat beogen.
 
 Maar ook: hoe moet het anders heten
 dit denken te herkennen vergeefs
 steeds weer de plek te zoeken waar 
 jaar in jaar uit je nest was.
 
 Dit wakker niet te kunnen geloven
 je vliegt erheen, erlangs, er pal
 op af, maar gaaf, en dicht, en glad, 
































































































what cross-species empathy might entail. Indeed, by dint of her wary question-
ing, Herzberg suggests other ways in which we might empathise, that can be 
compared to Costello’s/Coetzee’s probing and weighing.39 
Although questions appear often in Herzberg’s poems, they are even more 
frequent in her zoopoems, in which she searches for ways of knowing, engag-
ing with, and rendering an anymal’s life. I counted the questions that she poses 
in the volumes Zoals (1992) and Wat Zij Wilde Schilderen (1996). Four out of the 42 
poems gathered in Zoals are zoopoems. Of the 38 non-zoopoetical poems, six 
contain questions or hesitations. Of the zoopoems, three out of the four contain 
questions or hesitations. Approximately the same ratio appears in Wat Zij Wilde 
Schilderen; the volume consists of 40 poems, of which five are zoopoems. Whereas 
questions or hesitations appear in only five of 35 the non-zoopoetical poems, 
two of these five zoopoems contain questions or hesitations. This relatively high 
number of questions is not exceptional in zoopoetry; in fact many zoopoems 
thrive on this negative capability. In “The Well-known Masonry Nests”, ques-
tions pave the way for identification. It is not clear to whom the ‘you’ in the final 
lines of the poem refers; it might point to the swallow, the human reader, or 
them both at the same time. This identification is made possible thanks to the 
questions posed in the first lines, which, by having us ask with Herzberg “How 
else to name it?”, draw us into the feeling of searching for a nest. 
In contrast to this first mode of zoopoetical questioning, which seeks to 
draw anymals near, questions can also be used to mystify anymals. It is in 
the light of this second sense of questioning and hesitating that we can read 
Elizabeth Bishop’s famous poem “The Moose”. The speaker takes a long bus 
trip, dozes off, and is then awakened when “the bus driver stops with a jolt”. 
A moose “has come out of the impenetrable woods” (172), and stands in front 
of the bus:
Taking her time, 
she looks the bus over, 
grand, otherworldly. 
Why, why do we feel 
(we all feel) this sweet 
sensation of joy?
(173, ll. 151-156)
39 See chapter 1 for the various ways in which Coetzee/Costello labels engagements with anymals. That 
Herzberg’s work is motivated by a wish to empathise with anymals is also reflected in the poem “The 
Way” (“Zoals”), which is central to my Epilogue to this study. “The Way” puts into words the same 
mood and atmosphere as that found in “The Well-Known Masonry Nests”, which centres upon the 
wordless, intuitive searching and knowing that humans and anymals share (see Zoals 6). 
88 The moose takes her time to examine the bus and Bishop takes her time by 
using caesuras and commas to mimic the pace of the creature and let the reader 
imagine the moose in full. After the words “grand” and “otherworldly” comes 
the question of “why do we feel / (we all feel) this sweet / sensation of joy?” The 
question hangs there, unanswered. All of us who have had encounters with 
anymals may recognise the bus passengers’ shared joy. This feeling could be 
seen as an instance of “biophilia”, Edward Wilson’s term for the innate ten-
dency to affiliate with all that lives (Biophilia).40 It is this biophilia that Bishop 
wants to highlight and maybe even stretch to encompass readers’ experiences 
by calling it a ‘sweet sensation’, the alliteration serving as an invitation to share 
in the joy. As in “The Well-Known Masonry Nests”, a question remains unan-
swered. Yet whereas Herzberg partially answers her probing questions in a bid 
to find ways of engaging with the swallow, Bishop enhances the mystery of 
the moose by not answering the question. In many ways this emphasises the 
moose’s otherness; her sheer being is a mystery. Rather than bridging a gap 
between her and the passengers, this mysteriousness binds the passengers and 
the reader in a shared biophilia. 
In a manner that resembles Bishop’s mode of questioning, D.H. Lawrence 
recounts the hearing of a tortoise’s scream in “Tortoise Shout”. These are the 
first lines of the poem:
I thought he was dumb, 
I said he was dumb, 
Yet I’ve heard him cry. 
First faint scream, 
Out of life’s unfathomable dawn, 
Far off, so far, like a madness, under the horizon’s dawning rim, 
Far, far off, far scream. 
Tortoise in extremis. 
Why were we crucified into sex? 
Why were we not left rounded off, and finished in ourselves, 
As we began, 
As he certainly began, so perfectly alone? 
(ll. 1-12)
40 In his later work, Wilson points out that all species experience this affiliation, not humans alone (see 



































































89We read the astonishment at the shout of the tortoise, which he had assumed 
was dumb. The scream then carries the speaker to an unfathomable dawn, per-
haps the beginning of the earth. In lines 1-12, Lawrence mystifies the anymal 
by way of reference to Plato’s Symposium. In Plato’s text, the notions of perfect 
love and being are depicted as a rounded-off, hermaphroditic creature that gets 
divided by the gods out of fear that it might threaten their omnipotence (190). 
To Lawrence, the tortoise is such a creature: undivided, “perfectly alone”. The 
questions that the poem poses are not used to open up the possibility of con-
nections being made between the speaker and the tortoise. In fact, the tortoise 
is already characterised as perfect and the questions are used to demonstrate 
the speaker’s deplorable state, which makes the poem an example of group 2 
(in which anymals represent loss). 
The literary scholar Elizabeth Atkins explains the relationship between 
the mystification of the anymal in zoopoems on the one hand and a speaker’s 
deplorable state on the other. She writes that at the beginning of the twentieth 
century a radical change in poets’ attitude towards anymals becomes evident. 
Around that time, it came to pass that anymals were no longer seen as symbols 
for depraved human character traits, but as creatures that provided a counter-
balance to a sick human society. As causes for this attitudinal change, Atkins 
mentions the influence of “modern biology” and related to that “a shift in reli-
gious ideas”, urbanisation, and psychoanalysis. All of these causes led people 
to reconsider humans’ supposedly exceptional status. Poets who published 
in this period, including D.H. Lawrence and Elizabeth Bishop, not only saw 
animals as far more equal to humans than before. They even claimed that any-
mals formed “the only untried way of escape from despair” – a despair caused 
by the Great War. Whereas before the modernist tradition took hold anymals 
were mainly used in human imagery, the anymals in poetry at the beginning of 
the twentieth century suggested a new means of escaping a “sick civilization” 
(Atkins 273, 263, 264, 266, 267, 267).
Atkins points out that these poets’ attitude towards anymals almost com-
prised a new religion, an observation that somewhat chafes with her description 
of their poetry as “carefully literal” (263). It is as if Atkins sees a close connection 
between reverence and literalness. Indeed, as in Bishop’s “The Moose”, Law-
rence uses questions to enhance the reverence and the mystery surrounding 
the anymal. Rather than recognising how anymals and humans are entan-





























90 through questions.41 In both Bishop’s and Lawrence’s poems, the unanswered 
questions resemble those questions that are sometimes asked in prayer – in 
reverence and acceptance of not knowing. It is hard to see the anymal as itself, 
for just as people project desires onto God in religion, they also use the anymal 
in a religiously motivated search for a “way out of despair”.42
Whereas Lawrence and Bishop do not even recognise that there can be 
mutual relations between species, Herzberg suggests their proximity. Her 
questions let the swallow and human poetically coincide in a shared experi-
ence of ceaselessly searching for the nest in the final stanza. To achieve this 
effect, she also uses rhythm, which mimics the swallow’s flight. She does not 
give the swallow a voice, probably because that would be even more presump-
tuous than placing oneself in the swallow’s position. In the previous chapter, 
we saw how Les Murray and Kerstin Ekman dared to use a range of zoopoeti-
cal tools to present voiced anymals. In their poems, save for the questions that 
anymals themselves might have, ‘questioning’ has become redundant as a zoo-
poetical tool for relating the reader to the anymal, for that bridge has already 
been crossed by giving them a voice.
3.2.2  Hesitations: Recognising the indefiniteness of  
the world
W hereas questions thus either heighten an anymal’s mystery or bridge the gap between humans and anymals, hesitations have a somewhat different effect. They highlight the poem’s textuality 
and – perhaps for this very reason – the provisionality of any answers it offers 
too. We find hesitations in many poems by Elizabeth Bishop, including “The 
Fish”. After a series of observations, we read: 
41 Another example of mystifying an anymal by posing questions is William Blake’s “The Tyger”, in 
which even fourteen questions do not serve to bridge the gap between the speaker and the tiger. 
Indeed, they almost seem to warn us against his unapproachability.
42 According to the philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch “some of D.H. Lawrence’s work is spoiled 
by too much Lawrence” (From 226). In her view, an overly present self results in mediocre art. The 
anymals in Lawrence’s work struggle to get any attention that does not mystify them. In “Tortoise 
Shout”, the deplorable state of the speaker is more important than the tortoise, who serves as a sym-
bol. For a comprehensive discussion of the relation between Murdoch’s aesthetics and its importance 



































































91I admired his sullen face, 
the mechanism of his jaw, 
and then I saw 
that from his lower lip
 —if you could call it a lip— 
grim, wet, and weaponlike, 
hung five old pieces of fish-line,
(43, ll. 45-51)
The hesitation “if you could call it a lip” adds to the rather parlando style of 
“The Fish”, as does the repetition of the word ‘lip’. Leaving the hesitation in 
the poem contributes to its ‘spontaneity’. Together with ‘mystery’ and ‘accu-
racy’, this quality evokes the Bishopean idea that we might see “something new 
and strangely alive” in a poem (Poems 702-706). More often, Bishop uses the 
word “rather” to correct herself in a poem or withdraws words that may appear 
too definite. Consider again the poem “The Moose”, in which Bishop writes 
of the moose that: “She stands there, looms, rather” (Complete Poems 172). Here 
“rather” highlights the moment and urges the reader to envision the moose 
more carefully. Bishop interlards a poem with “rathers” to emphasise the sense 
of ‘nowness’ – as if someone is talking or thinking at this very moment. The 
“rather” in Bishop’s poem “Sandpiper” (see chapter 3.4.2.) has a similar effect: 
“He runs, he runs straight through it, watching his toes. / - Watching, rather, 
the spaces of sand between them.” It is as if the hesitation happens now, when 
reading it. We readers look again at the sandpiper, because, in envisioning the 
text, we first saw the bird looking at his toes before being prompted to attend 
to the bird more closely, whereupon we see what he is actually looking at: the 
sand between the toes. In an early letter from 1953 Bishop endorses Morris 
Croll’s description of the Baroque style as an ideal way of writing: “their pur-
pose [of the writers of Baroque prose] was to portray not a thought, but a mind 
thinking” (qtd. in One Art 12). Like many poets, Bishop strives to write poetry in 
action, portray minds in action, and come close to creating life.43 
A less straightforward way of hesitating works by using simile. We find a 
beautiful example of hesitation through simile in Ida Gerhardt’s “The Hedge-
hog” (“Het Egeltje”): 
43 In Bishop’s case, I would say that it is not so much a mind thinking as a mind seeing. The reader needs 
to “see something strangely alive” (Spires), but this is only possible when the poem focuses on what it 
sees. For Bishop, clean observation is the highest attainable virtue in an artist (or anyone, for she does 






























The hedgehog always at the hour of sunset
comes shambling along the tiling of the shed.
The breathing of his pointed snout
leaves, on the cold ground, traces that go in and out
around the silent human, who, with patience 
accustoms his shyness and fills the earthenware dish
and waits until a small ragged hand
gropingly grips the dish’s edge.
Then the animal drinks. In a moment, as if they understand
the two share glances, are content.44 (147, ll. 1-10)
The poem describes how a human being tries to gain a hedgehog’s trust by pro-
viding him with something to drink. The final sentence contains a puzzling 
simile: “Then the animal drinks. For a moment, as if they understand / the two 
share glances, are content”. How does the “as if” affect our understanding of 
the poem? The human and hedgehog are both satisfied and look at each other. 
The mutual glance occasions Gerhardt’s suggestion, made by way of a simile, 
that the human and hedgehog sort of understand each other. What exactly 
happens between them, however, remains unclear – and Gerhardt leaves it at 
that. The gesture of using a simile to mention ‘understanding’ and withdraw it 
at the same time could be described as imprecise. As I see it, however, it is a sign 
44 Het egeltje
 De egel komt in ‘t eendere schemeruur
 schuifelen langs de plavuizen van de schuur.
 De ademsporen van zijn spitse snuit
 gaan op de kille stenen aan en uit
 omtrent de stille mens, die met geduld
 zijn schuwheid went en de aarden schotel vult
 en wacht, totdat een kleine ruige hand
 zich tastend vastgrijpt aan de schotelrand.
 Dan drinkt het dier. Even, als in verstaan



































































93of poetic strength that Gerhardt allows for intuitions, hunches, or hesitations 
and tries to capture all shades of thinking and pondering. 
We may ask ourselves what we lose when we only have room for proven 
truths, although the answers may fall outside the scope of (exact) science. 
Among other things we lose what Martha Nussbaum calls “other ways of 
being precise”, a phrase that she uses in the context of her argument that 
Anglo-American philosophy has never considered these alternative modes of 
precision. Instead, it has always held onto “a style correct, scientific, abstract, 
hygienically pallid”, even when it comes to ethical thought (Love’s Knowledge 
19). In this poem, the simile’s hesitance opens up a possibility of cross-spe-
cies understanding. Hesitating through simile recalls Ekman’s technique of 
description ex negativo, in that avoiding saying something straightforwardly 
but rather raising it as a possibility is like bringing an idea to mind by describ-
ing what it is not.
Like description ex negativo, hesitation is a zoopoetical tool, since it directs 
us towards openness. This openness needs further explanation, however. Of 
course, the zoopoetical tools of questions and hesitation stand in stark opposi-
tion to the convictions that Uexküll wrote about. Whereas convictions close 
minds off from possibilities, questions and hesitations open them up. When 
I use the word ‘openness’ I mean the opposite of definitive answers and fixed 
ideas, such as the unquestioned human-animal binary, for instance. Questions 
and hesitations in poems prompt us to rethink our convictions – if not always 
in an active and conscious way. Moreover, leaving questions unanswered or 
unanswerable in a poem, or presenting hesitations as a way to consider a pos-
sibility, allows us to imagine tentative ways of probing and wondering.45 
My interpretation of questions and hesitations as zoopoetical tools direct-
ing us to openness presupposes a poetics that conflicts with more traditional, 
anthropocentric conceptions of poetry, which take poems to be thoughts or 
thought scripts. Thoughts necessarily belong to someone and are articulated 
in someone’s mind – whether the poet’s, speaker’s, or reader’s. Going by this 
understanding of what poems essentially are, one might argue that, rather 
than opening up a world, questions and criticises indicate someone’s indeci-
sive mind. The philosopher Eileen John criticises this understanding of poems 
as thoughts. In particular, she discusses three influential proponents of the 
45 Angela Leighton argues that hesitation ought to be a more prominent feature of philosophy. She 
approvingly quotes Ludwig Wittgenstein, who suggests that “language somehow broken down, 
stuttery and uncertain … offer[s] a greater approximation to philosophical investigations of knowl-
edge than clear, consecutive prose does” (167). Leighton refers to another remark from Wittgenstein, 






























94 thought-script model: Kendall Walton, Helen Vendler, and Glyn Maxwell.46 
In weighing up their positions, John cites Maxwell to indicate some of the dif-
ficulties with treating poetry as thought: 
Poets are voices upon time. What makes poetry so giddyingly different from 
other forms is how naturally and plainly its reader can inhabit that voice. 
For we all consciously know that poetry is written in the everyday material 
of language, but at a deeper cerebral level surely it becomes easier to imag-
ine the voice one’s own, that we could be thinking it, living it, saying it. We 
could have come to just this place. (qtd. in John “Poetry and Directions” 456)
To Maxwell, a poem “coherently expresses the presence of a human creature” 
(qtd. in John “Poetry and Directions” 457). Whereas John has problems mainly 
with the idea that poems are ultimately expressed thoughts that presuppose a 
subject expressing them (the poet, speaker, or reader), my concern goes further. 
I would like to stress how Maxwell’s view of poetry is essentially anthropo-
centric, like Fludernik’s approach to literature. What makes poems stand out 
from the rest of literature, Maxwell claims, is the ease with which humans can 
inhabit their voices. On this account, poems’ apparent substitutability with 
humans’ inner voices suggests that poems are ultimately human voices. Clearly 
this view results from the initial conviction that poems are thought scripts, 
which aligns with a more fundamental point a critic could have: typically peo-
ple hesitate and ask questions, so why would these tools be zoopoetical? 
Let me get back to the hesitation in Gerhardt’s “The Hedgehog”. Although 
it does so very cautiously, the hesitant simile examines ways of engaging with 
the hedgehog. It presents us a hesitation concerning how he experiences the 
world. Is this Gerhardt’s hesitation? Or does it become my own in reading it? 
Does reading the simile and then experiencing the hesitation as an up-in-the-
air possibility of mutual understanding between human and hedgehog count 
as my or Gerhardt’s thought? Does it tell me something about Gerhardt’s 
mind? When I read the poem, are the lines my own thoughts? And moreover: 
are they thoughts? Somehow the rubric of ‘thought’ in the sense of ‘propositions 
46 The interpretation of zoopoems becomes a more difficult undertaking if poems are conceived of as 
thoughts or thought scripts, since first the poet’s voice needs to be positioned before readers can turn 
their attention to the anymal. An example of this can be found in Brett C. Millier’s biography of 
Elizabeth Bishop, in which he writes the following of “The Fish”: “details about the speaker who 
is examining the fish are as important as those of the fish itself” (154). The poem certainly does not 
clarify why details about the speaker are as important as those of the fish itself. “The Fish” is a poem 
of 76 lines in which an ‘I’ is mentioned only seven times and whose undivided attention is aimed at 



































































95belonging to a mind’ no longer seems to capture what goes on in the reader. 
John criticises the idea that thought ownership is essential to a poem in her 
reflection on Elizabeth Bishop’s poem “At the Fishhouses”: 
It seems that poetry offers experience of thought that has an intimate pres-
ence, but that nonetheless lacks some of the markers of one’s own thought. 
Irregular progression of a train of thought, thinking the answer to a ques-
tion I did not formulate, moving to a new thought without effort or choice 
– these all seem familiar to me as a reader of poetry. In such experiences my 
thinking may be, in its content, well directed by the poem, yet it seems not 
to be (or not yet) fully my thought. (“Poetry and Directions” 463)
John claims that even though the lines in a poem are read by me, they are not 
my thoughts. In this connection, she writes about the “derailment of thought” 
and formulates the phenomenology of reading a poem as follows: “it seems 
that behind-the-scenes absorption, storage, decomposition, reinforcement, 
and structuring are all at work in thought-processes, but cannot all be claimed 
as “one’s own thinking”” (465). Nor, John expands, does the poem itself assume 
“control or closure of the thinking it initiates in various ways” (“Poetry and 
Directions” 464). 
If John is right, three points follow. Firstly, poems are not merely thoughts 
and therefore cannot be seen as thought scripts. Secondly, insofar as they are 
thoughts, poems are not necessarily my thoughts when I am thinking them 
(indeed, one might ask more generally: what does it mean for a thought to 
be one’s own?). Thirdly, insofar as they are thoughts, poems are controlled by 
neither me, the poet, nor the poem. In the quotation above, John refers to the 
function of questions: whilst reading a poem I can be looking for an answer to 
a question asked in the poem. For John, such questions would neither belong 
to someone nor solely tell us something about someone’s mind. In the case of 
“The Hedgehog”, the disguised question rises out of a relationship between 
hedgehog and human, much like the questions in “The Well-Known Masonry 
Nests”, which have to do with the relationship between human and swal-
low. Maybe this – that the questions rise out of a relationship – applies less to 
Bishop’s questions and even less to those posed by Lawrence. Indeed, in Law-
rence’s poems the questions serve only to highlight the human mind and his 
reverence for the anymal as a way out of despair. As such, they bear markers of 
the speaker’s own thought. The questions and simile hesitation in Herzberg’s 
and Gerhardt’s poems, by contrast, do not direct our attention to a mind or 
thought. Rather, these questions are found in the relationships that we already 





























96 Here, the openness occasioned by questions and hesitations forms a space in 




































































3.3  Commingling words: 
Wholeness
I n the previous section, we have seen that poets such as Bishop and Lawrence approach the anymal as a whole, but need to mystify the anymal in order to do so. The new attitude towards anymals, which set in at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, might represent a different way of evaluating anymals, 
in that it considers them “a way out of despair” (Atkins 267). Nonetheless, it 
again turns them into something other than themselves. One important differ-
ence between Bishop and Lawrence on the one hand and Herzberg and Murray 
as we saw in his poem “Pigs” on the other is that the former two poets con-
sider anymals to be unknowable. Doing away with mystification implies that 
anymals are knowable. Not in the sense that we can approach them behaviour-
istically as if they were (simple) machines, stripped of all riddles, but knowable 
in that we can understand them as someone – a living being – rather than as 
something. To regard an anymal from this perspective asks that we leave Car-
tesian dualism behind and not interpret all human behaviour as inherently 
meaningful and be puzzled when this default attitude fails.47 My claim is that 
we can observe anymals’ subjective experiences, at least in part.
Wholeness does not only mean that which has not been dissected into parts 
(Uexküll, recall, holds that we often see as anymals in terms of their parts). 
47 When someone yells at someone else, for instance, we take that behaviour to mean something (anger 
aimed at the other person, perhaps, or despair occasioned by the other person). If it appears that 
the other person has nothing to do with the screamer then we are puzzled until the behaviour is 
explained (through mental illness for instance). In his philosophy of moral responsibility, Peter 
Strawson introduces the term “reactive attitude” for our default emotional reaction towards people. 
In special cases, in which this default attitude is unable to explain behaviour, we take up an “objective 
attitude” (Strawson). In these cases, we see behaviour as something that happens to someone rather 
than as purposefully acted out. For anymals it seems to be the other way around: their behaviour 
tends to be evaluated from an objective attitude and be labeled as “happenings”, unless it is impos-
sible to explain the behaviour in any other way than as intended.
98 It is also opposed to a Cartesian definition of the mind as detached from the 
body. Leaving this Cartesian distinction behind is easier said than done, as we 
have already learned from Daniel Dennett’s remark about being haunted by 
the terminology that comes with it (Consciousness 107). The philosopher John 
Haugeland spells out what such undertaking would mean: 
[T]he Cartesian separation … is still so pervasive as to be almost invisible. In 
particular, interrelationist accounts retain a principled distinction between 
the mental and the corporeal – a distinction that is reflected in contrasts 
like semantics versus syntax, the space of reasons versus the space of causes, 
or the intentional versus the physical. (Notice that each of these contrasts 
can be heard either as higher versus lower “level” or as inner versus outer 
“sphere”). (“Mind” 233)
Maybe Descartes is not the only one to blame for all of these divisions in our 
thinking, but the compartmental thinking that rests on this mind-body 
dualism has had far-reaching consequences in many fields. Note here that 
Haugeland’s view resembles Dennett’s critique of the unknowability of any-
mal minds, which stresses how the erroneous assumption that the mind is 
separate from the body “haunts us” (chapter 1). Haugeland, however, takes the 
ultimate consequences of abandoning dualism into consideration. Whereas 
Dennett still spoke derogatively about Elizabeth Marshall’s “poetry”, Hauge-
land understands that we need to revise other binaries as well. Giving up the 
idea that the mind is separable from the body asks that we re-evaluate the 
words that we use to honour the wholeness of psycho-physical subjects. 
Indeed, when we read the work of researchers who try to break down 
one or more divisions, we can see the need for new terminology, not only to 
describe our body and mind, but also to transform our all too cerebral ideas 
about meaning. Uexküll, for instance, initially coined the term Umwelt to 
indicate the different perspectives that creatures have on their environment 
and stress that the concept of ‘perspectives’ is not to be understood as another 
word for secluded minds; the environment is part of the Umwelt, in the sense 
that the environment bears meaning. As I mentioned in the introduction to 
this chapter, Merleau-Ponty uses the term ‘body-subject’ to go beyond Carte-
sian dualism. Following in the wake of Merleau-Ponty’s work, biosemioticians 
emphasise that meaning is a natural phenomenon. Jesper Hoffmeyer, for 
instance, writes that there is “nothing mysterious about the phenomenal 
world, for it is deeply embedded in bodily semiotics” (89). To grasp the lack of 
fundamental distinctions between mind, body, and world, Haugeland intro-



























































































The contrary of this separation … is something I would like to call the inti-
macy of the mind’s embodiment and embeddedness in the world. The term 
‘intimacy’ is meant to suggest more than just necessary interrelation or 
interdependence but a kind of commingling or integralness of mind, body and 
world – that is to undermine their very distinctness. (Having Thought 208)
At first sight, presenting anymals as themselves instead of symbolically anthro-
pomorphised beings would seem to be a different undertaking than that of 
solving the philosophical or biological problems of dualism and behaviourism. 
Still, the dictum of presenting anymals “as themselves” implies a search for 
wholeness, which is the underlying pursuit. In this sense poetry and philoso-
phy are not very different. This can be seen in the “commingling words” used 
by poets. I borrow this expression from John Haugeland, because it hints at all 
the de-binarisation that is going on in poetry: sometimes these commingling 
words capture the ways in which a mind and body coincide, at other moments 
they figure a merging of mind, body, and environment.48 In many poems we 
can find words that show anymals as lived bodies and meaning carriers, who 
are entwined with humans or their environment. In the following poem by 
John Updike, which uses almost everyday language to describe the death of a 
puppy, there is a clear moment at which the dog is presented as a psychophysi-
cal whole: 
Dog’s Death
She must have been kicked unseen or brushed by a car.  
Too young to know much, she was beginning to learn
To use the newspapers spread on the kitchen floor
And to win, wetting there, the words, “Good dog! Good dog!”
 (51, ll. 1-4)
The family try to play with the dog, unaware of the internal bleeding caused by 
a car or kick. The next morning they find her “twisted and limp but still alive” 
“beneath the youngest’s bed”. Although they immediately take her to the vet, 
it is too late:
48 In Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Val Plumwood relates patriarchic thinking in anymal stories to 
Cartesian dualism.
100 In the car to the vet’s, on my lap, she tried
To bite my hand and died. I stroked her warm fur
And my wife called in a voice imperious with tears.
Though surrounded by love that would have upheld her, 
Nevertheless she sank and, stiffening, disappeared.
Back home, we found that in the night her frame,
Drawing near to dissolution, had endured the shame
Of diarrhoea and had dragged across the floor
To a newspaper carelessly left there. Good dog. 
(51-52, ll. 11-19)
The poem moves us through the modest and candid style in which the sad acci-
dent is recounted. This style might lead us to overlook an important moment 
in the poem, at which outside and inside, subjective feeling and the objective 
world, are commingled. It is in the simple word “win” in combination with 
“words” in line 4 that we can feel body and mind entwined. Normally, one 
would say that winning something objectively describes the outcome of a 
game or contest. In this poem, however, the dog wins the words “good dog!” 
Although “win” is taken out of its usual competitive context, it is accurate 
because we imagine the dog’s world through this kind of winning; the word 
evokes the image of a puppy, who enthusiastically receives the words ‘good 
dog’, wagging her tail or whole body as puppies do. Since the words “win” and 
“words” are not commonly combined, as readers we are asked to do more than 
we usually might; although the connotations ‘to win’ might lead our reading 
in one direction, we have to realise that for the dog “words” are something that 
can be won. This realisation is touching because the instant in which we com-
bine the words spawns the image of the puppy. Humans may be unfamiliar 
with the experience of winning words, but the speaker describes what happens 
to the dog in those terms without shifting perspectives. It would appear, then, 
that the dog’s experience is visible. That is to say that the reader sees something 
in the behaviour of the dog that is best described as “to win words”. 
In line with one of the aims of zoopoetry, we can read commingling words 
as a test: when the combination of the words makes the reader envision the dog 
more vividly, it must be a good description of what the poet ‘saw’. Anthropo-
morphisms do the opposite: they divert the reader’s attention and the living 
anymal is lost from view. Poets who commingle words use what would be 
called “the direct perception argument” in philosophy. This argument sup-



































































101of body and mind. To proponents of this argument, the ‘direct’ in “direct per-
ception argument” refers to the conviction that we do not infer a mind from 
behaviour. Instead, the fact that mind and body are one means that we see lived, 
intentional, and minded bodies. The philosopher John Searle starts defending 
this position by describing a common daily experience: his dog greeting him 
upon returning from work:
I get home from work and Ludwig rushes out to meet me. He jumps up and 
down and wags his tail. I am certain that (a) he is conscious; (b) he is aware of 
my presence (intentionality); and (c) that awareness produces in him a state 
of pleasure (thought process). How could anyone deny either a, b or c? (207)
For Searle, it would be impossible to consider his dog mindless. Were we to do 
so then we, with Descartes, would perhaps feel more secure in calling anymals 
machines and thus deem our the emotions that we supposedly attribute to any-
mals a pathetic fallacy. The other route, taken by Searle himself, is expressed 
in Updike’s poem. It is as if Updike is saying that what is going on here, when 
looking at the pup, is best described as ‘winning words’. How can anyone call 
this directly perceived emotion into question? Any other description would be 
less accurate. 
Arguably, “the shame of diarrhoea” in line 18 is another moment at which 
we can see the puppy’s subjective experience in the poem. There is a difference, 
however, in ascribing “shame” and the urge to “win” to the puppy. In contrast 
to ‘winning’, “shame” cannot be seen exclusively from a third-person perspec-
tive. Updike uses the phrase “to win” in a way that turns an objective word into 
a feeling, through which it becomes an apt example of a commingling word. 
Whereas we can remain in the sceptical mode with regard to the “shame” men-
tioned in line 18, asking whether Updike is anthropomorphising the dog, with 
the ‘winning’ we cannot. 
These in-between or commingling words are often present in zoopoems. 
Elizabeth Bishop uses the tool halfway through “The Fish”:
While his gills were breathing in 
the terrible oxygen 
—the frightening gills, 
fresh and crisp with blood, 
that can cut so badly— 
I thought of the coarse white flesh 
packed in like feathers, 
























102 the dramatic reds and blacks 
of his shiny entrails, 
and the pink swim-bladder 
like a big peony.
(42, ll. 22-33)
This part of “The Fish” seems to be full of shifts in perspective. With each adjec-
tive we might ask: “who is experiencing what”? The oxygen mentioned in line 
23, for instance, is terrible for the fish. We know this, but presenting it here in the 
poem as a perspectiveless fact, like the ‘winning’ in Updike’s poem, unsettles 
our thinking. In these lines, Bishop first describes the oxygen as “terrible” and 
then the gills as “frightening” because they can “cut so badly”. It might seem 
that the perspective is shifted, starting from the fish before moving back to the 
speaker. The power of the poem, however, partly lies in the fact that Bishop 
can call the oxygen terrible whilst the speaker stays human. The speaker, for a 
moment, experiences the oxygen as terrible in a flash of feeling fish-like. The 
effect on the reader is that we see the fish gasping for respirable oxygen. We do 
not need a shift in perspectives to read all the adjectives in the right way; we 
only need to imagine what they entail in minute detail. 
Bishop lets our thinking shift slightly by referring to “terrible oxygen”. This 
does not really stretch our imagination because we know that the fish is suffo-
cating and familiar with the feeling of being out of breath. The commingling 
word “terrible” describes the fish’s Umwelt, but this is not to be understood as 
a closed-off world. In this way, it is not only the fish and the environment that 




































































3.4  Rhythm and metaphor: 
Growth 
Rhythmic gRowth
L et me get back to Eileen John’s remark that poems are not merely thoughts. She concludes her article with stating that a poem is some-how intimately related to thought, but that it “cannot simply become 
thought; it will often offer more than can be thought” (“Poetry and Directions” 
468). To explain what happens when reading a poem, John uses Samuel Tay-
lor Coleridge’s image of growth. Coleridge refers to poems as organic wholes, 
growing like plants (qtd. in “Poetry and Directions” 465). John’s comments on 
liminality in relation to this image are telling, because they hint at a merging 
of nature and text, especially when she argues that it is difficult to distinguish 
metaphor from literal language (“Poetry and Directions” 460). Understanding 
poems as plants (evident in Coleridge and echoed by John’s descriptions) fits 
into a wider image of poetry as biology, a theme to which I return in section 
4.3.2.
John’s biological explanation of poetry makes us see how poetry appeals to 
us not only as a thought script, offering thoughts that we can entertain as our 
own, but also because it invites us to participate in a process that resembles life. 
She reflects on what happens when she reads Bishop’s famous line “[i]t is like 
what we imagine knowledge to be” from “At the Fishhouses”: “I feel that I can 
think it, am thinking it, but I am not sure how or why I got there” (“Poetry and 
Directions” 467).49 John describes the feeling of growth that took hold of her 
after reading the poem as “the sense that my resources have been used, even 
if I have not controlled how they have been used”. John uses the experience 
of Bishop’s poem as an example of what she calls a “derailment of thought”. 
She suggests that this is caused partly by experiencing feeling rather than think-
ing in a poem and partly by a sensation of surrender effected by “metaphor or 
104 other means” (468, 463, 464). Indeed, metaphor is a central tool in poetry. In 
zoopoetry it plays a specific role in the derailment of thought, showing that 
our imagination is not restricted to the resources of our own minds (as Nagel 
thought). I address metaphor in the next section on ‘growth’; in this section I 
examine the effect of rhythm. 
Parallel to John’s line of thought, we could call rhythm – the cadence of 
sound – a “derailment of feeling”. We can undergo this derailment by reading 
“Other People’s Dog” by Joke van Leeuwen:
Other People’s Dog
I did not walk the dog,
the dog instead walked me.
Look, he said, look, this is what you do:
you sniff a bit, you then crawl 
under bushes, you do there what you  
need to do. You wag your tail – 
no you’re not able to – go after 
what has wings, you roll over to your
one side, your other side, your one side,
your mouth lets through the wind, you search  
in words for scent, at borders 
for strange wet, hear loud shouting 
of crowds of humans as if they bay,
pick up only your name
and Lie and Down and Stay. (18)50
49 With the line from “At the Fishhouses” “It is like what we imagine knowledge to be”, the poem shifts 
from the sensory experience of tasting and feeling the seawater surrounding the fishhouses to the 
abstract theme of knowledge. The sensory atmosphere of the beginning of the poem is continued in 
the characterisation of knowledge. Apparently, we imagine knowledge to be:
 dark, salt, clear, moving, utterly free, 
 drawn from the cold hard mouth 
 of the world, derived from the rocky breasts 
 forever, flowing and drawn, and since 
 our knowledge is historical, flowing, and flown (66, ll. 79-83). 
 
 See for an evaluation of this line: John (“Poetry and Directions” 466). John also refers to Stevenson’s 
discussion of Bishop’s geographical poems, that they “begin in a low-keyed deictic mood, pointing 
at this and that. They go on so long, pointing and looking so intently that, by the end, some more 



























































































Most lines of the poem are written in iambic tetrameter, which is an apt rhythm 
for a stroll because the iamb bounce keeps pace with our heartbeats. Yet after 
the first two lines the metre breaks up through a dactyl when the dog takes the 
lead (“Look, he said, look”), before returning to iambic tetrameter. The met-
rical foot is loosened in lines 4 and 5 (“you sniff a bit, you then crawl/ under 
bushes”). As a result of this, the rhythm of the iambic metre loses its lulling 
effect. When reading the poem out loud, one notices that sentences falter. This 
gives the rhythm a certain abruptness, which conceivably mirrors a dog’s way 
of walking whilst sniffing and raising its nose to the air. Hence, the poem starts 
off with a human perspective on a stroll, written in a regular tetrameter, before 
being interrupted by the dog with a firm dactyl that is followed by a doglike 
iambic metre, which almost runs over the lines and is written from the dog’s 
perspective. 
The title of the poem is reflected in the first lines: “I did not walk the dog / 
the dog instead walked me”. The dog knows that the speaker is inexperienced 
in walking dogs. Van Leeuwen does not hesitate to shift perspectives immedi-
ately and lets the dog not only teach the walker to walk a dog, but also to walk 
like a dog. In addition to the irregularities in the metre, which mimic the dog’s 
walk, Van Leeuwen uses repetition (“you roll over to your / one side, your other 
side, your one side”) to evoke the dog’s rolling over. The enjambment after 
“your” mimics the moment before toppling over to “your one side”. Thanks 
to the repetition we can easily envision the dog’s rolling over to his one side, 
his other side, and back again. Still, we do more than envision the dog’s rolling 
when we read the line. More than just seeing an image, the repetition invokes 
in the reader a feeling of rolling over. In a manner reminiscent of John’s derail-
ment of thought, we might rightfully ask to whom this feeling belongs. The 
rhythm literally resituates us, such that we might again have cause to wonder 
50 Ik ging niet wandelen met de hond,
 de hond ging wandelen met mij.
 Kijk, zei hij, kijk, zo doe je dat:
 je snuffelt wat, je kruipt eens
 onder groen, je doet daar wat je   
 daar moet doen, je kwispelt -
 nee dat kun je niet - loopt achterna
 wat vleugels heeft, je rolt je op je
 ene zij, je andere zij, je ene zij,
 je mond staat op de tocht, je zoekt  
 in woorden naar een geur, bij grenzen
 naar vreemd vocht, hoort woest geroep
 van groepen mens als blaffen aan,
 verstaat alleen je naam
 en Lig en Koest en Af. (18, ll. 1-15)
106 “how did I get here?” We might even experience a physical feeling of move-
ment and being moved, but are unsure whether we can call this feeling our 
own. Were I asked to reflect on the line, I would not probably describe what 
happens using words, but mimic the dog’s movements. With John’s remarks in 
mind, I would be inclined to say that my rhythmic resources have been used, 
even if I have not controlled how they have been used.51 Here, I use the idea 
of growth to indicate that my rhythmic participation in a dog’s movement 
extends my (bodily) imagination: before reading the poem I had not had the 
experience of rolling over like a dog, but now I have. This makes the question 
to whom the rolling movement actually belongs more intricate but also redun-
dant: it is a shared movement without a specific owner. 
Reflecting on the intimate connection between body and rhythm, the liter-
ary theorist Jonathan Culler writes that rhythm “gives lyric a somatic quality 
that novels and other extended forms lack” (138). Here I am less interested in 
the fact that novels lack this quality than in this somatic quality’s effect. Indeed, 
rhythm’s bodily dimension brings us to realise that poetry is much less about 
interpretation and seeking for wordily meaning. For Culler, rhythm steers us 
away from questions pertaining to content, such as “what the poem is about”, 
and draws us into the experience of the poem (165). 
Some metres, Culler shows, are especially suited to diverting attention from 
the question “Who is speaking?” – a standard question often posed when begin-
ning to reflect on a poem. Four-stress metres as in a sentence such as “Jack and 
Jill went up the hill”, for instance, do not cause us to wonder about the identity 
of the speaker telling us about Jack and Jill’s whereabouts, because the rhythm 
‘feels’ descriptive. A four-stressed metre is therefore apt to present nonhuman 
others descriptively, as in the first line of William Blake’s “The Tyger”: “Tyger 
Tyger burning bright / in the forests of the night” (lines 1,2). Again, when read-
ing these lines, it is not likely that the first question to come to our minds will 
concern the speaker’s identity, and this, according to Culler, is especially due 
to the rhythm. In contrast, a five-stressed metre, like iambic pentameter, does 
lead us to wonder about who is speaking. This is because iambic pentameter 
51 It is important that I address a potential sceptical counter my ponderings here, which would suggest 
that my participation in a feeling of rolling back and forth should be regarded as fake participation, 
since humans simply are not dogs. I would respond by pointing out that Elisabetta Palagi and her 
collaborators have discovered that for my mirror neurons to fire it is far more important that you and 
I share an emotional affinity than belong to the same species. Palagi and her team tested this hypoth-
esis by researching why and when yawns are contagious. Palagi’s research queries the necessity of 
species membership or even being alike for mirror neurons to function (Palagi). In their research after 
contagious yawning in dogs Romero et al. found that dogs are more prone to ‘catch’ their owner’s 



































































107enacts a rhythm that stays close to the tempo and intonation of a human voice, 
according to Culler.52
We might recognise this transition from a human to a nonhuman voice in 
the first lines in Van Leeuwen’s “Other People’s Dog”. As I wrote earlier, these 
lines are written from a human perspective in iambic metre, which is then 
interrupted by a dactyl upon which the dog’s perspective takes over (“Look, he 
said”). In line with Culler’s theory, this shift in rhythm is not a coincidence, for 
it creates room for the other-than-human voice. In lines 12 and 13 Van Leeuwen 
also uses vocal effects to elude the human voice. In the translation, the rhyth-
mic assonance of the diphthong “ou” (which in the original is the digraph ‘oe’) 
mimics the sound of baying but merges with that of humans having an argu-
ment. These lines also contain a break in the iambic metre. It is an example of 
what Van Leeuwen achieves in this poem: the reader hears humans bay/argue 
from a dog’s perspective. 
Moving like a dog and hearing what a dog hears when humans argue, are, 
I think, outcomes of what Culler calls the paradox of lyric: “the more a poem 
foregrounds vocal effects, … the more powerful the image of voicing, oral artic-
ulation, but the less we find ourselves dealing with the voice of a person” (176). 
Culler formulates the paradox of lyric poetry in general terms. For zoopoetry 
in particular, though, the paradox has considerable explanatory power. Con-
sider, for instance, the zoopoems written by Les Murray in Translations from the 
Natural World, in which animals have a voice (as we saw in “Pigs” in chapter 2 of 
this study). These poems are not written in iambic metre. In most of them, the 
stress lies instead on the first syllable of each line, which draws us away from 
the lulling effect of the familiar iamb, which resembles a human voice.53 
The same phenomenon – let us call it ‘rhythmic growth’ – can be recognised 
in Ted Hughes’ zoopoems. Michael Malay addresses this carefully, explaining 
how in Hughes’ zoopoems rhythm relates us to other-than-human energies: 
One way the poems do this … is through rhythm: the poems tune themselves 
to nature’s sounds – the drumming of the rain, or the hunched-up running 
of the jaguar – through their intricate manipulations of cadence. Doing so, 
they may be said to load language with more-than-human energies thus 
52 Culler does not address differences in languages; does the iamb specifically pairs with Germanic lan-
guages in which the verb comes second? 
53 It is also worth noting that Murray’s poems in iambic metre are often written from a first-person per-
spective. See, for instance, “Migratory”, “Spermaceti”, “Puss”, and “Echidna” from Translations from the 
Natural World. In these poems, the iambs draw us into an individual person’s voice, even though the 
























108 bypassing modes of thought that would hold animal life at a conceptual 
distance. (103)
Following up on Elisabeth Costello’s praise of Hughes’ “The Jaguar”, especially 
the way it steers clear from any conceptual appropriation, Malay discusses “The 
Jaguar” and another of Hughes’ poems, “Second Glance at a Jaguar”, in detail. 
In Malay’s view, “The Jaguar” is still written from within a human framework, 
but “Second Glance at a Jaguar” overcomes the problem of anthropomorphism 
entirely in that the poem attunes itself to nature’s sounds (103). By contrast, in 
“The Jaguar”
Hughes’s speaker comes to the zoo with a longing for authentic contact, 
and, disappointed by the yawning ape and the sleeping tiger he sees earlier 
in the poem, fastens onto the jaguar as an example of uninhibited life. This 
determined search for wildness, however, reveals more about Hughes’s 
speaker (his boredom, and his need to transcend it) than it does about the 
jaguar itself. (Malay 124) 
And further on Malay even states that the poem “taps into the speaker’s own 
desire for freedom” (126). With the speaker’s projections coming into play, the 
jaguar himself is now two steps away from the poem’s attention. In seeking to 
establish the cause of this projective identification, Malay points to the images 
in the poem that have more to do with modern society than a jaguar, of which 
the final image of the jaguar being a visionary is the most anthropomorphic. 
He also highlights how the speaker sets off in search of uninhibited life in a 
(man-made) zoo. Malay implicitly refers to the effect of rhythm when he judges 
“Second Glance at a Jaguar” to be a more apposite example of an encounter 
with an unappropriated wild anymal. Indeed, he says that in this poem Hughes 
“allows the animal to shape the cadences of language” and discusses the asso-
nances and repetitions of word and sound in the stanzas that enable this. 
In my view, it is less the all-too-human images than the rhythm that sets 
off our anthropomorphism alarm when reading “The Jaguar”. “Second Glance 
at a Jaguar” is more attuned to the anymal itself not because it contains less 
human imagery. Indeed, in this poem Hughes uses “gangster”, “club tail”, 
“black jack tail” – images that are every bit as anthropomorphic as that of the 
visionary in “The Jaguar”. Instead, anthropomorphism comes to the fore in 
“The Jaguar” because it is written in a rough iambic metre, whereas “Second 
Glance at a Jaguar” is not. With Culler’s remark about the iamb approximating 



































































109does not overcome a human framework simply by noting that rhythm leaves 
too little space for nonhuman energies. 
Growth, here, means that through the poems the reader becomes able to 
walk “flank to flank” with the anymal, as Costello/Coetzee phrases it (114). The 
poem’s rhythm somehow expands my bodily imagination. In my view, walking 
with the anymal shows that anthropomorphism depends, at least in part, on 
questionable presuppositions. This also becomes apparent in Malay’s discus-
sion. After his impressive treatment of the jaguar poems, in which he considers 
the possibility that poetry might “load language with more-than-human ener-
gies”, Malay suddenly falls back into the binaries of anymal versus human, 
body versus mind, and rhythm versus language: 
Of course, as with any poem about any animal, Hughes cannot escape 
the prism of language. The jaguar is necessarily described within an all-
too-human framework and thus tangled up with human concerns and 
projections. (127)
Apparently, “loading language with more than human energies” was only 
meant for bodily energies. The jaguar is set at a distance again. This is not 
because of his ‘otherness’, as Malay suggests a few sentences earlier, but 
because of Malay’s erroneous idea that rhythm only induces bodily engage-
ment, whereas ‘meaning’ and a ‘cognitive engagement’ with the jaguar stay 
out of reach. Here again, Haugeland’s remark about the pervasiveness of Car-
tesian dualism pertains (“Mind” 233). A poem that makes room for more than 
only human energies would have to make room for anymals as body subjects, 
questioning the simple anthropomorphic/zoomorphic distinction. Perhaps 
Hughes’ own reflection on zoopoetry gives us the words with which these bina-
ries can be overcome:
How can a poem … be like an animal? Well, perhaps it cannot look like a 
giraffe or an emu or an octopus … It is better to call it an assembly of living 
parts moved by a single spirit. The living parts are the words, the images, 
the rhythms. The spirit is the life which inhabits them when they all work 
together. … So, as a poet, you have to make sure that all those parts over 
which you have control, the words and rhythms and images, are alive. 
(Handbook 17)
Creating life in a poem involves fine-tuning all of its aspects: rhythm, rhyme, 
and images. It is this extended metaphor of a poem as an anymal, much like 
























110 nonhuman others have such a close relationship on a deep level. Zoopoetry 
necessarily treats anymals as body subjects; if that were otherwise, neither 
the zoopoem nor the anymal who inhabits it would come alive. In chapter 4, I 
explore how metaphor, as used by Hughes here, is more than ‘just’ a poetic tool.
metaphoRic gRowth: metaphoRs veRsus matching
3.4.1  Introduction
M etaphors are preeminent poetic tools. One of the first tropes for which we would probably reach in characterising poetry is meta-phor. In zoopoems they play an even more important role, because 
they convey a feeling of growth, as does rhythm. They swiftly lead us to see 
what we have not seen before. Moreover, in this section I argue that they can 
even give us an inkling of what it is like for someone to be that someone – even 
when the someone in question belongs to another species.
In this way, the tool of metaphor taps directly into the empathy debate, 
which brings us back to the distinctions and presuppositions discussed in 
chapter 1. In that chapter I distinguished between three presuppositions that 
beset existing thought on anymal minds. As a zoopoetical tool, metaphor 
refutes the third of these tenets, which holds that the gap between encapsu-
lated selves can “only [be] credibly crossed when the other selves in question 
are similar to me”. This assumption is quite common and generally accepted. 
How often do we use the phrase “you don’t know something unless you have 
experienced it yourself” to mark the limits of our imagination in everyday 
situations? This presupposition is not relegated to everyday life; the educated 
view also assumes that empathy is impossible without significant similarities 
between the empathiser and the target of their empathy. So much is clear in 
Amy Coplan’s remark that “the more unlike the target we are, the more dif-
ficult it is to reconstruct her subjective experiences” (“Understanding” 13) and 
Thomas Nagel’s assumption that one needs to be “sufficiently similar … to 
adopt his point of view” (442). 
In this section I question the extent to which similarity is a prerequisite for 
empathy not by engaging with the empathy debate, but by turning to the pro-
cess of metaphor instead. Even though metaphor and empathy may not seem 
an obvious pair, I argue that in fact metaphorical and empathetic processes are 
much alike. They resemble one another, most notably, in that they instigate 
changes of perspective and face some of the same pitfalls. To develop this line 



































































111feature of metaphors. Furthermore, I discuss Marco Caracciolo’s specific class 
of what he calls “phenomenological metaphors”, which he suggests not only 
bring about a change in perspective but even capture the “what it is like” for 
someone to be that someone. In this way, a phenomenological metaphor can 
establish empathy – even if the target of one’s empathy does not resemble me 
(“Phenomenological Metaphors” 73). 
As I have said, it is often assumed that the possibility of empathy and one’s 
perspective being changed relies on similarities between the object and source. 
Looking beyond the empathy debate, however, the metaphor debate calls into 
question whether such similarities really are a precondition in this respect. 
What is at stake in this discussion is whether metaphors either reveal or create 
similarities. I argue that we need to ask the same question in empathy stud-
ies: the question, that is, of whether we create similarities when we empathise 
rather than assuming that our empathy is based on pre-existing resemblances. 
The structure of this section is as follows. Firstly, I discuss a metaphor 
in Bishop’s poem “Sandpiper”. Secondly, I show how this metaphor induces 
a change of perspective and in that way bears similarities to the process of 
empathy. I then show, via a different route, how metaphorical and empathetic 
processes are similar with regard to the pitfalls they encounter, specifically 
concerning ‘projection’ and ‘selfishness’. Thirdly, I turn to the work of Gerard 
Steen and Marco Caracciolo and discuss a metaphor in Les Murray’s poem 
“Yard Horse” in light of their claim that the process of metaphor has the same 
effect as the process of empathy. Describing empathy as a metaphorical process 
prepares us for the second part of this section, which critically discusses the 
idea that the empathiser and target of their empathy need to match. 
By discussing these poems, I further explore the extent to which metaphors 
other than phenomenological metaphors can capture the “what it is like” for 
someone to be that someone. The underlying question here is whether the 
“what it is like” – in other words, ‘raw feeling’ or ‘subjective experience’ – is pri-
vate and ineffable, as the preposition described above suggests. Furthermore, 
through a discussion of metaphors and similes in Les Murray’s “Yard Horse” I 
gauge how we might change our perspective without being similar. 
In metaphor studies there are roughly two ways of understanding the 
working of metaphor. One is proposed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, 
who understand metaphor as an omnipresent tool in our language and culture. 
It can ultimately be traced back, they suggest, to the way in which we experi-
ence our bodies. These factors determine the “metaphors we live by” (to quote 
Lakoff and Johnson’s title). Such a view of metaphor can be paired with the idea 
that similarity is a prerequisite for empathy. On this view, metaphors are pre-
























112 do not bear any similarity to the target of our empathy, then empathy has no 
chance). The other understanding of metaphor is that metaphors do not reveal 
what is already given, but extend our categories and shape new meanings and 
feelings. This view on metaphor comes close to Elizabeth Costello’s conviction 
that there are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination, which reflects the 
theme of growth. Metaphors in zoopoetry are best evaluated through this sec-
ond grasp of metaphor. Ultimately, I think that we do not empathise because 
of given similarities (whether they be present in nature or agreed upon in cul-
ture); instead, we create similarities because we empathise. 
3.4.2  Looking through the eyes of Bishop’s sandpiper 
B efore I discuss these two views on metaphor in more depth, in this section I show how metaphor can induce a perspective shift in a man-ner comparable to the process of empathy. A metaphor in Elizabeth 
Bishop’s poem “Sandpiper” illustrates such a perspective shift. Yet, as I will 
describe shortly, Bishop is herself cautious about using metaphors. This hesita-
tion, which we can sense in “Sandpiper”, concerns the pitfall of projection and 
not keeping a respectful distance from the anymal.
In her poems, Bishop often refers to anymals as creatures whose experi-
ential lives are inaccessible to humans. Their ‘otherworldliness’ inhibits our 
attempts to enter their minds.54 In her poem “Sandpiper”, however, there is a 
perspective shift. This occurs in the first four stanzas, as we are looking at the 
sandpiper, and then the final line, which we suddenly see through the sandpi-
per’s eyes. To achieve this effect, Bishop uses a metaphor in the first stanza, in 
which she characterises the sandpiper as “a student of Blake”. As I will show 
shortly, this metaphor gives rise to a set of questions and reflections.
Sandpiper 
The roaring alongside he takes for granted,
and that every so often the world is bound to shake.
He runs, he runs to the south, finical, awkward,
in a state of controlled panic, a student of Blake. 
(131, ll. 1-4)



































































113With this metaphor, Bishop playfully alludes to the Romantic poet William 
Blake’s poem “Auguries of Innocence”, which begins with the line that has 
made the poem famous: “To see a world in a grain of sand” (line 1). This line 
could be read as an instruction to the reader, making “Auguries of Innocence” 
an example of didactic poetry.55 Although humans do not usually see worlds 
in grains of sand, the poet suggests that they should make an effort to do so. To 
better grasp the meaning of this first line, we need to read the following lines 
in which Blake urges humans to understand that “small cruelties” eventually 
cause “big disasters”:
A robin redbreast in a cage 
puts all heaven in a rage 
a dove house fill’d with doves & pigeons 
shudders hell thr’ all its regions 
A dog starv’d at his master’s gate 
predicts the ruin of the State
(ll. 5-10) 
Small cruelties befall a series of home-and-garden anymals – a robin, doves 
and pigeons, and a dog. They suffer, but their suffering is not the subject of 
the poem. Blake’s real focus lies on what these small cruelties predict, namely 
‘big’, unfortunate events that involve humans. It is this discrepancy between 
the target of cruelty and its moral source that makes Bishop reluctant to use 
metaphors.
Bishop is uneasy about didacticism or moralism in poetry (One Art 596; 
Poems 861).56 Moreover, she had reservations about the Romantics, for their 
sentimentality obstructed an impersonal view of nature (Poems 685, 686). If we 
take her discomfort with didacticism and reservations about the Romantics 
together with her hesitation about metaphors as a poetic trope, it is tempting 
to read Bishop’s metaphor in “Sandpiper” as a way of jokingly putting Blake in 
his place. It is as if she is saying to Blake: “Here is your apt pupil! Seeing a world 
in a grain of sand means that you cast your eyes on the soil of the earth, not on 
a sentimental, apocalyptic picture of a state’s ruin”. However, reading the ref-
55 Cf. Grant. 
56 As I wrote in my bachelor thesis, Turning the Light-Switch Off, Bishop suggests that to improve poetry 
one should “cut the morals off – or out” (One Art 596). She dislikes Auden’s preachy tone (729) and 
didacticism in general, especially coming from Christians (Poems 861). She is very curious to hear what 
Lowell means when he calls her “moral” (Words in Air 82), probably because she fears that she has fallen 
























114 erence to Blake as nothing more than a joke would fail to take the metaphor’s 
other achievements into account. 
A first achievement is that the metaphor triggers many questions. It com-
pels us to think again about what Blake’s lines might mean and subsequently 
about Bishop’s intention in using the image. In Bishop’s metaphor, the sand-
piper is a true student of Blake. He is not used as a sign or image of the abstract 
concept of ‘innocence’. Of course, the word ‘innocence’ means, in addition to 
being without sin, not knowing or even naivety. It is exactly the presump-
tion that anymals are innocent that Bishop’s metaphor calls into question. 
Her sandpiper can actually do something that humans, perhaps, can only do 
with great difficulty: see a grain of sand without looking for a deeper meaning. 
Hence, the image of the sandpiper as a student of Blake confronts us with the 
following, related questions: What does Blake mean when he writes about see-
ing a world in a grain of sand? What world would we humans see? Would we 
immediately symbolise it into something more meaningful for us or can we see 
the grain of sand as a whole world in itself? Humans might struggle with the 
latter task, because we can hardly focus our attention on something so small 
and – in our eyes – so meaningless. When the grain of sand comes to our atten-
tion, we notice that we have been defeated by a sandpiper.
As a second achievement, and on a more abstract level, Bishop’s metaphor 
lets us rethink how we experience metaphors. It is difficult to read Blake’s 
line “to see a world in a grain of sand” in a non-metaphorical way, since we, as 
human readers, are trained to read poetry figuratively. Knowing this, Bishop 
uses the metaphor to question the very nature of metaphor. By calling the 
sandpiper a student of Blake, she invites us to direct our attention to the real 
world. Hence, this metaphorical process runs in the very opposite direction to 
that which Blake had in mind and indeed to that of metaphorical processes in 
general. According to the most basic explanation of metaphor, when we read 
or hear a metaphor we would normally look for abstract, shared characteristics 
between the target and the source. 57 When we process the phrase “you are a 
flower”, for instance, we immediately search for abstract characteristics that 
both the flower and you share so as to make sense of the metaphor (‘beautiful’ 
and ‘tender’, for example). Bishop, however, does not use this metaphor in this 
way. By calling the sandpiper a student of Blake, she inverts Blake’s image of 
someone trying to see a world in a grain of sand, such that the grain of sand is 
seen as an actual world in itself. Indeed, this forms the world of a sandpiper. To 
Bishop’s sandpiper, these grains are the world and Bishop urges the reader to 



































































115envision real grains of sand from his perspective. It is not only the metaphor 
that causes this shift in perspective; the hesitation in line 9 “– Watching, rather, 
the spaces of sand between them” also contributes to the effect:
The beach hisses like fat. On his left, a sheet 
of interrupting water comes and goes
and glazes over his dark and brittle feet.
He runs, he runs straight through it, watching his toes.
 
- Watching, rather, the spaces of sand between them,
where (no detail too small) the Atlantic drains 
rapidly backwards and downwards. As he runs,
he stares at the dragging grains.
 
The world is a mist. And then the world is
minute and vast and clear. The tide
is higher or lower. He couldn’t tell you which. 
His beak is focussed; he is preoccupied,
 
looking for something, something, something.
Poor bird, he is obsessed!
The millions of grains are black, white, tan, and gray,
mixed with quartz grains, rose and amethyst.
(131, ll. 5-16)
Rather than directing us towards an abstraction, Bishop draws us into a con-
crete world, even more concrete than that which we usually allow ourselves to 
see. This is why the final lines can be read as descriptions of what the sandpiper 
sees or, rather, its translation into human language: “The millions of grains are 
black, white, tan, and gray / mixed with quartz grains, rose and amethyst”. This 
final line shows that we have taken the opposite direction to that of Blake’s 
“heaven’s rage” and “ruin of the state”. Bishop alerts us to the hazards of using 
metaphors which highlight the target at the expense of the source. With the 
help of a meta-metaphor Bishop takes the first step towards a perspective 
change and by the final stanza we are – as far as we can be – in the sandpiper’s 
world. 
On first reading, we would probably doubt whether Bishop’s metaphor 
can perform such a shift. The processes of perspective shift, empathy, and 
metaphor, however, bear many resemblances. The relationship between meta-
























116 Marco Caracciolo, who study the role of metaphors in founding fully fledged 
empathy. Before I turn to especially Caracciolo’s work, however, I would like 
to dwell on the idea that the process of metaphor is comparable with that of 
empathy. Another way of demonstrating their resemblances, besides indicat-
ing what one metaphor can accomplish, is to pay attention to how both of these 
processes can be hindered. As Bishop has already shown, the source of a given 
metaphor (in Blake’s case the anymals) is at risk of being lost from sight. In 
terms of empathy we face the pitfall of what Coplan has termed “self-oriented 
perspective taking”, by which she means our learned way of trying to connect 
to others (“Understanding” 9). This boils down to me imagining myself in your 
situation as opposed to “other-oriented perspective taking”, which entails me 
imagining you in your situation (“Understanding” 10). Coming from different 
routes, both poets and theorists recognise this problem, which I address in the 
following paragraph. 
3.4.3  Two poets’ hesitations about anymal metaphors
F rom Bishop’s metaphor in “Sandpiper”, we learn that we tend to lose sight of the concrete world and risk losing the source domain. This, Bishop explains, is precisely why metaphors are scarce in her poetry. To 
make her point clear Bishop approvingly cites Edgar Allan Poe, who, in reflect-
ing on his work “The Raven”, explains that he uses metaphor only sparingly 
because they “dispose the mind to seek a moral in all that has been previously 
narrated” (qtd. in Poems 683). This is especially so when anymals are the source 
domain. Indeed, Bishop is very reluctant to use them in “false analogies” (685): 
It was perhaps consoling and popular to think that the animals were just 
like the citizenry, but how untrue, and one feels … how selfish. There are 
morals a’plenty in animal life, but they have to be studied out by devot-
edly and minutely observing the animal, not by regarding the deer as a man 
imprisoned in a “leathern coat” (Poems 686). 
The concern exhibited by Bishop’s sharp wording has to do with the loss of 
the source, which is in most cases the anymal. This quotation is lifted from her 
literary statement titled “As We Like It” – a reference to Shakespeare’s play, in 
which the character Jaques suggests that lords should actually wear the horns 
and skin of a killed deer. In her statement, the jargon of the empathy debate 
and that of metaphor studies intermingle. In the context of anymals, Bishop 



































































117Bishop’s observation can be substantiated by George Lakoff and Mark John-
son’s work on metaphor. In their seminal work Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff 
and Johnson state that the process of metaphor necessarily hides some aspects 
of the source in order to foreground the target (10). So, when I say: “You are a 
flower”, the target is “you” and aspects of the flower that do not serve to envi-
sion “you” are necessarily obscured. Lakoff and Johnson present this as a given. 
The target domain – as they call it – is highlighted at the expense of aspects of 
the source. In their aim to show that metaphors have power even beyond the 
margins of a text, Lakoff and Johnson stress that metaphors are not solely to be 
seen as a poetical trope but are fundamental to our thinking (3). They discuss 
examples of metaphors that we use on a daily basis. “ARGUMENT is WAR” 
and “TIME is MONEY” are the most famous of these examples, because they 
show that our thinking is thoroughly metaphorical: we spend time or win an 
argument without even considering these phrases metaphors (4). 
The idea that metaphors are taken for granted applies equally to poetry. In 
their study of poetic metaphor George Lakoff and Mark Turner explain that 
poets use metaphors in broadly the same way as people normally do, in that 
poets themselves lean on metaphors that have been culturally passed on and 
use them almost subconsciously:
there exist basic conceptual metaphors for understanding life and death 
that are part of our culture and that we routinely use to make sense of the 
poetry of our culture. We might have used any of these poems as an intro-
duction to these basic metaphors. We chose the Dickinson poem [“Afraid? 
Of Whom Am I Afraid?”] not to point out what is unusual about it but 
rather to introduce the range of common, unconscious, automatic basic 
metaphors which are part of our cultural knowledge and which allow us 
to communicate with each other, whether in ordinary conversation or in 
poetry. (15)
In relation to anymals, Lakoff and Turner argue that Western culture conveys 
the paradigm of “The Great Chain of Being”, according to which humans are 
endowed with “higher-order attributes and behavior (e.g. thought, character)” 
whereas anymals are attributed “instinctual attributes and behavior” (170). In 
Lakoff and Turner’s view, poets do not break with ‘barring convictions’ in an 
Uexküllian sense but simply reiterate them in their poetry. The presence of 
these pre-given metaphors, which are used subconsciously and automatically, 
raises the question of whether we can understand poetry in a way that does 
























118 in terms of our culture, as Lakoff and Turner argue? With these questions in 
mind, I discuss this issue by means of a metaphor in a poem by Les Murray.
Contrary to Lakoff and Turner’s view, poets such as Hughes, Bishop, Herzberg, 
or any of the other poets whom I discuss in this study are wary of using cul-
turally reproduced metaphors. This is precisely because of the way that they 
restate and ingrain the convictions that set us at a distance from anymals.58 In 
her poem “Starfish”, the Dutch poet Judith Herzberg puts forward her objec-
tions to the use of metaphors: 
Starfish
Always assumed it must be whales
because they’re so big and bare in the water
so scaleless and from the inside extensively 
stringed, for whom it would be the worst.
These brainwaves, what they feel, sense and suspect,
that it must be whales for whom it would be the worst 
With their sea-wide radar
the whales, seals and dolphins
who more than we know understand 
make more of vibrations and 
the most refined signalling.
But then all these shells and snails
not knowing anything
a snail not noticing it is outgoing tide 
whilst it is outgoing tide, is gone and a starfish
attached to the rock but you can’t feel yourself 
into their being actually yes, 
like the fingers of children around the handles 
of heavy, valuable bags how they, without any notice, 
relocate themselves, you can feel your way into everything 
but it makes you complicit 
and whether it’s correct can never be checked.
58 Bishop has a preference for similes, which leave both the source and target intact, because something 
is not understood in terms of something else. That said, she sometimes uses ‘image-metaphors’, as 
for instance in “The Fish”: “barnacles, / fine rosettes of lime” or “the irises backed and packed / with 
tarnished tinfoil / seen through the lenses / of old scratched isinglass” (42-43). In these instances of 



































































119But feeling your way into an evolved organism
is less upsetting than this news 
from the north: starfish often die two 
by two, their tips hooked together,
and then, by the thousands, wash ashore. (this is not
a metaphor for this is way and way too real
and way too real for one). The absolute annihilation
is nothing compared to this if the small nothingness
serves as nothing but a symbol.59
With the lines “this is not / a metaphor it is far and far too real / and far too real 
for that), Herzberg refers to a newspaper report of starfish washing ashore. We 
might be tempted to read their washing ashore as a metaphor by the way in 
59 Zeesterren
 Altijd gedacht dat het walvissen waren
 omdat die groot en zo bloot in dat water
 zo schubloos en van binnen uitvoerig 
 besnaard, voor wie het het ergste zou zijn. 
 Die hersencumuli, wat daarin 
 doordacht wordt, voorvoeld en geahnd, 
 dat het walvissen waren voor wie het het ergste
 zou zijn met hun zee-brede radar 
 de walvissen zeehonden en dolfijnen 
 die meer dan wij weten begrijpen 
 meer maken van trillingen en 
 het verfijndste seinen. 
 
 maar dan al die schelpen en slakken 
 die nergens van weten 
 een slak die niet merkt dat het eb wordt 
 terwijl het toch eb wordt is weg en een zeester 
 gehecht aan de rots maar daar kan jij je 
 niet in verplaatsen jawel 
 als de vingers van kinderen om hengsels 
 van zware kostbare tassen, hoe die zonder bericht
 zich herschikken, je kunt je overal in verplaatsen 
 maar het maakt medeplichtig 
 en of het klopt is nooit na te gaan. 
 Maar het inleven in een ontwikkeld organisme 
 maakt minder van streek dan dit nieuws 
 uit het noorden: zeesterren sterven vaak twee 
 aan twee met punten in elkaar gehaakt, 
 en spoelen zo bij duizenden aan. (dit is geen 
 metafoor daar is het veel en veel te echt 
 en veel te echt voor.) het grote niets
 is daarbij vergeleken niets als aan de kleine
























120 which they do so in pairs, with the tips of their arms hooked together. We could 
easily link this to how humans cling to each other in their hour of need. Even 
more so, the transmission of the cultural heritage of The Great Chain of Being 
trains us to read the starfish’s fate as an image for that of humans. 
However, Herzberg rather strongly instructs the reader not to turn the 
image into a metaphor. By stressing the report’s veracity, Herzberg urges the 
reader to acknowledge that the starfish washing ashore is a fact that stands on 
its own and has intrinsic value. The source domain, she argues, should be left 
intact. This can be read in the final lines of the poem: “The absolute annihila-
tion / is nothing compared to this if the small nothingness / serves as nothing 
but a symbol” (30-32). The terms “big” (absolute) and “small” are mentioned, 
but in “Starfish” and in Blake’s poem the words are evaluated differently. In 
“Starfish” the metaphorical route is questioned, in a manner that is reminiscent 
of Bishop’s objections. Herzberg disapproves of turning something assumedly 
“small”, like starfish clinging together, into a metaphor or symbol for human 
misery, even if that misery were the greatest misery imaginable.
Herzberg’s warning is indeed comparable with Bishop’s reluctance to use 
metaphors. They both shy away from highlighting the object at the expense of 
the source. In Herzberg’s warning we read the same plea not to shift our atten-
tion to something bigger. To her, the starfish are too real to be lost in metaphor. 
Denying their reality is selfish, in a way. Indeed, according to Bishop this is pre-
cisely the problem with metaphors as such; turning anymals into metaphors is 
a selfish way of focusing on one’s own species by way of a detour through oth-
ers. The only metaphors that both Bishop and Herzberg make use of are those 
in which the source domain and the target domain are equally prominent. 
The same pitfall of selfishness is recognisable in the empathy debate. Amy 
Coplan sees selfish projection as the main difficulty with the process of empa-
thy. This is also the problem of, “self-oriented perspective taking”, whereby 
we imagine ourselves in others’ shoes as opposed to “other-oriented perspec-
tive taking”, in which we imagine how it is for them in their shoes. Earlier I 
described how in order to feel empathy, according to Coplan, we must be alike 
but not be too similar: we must retain a sense of a separate self. I must be alike 
enough to be able to feel what someone else is feeling. However, I must also be 
different enough to really feel what someone else is feeling. For Coplan, some 
similarity between target and source is indeed a prerequisite for empathy since 
“the more unlike the target we are, the more difficult it is to reconstruct her 
subjective experiences” (“Understanding” 13-15, 15, 13). It is by stressing the 




































































121However, Coplan shifts from an objective towards a more subjective position 
on similarity, rephrasing this sentence later as “we are more likely to empa-
thize with those we know well and whom we judge to be like ourselves in some 
important respect” (“Understanding” 13; my emphasis). This shift shows that 
the issue of similarity is far from clear cut in the empathy debate. Although 
we might presume that it is a prerequisite for empathy, if we follow Coplan’s 
less stringent rephrasing and do not consider similarity as an ontological 
given then the question arises: under which circumstances do we judge others 
to be like ourselves? Are such judgements context specific? Are they cultur-
ally determined? Metaphors and empathy both circle around the subject of 
understanding. Accordingly, having discussed Lakoff and Turner’s analysis of 
metaphors I raised the following, related question: can we only understand 
things in terms of our culture? Before we can decide on this matter, we need to 
know how metaphor and empathy are related. 
3.4.4  Phenomenological metaphors
A direction in which we might find an answer to this question is intimated by Gerard Steen, who puts forward the following under-standing of the core of metaphor: “[w]hen a metaphor is used 
deliberately, it instructs the addressee to momentarily adopt another stand-
point, in another frame of reference, and to reconsider the local topic from 
that point of view” (16). This is what happens in the case of Bishop’s sandpiper, 
because viewing the bird as a student of Blake makes us see the bird anew – as 
someone who can really see the world in a grain of sand. 
Marco Caracciolo goes even further than Steen. In what he terms “phenome-
nological metaphors”, he sees the possibility of not only inducing a perspective 
shift with regard to a given topic, but even a way of feeling what someone 
else is feeling from their point of view (“Phenomenological Metaphors” 61). 
He substantiates his argument by way of examples of such metaphors taken 
from the novel Saturday written by Ian McEwan. In this novel, the narrative is 
internally focalised by the protagonist Henry Perowne. Caracciolo argues that 
metaphors and similes have a special role in this novel, in that they convey Per-
owne’s ‘raw feelings’ to the reader. Consider, for instance, a paragraph in which 
Henry Perowne’s experiences assertions and questions as a “mental shrug” and 
“interrogative pulse” (qtd. in “Phenomenological Metaphors” 69). These simi-
les induce an experience in the reader of the what it is like to be Henry Perowne. 
























122 Caracciolo shows that preverbal consciousness in particular benefits from these 
metaphors and similes (“Phenomenological Metaphors” 61). As readers, our 
perspective shifts not only in the sense that we understand what Perowne is 
thinking and feeling; we also simulate how Perowne experiences his thoughts 
and feelings. Phenomenological metaphors, then, are metaphors that let the 
reader enter into how a person experiences the world. Caracciolo claims that 
this type of metaphor captures the what it is like, as Nagel put it; that we as 
readers can undergo Perowne’s raw feelings in the sense of unmediated, unin-
terpreted emotions thanks to the metaphors and similes; and, furthermore, 
that this is what is called empathy. Although this last point may be true, a dev-
il’s advocate would still refer to Coplan’s concern and point out that it is not 
at all certain whether we are experiencing Henry Perowne’s raw feelings by 
simulating them. Are we not just too similar?60 
That said, when we think of the sandpiper as a student of Blake, might 
we not say that we now have an inkling of the what it is like for the bird to 
be the bird? Or, in other words, that we now know how the bird experiences 
his world? Thanks to the metaphor, we realise that humans are inclined to 
value the Romantic image of a world in a grain of sand more than the con-
crete world of the sandpiper. We may also ask ourselves how it is that we fall 
short in translating what the bird sees, simply because in our world grains of 
sand are normally not that important. Still, these realisations do not seem to 
capture the sandpiper’s raw feelings in the way that metaphors and similes in 
Saturday depict Henry Perowne’s raw feelings. Additionally, Bishop’s metaphor 
describes the bird from the outside, whereas the phenomenological metaphors 
capture someone’s internal experience. Does this mean, perhaps, that although 
Bishop’s metaphor puts a perspective change in motion, a total perspective 
change may only be possible when we read and experience phenomenological 
metaphors? And, finally, in order to simulate raw feeling through a metaphor, 
do we not just have to be similar? Could it be Bishop hesitates to capture the 
sandpiper’s inner world in a metaphor because she considers humans and 
sandpipers too different to draw the former into the latter’s perspective?61 If 
60 In his “Reflection” on Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals, which was included in the book following the 
Princeton edition from 1999, Peter Singer conducts a fictive (?) dialogue with his fictive (?) daughter. 
The conversation calls into question the fact that Coetzee/Costello’s lectures observe no boundary 
between characters in novels and persons in real life. Naomi, Singer’s daughter, contests Costello’s 
conviction that it is possible for her to imagine herself into the life of a bat because she is able to 
imagine herself into a fictional character who has not even lived. Naomi’s reasoning is that it is far 
easier to enter a fictional character’s life, since a writer can simply make the character look like herself 
or someone else whom she knows (91). I discuss this refutation in the final chapter. 
61 In fact, this would be in line with Bishop’s hesitations about focalising the world of an anymal, which 



































































123we hold on to the need for similarity then the possibility of empathy might face 
a double bind: either we are too similar and cannot adopt someone else’s feelings, 
or we are too different and cannot capture the what it is like. 
3.4.5  Feeling our way into Les Murray’s yard horse
S tudying the metaphors and similes in Les Murray’s poem “Yard Horse” offers a way to break through this impasse. In his volume Translations from the Natural World, Murray describes anymals’ minds from the 
inside. In “Yard Horse” the reader experiences the world through the lived 
body of a horse that is learning to lead his herd.
Yard Horse  
Ripple, pond, liftoff fly. Unlid the outswallowing snorter
to switch at fly. Ripples over day’s gigantic peace.
No oestrus scent, no haem, no pung of other stallion,
no frightening unsmell of sexless horses,
the unbearable pee-submissive ones who are not in instinct.
Far off blistering grass-sugars. Smoke infinitesimal in air
and, pond gone, his dense standing now would alert all mares
for herded flight. Fire crowds up-mountain swift as horses,
teeters widening down. Pond to granite to derelict
timber go the fur-textures. Large head over wire
contains faint absent tastes, sodichlor, chaff, calc.
The magnified grass is shabby in head-bowed focus, the earth
it grows from only tepidly exists; blots of shade are abyssal.
In his mind, fragments of rehearsal: lowered snaking neck
like goose-speech, to hurry mares; bounced trot-gait of menace
oncoming, with whipping headshake; poses, then digestion.
Moment to moment, his coat is a climate of mirrorings
And his body is the word for every meaning in his universe. (31, ll. 1-18)
Just as we shape our metaphors and similes in accordance with what we experi-
ence daily, so does the horse; his use of metaphors reflects his daily experience. 
The simile “fire crowds up-mountain swift as horses” (line 8), for instance, 
shows how he evaluates a wildfire; maybe the horse has only seen fire in a fixed 
place but in this case the fire is on the move and to him behaves like a drove 
























124 he must control his herd: “In his mind, fragments of rehearsal: lowered snak-
ing neck / like goose-speech, to hurry mares”. In human language, metaphors 
or similes having to do with how geese talk to each other would only be used 
in a degrading way. Geese lower their necks to shoo other geese or intruders 
away. Wild and some domestic horses lower their necks as well, which is indeed 
called ‘snaking’ and has the purpose of managing the herd. 
We can recognise cross-species behaviour in the simile “like goose-speech” (line 
15) because it translates the natural world. What Murray achieves in this poem 
is that he brings us readers to stop taking our experiential world to be the only 
possible world; think about what it would mean to live near grass, horses, and 
geese, outside, and with a different form of sight (“blots of shade are abyssal”); 
and realise that for a horse living on a farm, metaphors derive from one’s sur-
roundings. But things do not stop there, as Lakoff and Johnson would insist. 
For us, this simile and the metaphor open up the yard horse’s world and insti-
gate a perspective shift that would be thought impossible were one to focus 
solely on similarities and dissimilarities. Perhaps we need a common ground 
for understanding, but it could also be that inhabiting the same earth and 
“shar[ing] a substrate of life” may be enough (Coetzee 49). 
Although Murray translates the way in which the horse sees and experi-
ences the world, we may ask whether this perspective change is complete. 
Indeed, the poem gives us only the content of the experiences, not how the 
horse experiences that content. The simile of the lowered goose neck, therefore, 












































































































125Could it be that we can only empathise our way into somebody else’s feelings 
if that someone is, as Coplan and Nagel write, similar to us? Is it the case that 
we can simulate Henry Perowne’s raw feelings, since we have similar bodies 
and therefore know what a shrugged question feels like? In the poem, we learn 
what the horse sees, hears, and smells, but not how the horse experiences these 
sensations – or do we?
Two metaphors in Murray’ poem can help answer the question as to 
whether we can experience the horse’s world – even though our worlds dif-
fer. In the final line of “Yard Horse” we read: “and his body is the word for 
every meaning in his universe”. With this line Murray summarises the poem, 
since all of the former lines contain references to bodily sensations, postures, 
and mimic the swift rhythm the horse’s movement. Although we are trained 
to separate these bodily sensations from what it means for someone to have 
these bodily sensations, in this final line Murray tells us that for the horse there 
is no split between his body and what it is like to have his body. This is also 
shown in the metaphor “bounced trot-gait of menace oncoming” (lines 15-16). 
In this metaphor, Murray reaches out to us, human readers, in that the horse’s 
bounced trot-gait must be translated as “I feel a menace oncoming”. We read 
it, subsequently, as a metaphor, because we do not immediately see “trot-gait” 
and “menace oncoming” as the same thing. To the horse, however, the bounced 
trot-gait is not a metaphor, since there is no separate target and source domain. 
The trot-gait is neither something other than the experience nor an outcome 
of a private subjective feeling; instead it mirrors the “menace oncoming”. In 
fact, there is no outside and inside to this horse, for his body is the language 
with which he expresses how he feels. His body carries all of the meaning in 
his universe, coming very close to Uexküll’s concept of the Umwelt. The horse’s 
Umwelt does not consist of behaviours that are the outcome of a hidden mind. 
On the contrary, it consists of subjective experience, of meaning that is not 
hidden behind the coat of his body: the horse’s every move, smell, and stance 
carries meaning. 
Given that Caracciolo presents phenomenological metaphors as eminent 
tools for capturing “what it is like for someone to be that someone”, we might 
hesitate before reading Bishop’s sandpiper metaphor and the metaphors in 
“Yard Horse” in the same way. What we can learn from Bishop’s and Murray’s 
poems, however, is that what it is like for someone to be that someone is not 
necessarily a raw feeling in the sense of an inner, mental, private experience. 
Furthermore, the metaphors used in “Yard Horse” induce us to imagine a 
horse’s world first in a questioning way. (What do the new words mean? What 
























126 become more and more detailed until we realise that smells and other bodily 
sensations are in fact the horse’s raw feelings. 
Bishop’s and Murray’s metaphors also show us that we need not be alike to 
understand the what it is like. This might be best explained by way of a zoo-
poetical tool that appears at the beginning of Murray’s poem: “no frightening 
unsmell of sexless horses”. “Unsmell” is a bit of a neologism. Something can 
be ‘unsmelled’ in that no-one has smelled it before or ‘odourless’, but neither 
adjective exists as a noun. Humans do not need a noun for this phenomenon, 
since in a human world smelling is less important than it is in the world of a 
horse. Again, the word “unsmell” reveals the rapidity with which the poem 
allows us to enter this horse world, in which smells are more important than 
language (cf. King and Gurnell 30). Humans are not afraid when they do not 
pick up a scent (except perhaps when they expect to smell something and are 
unable to). To horses, however, not smelling other horses might be as upsetting 
as it would be for humans to meet someone who does not say a word. Translat-
ing the world of the horse necessarily entails entering it and opening it up for 
the reader. 
3.4.6  Metaphors and the growth of the imagination
T he leading questions for this section have been how we can adopt the perspective of – or even empathise with – a creature that is different from ourselves and how metaphors are involved in these processes. In 
seeking to formulate an answer to these questions, we must attend critically to 
the presuppositions that they entail. Costello criticised these presuppositions 
in a puzzling remark, but her thought gets substantiated by our experience 
when we read “Yard Horse”. 
There is one further step to take to finalise my argumentation, given that 
theorists in metaphor studies and the empathy field have also endorsed Cos-
tello’s point. In this final step, I point out that we have been questioning the 
wrong phenomenon. It is not our experience of empathy with or taking the 
perspective of anymals that are dissimilar to ourselves that we should doubt; 
rather, we should doubt the extent to which similarity is a prerequisite for 
empathy. In arguing that similarity should be rejected as a precondition for 
empathy, metaphor studies offer help again. 
In their research on metaphors, Sam Glucksberg and Boaz Keysar under-
score their view on similarity by referring to a remark by Goodman and 
Barsalou: “Just as everything in the world is similar to everything else in the 



































































127ways (qtd. in Glucksberg and Keysar 7). This remark comes close to Dan Zaha-
vi’s key argument, which I unpacked in chapter 1.5., that: “After all, everything 
else resembles everything else in some respect” (“Phenomenology” 36). Framed 
in relation to the field of metaphor studies this thought means that there are 
perhaps distinct domains that then are related by way a comparison, like a 
metaphor. Still, instead of taking these fields to be separate from our judge-
ment, we need to realise that we decide that they are separate. Glucksberg and 
Keysar aim to show that metaphors are not to be understood as similes but, on 
the contrary, that similes are in fact metaphors. In contrast to the conviction 
that metaphors are best understood as cross-domain mapping (as in Lakoff and 
Johnson’s view), Glucksberg and Keysar propose that metaphors extend cat-
egories, in that they connect different domains. Other than in the conception 
of metaphors as connecting different domains, whereby domains stay the same 
and we hide and highlight certain aspects of them, in category extension we 
create new categories when we hear novel metaphors. Glucksberg and Keysar 
offer the following conclusion: 
When metaphors are expressed as comparisons (i.e., as similes), then they 
are interpreted as implicit category statements, rather than the other way 
around. The grouping that is created by the metaphor induces the similarity 
relation, and so the grouping is prior. (16; my emphasis)
Since things are always like other things in indeterminate ways, we might 
reconsider whether similarities are a prerequisite for feeling empathy. If they 
are not, Coetzee/Costello may be right to cast doubt on the idea that the right 
question is whether “we have something in common – reason, self-conscious-
ness, a soul – with other anymals?” (Coetzee 47). If so, the taken-for-granted 
conception of empathy might be reversed: first we empathise and then subse-
quently search for similarities as a way of explaining the empathy that we feel. 
The idea that we have to have characteristics in common has also been ques-
tioned in empathy studies, by the aforementioned Dan Zahavi and Graham 
McFee, for instance. According to McFee, the idea that “matching feelings” is a 
prerequisite to empathy is incoherent:
So my point is not that we lack a clear idea of what represents a total match, 
nor that there is insufficient matching in some cases, nor that we do not 
know if there is ‘matching’. Rather, my objection is to the whole metaphor 
of matching: since there is no finite totality of features to consider, any 
























128 of success condition needed – and its incoherence is inherited by the picture 
of empathy it sustains. (197)
This picture of empathy suggests that it consists of stages that are hierarchi-
cally ranked; from shifting one’s perspective to fully fledged empathy. Coplan’s 
assumption (that our feelings have to match and that matching is only possible 
if we are similar) is the outcome of a fruitless definition of empathy.
Poets such as Bishop and Herzberg may unintentionally critique the concept 
of matching. In the poem “Starfish”, which I have discussed above, Herzberg 
conducts an interior dialogue by way of a powerful simile that undermines the 
idea of similarity: “but you can’t feel yourself / into their being actually yes, / 
like the fingers of children around the handles / of heavy, valuable bags how 
they, without any notice, / relocate themselves, you can feel your way into eve-
rything”. Next to the line that says we can feel our way into everything, we find 
a novel metaphor for empathy itself, which relates to the image of children’s 
fingers, that creates a new idea of what empathy might entail. We might tend to 
think about empathy in the tradition of Coplan: there are two human beings, 
one of whom recreates the subjective experience of the other through what 
we might call ‘in-her-shoes-perspective taking’. When we follow this route, 
however, we irretrievably end up in a discussion of how much we ought to be 
alike to experience the same feeling and how much we must differ to avoid self-
oriented perspective taking.
In her poem Herzberg asks us to review this definition of empathy through 
a simile that brings us to the point of reconsidering our presuppositions. And 
since Herzberg relates empathy to a thoroughly bodily sensation of fingers 
relocating themselves, we might ask whether the idea that empathy is just 
simulation is motivated by the dubious mind-body split. Are mentally adopt-
ing a perspective and bodily simulating raw feelings really two distinct forms 
of empathy? If indeed the grouping is prior, as Glucksberg and Keysar point 
out, and we can connect two things in ways to which we have never paid atten-
tion, then, yes, we might be able to empathise with anyone, with anything. Ted 
Hughes writes about how metaphors and similes train our imagination: 
It is one of those curious facts that when two things are compared in met-
aphor or a simile, we see both of them more distinctly than if they were 
mentioned separately as having nothing to do with each other. A compari-
son is like a puzzle. When I say, “His hair was like a rough coconut’s” – you 
say to yourself “How can it be?” And this rouses your imagination to supply 
answers, showing just how hair can be like coconut hair, without the head 



































































129to think, and make distinctions, and be surprised at what you find – all this 
adds to the strength and vividness of your final impression. And it all hap-
pens in a flash. (Handbook 44)
Hughes does not mention empathy in this quotation, focusing instead on how 
two things can be seen more vividly thanks to a metaphor or simile. The group-
ing of a coconut with hair does not seem obvious. Still, these two things are 
similar in so many ways if we decide that they are. If we group anew, then we 
might see that humans are like insects, fish, and horses, without a phyloge-
netic hierarchy. In learning that bounced trot-gait is menace oncoming and 
that fire can crowd up mountains swift as horses, we are training our percep-
tion. Through these metaphors we learn about the world of the horse. On the 
one hand they let us look more closely; on the other they show that Murray 
assumes the horse figuring in his poetry is a meaning carrier who can create 
new meaning by grouping things together differently (as the horse himself 
does when he sees wildfire, perhaps for the first time). The poem seeks to stay 
close to the horse’s experiential world by letting readers suspend their own 
experiential world. This effect is mostly due to the perspective shift that the 
metaphors induce. 
If we give up the idea of ontological matching and realise that it is up to 
living creatures to decide to group things, then we must think again about the 
right conditions under which empathy can flourish. It may be that one of these 
conditions is not so much being alike, but simply being close together, as also 
Dan Zahavi points out (“Phenomenology” 37). If empathy is not dependent on 
matching features up with one another, then Coetzee/Costello is right in her 
claim that there are “no bounds to the sympathetic imagination” and we do not 






























T hrough the use of zoopoetical tools, poets are able to lessen the degree to which their poetry is anthropomorphic. What is more, they can instigate openness, show the anymal as a whole, and allow the reader 
to grow by sharing in anymal energies and stretching the imagination. Any-
mals fare well in the realm that zoopoetry creates for them. When we seek to 
explicate why poetry and anymality are intimately linked, we enter the field 
of zoopoetics. Rendering this intimate relation in words involves the same 
probing and weighing as Coetzee and Herzberg have performed in their work; 
the definition of zoopoetics is not clear cut. In any case, it needs to include an 
account of how anymals ‘debinarise’ our thinking, the materiality of zoopoems, 
and how these themes relate to the presence of anymals. Finally, to my mind, 
zoopoetics has to evaluate the concept of reality. The poets whom I discuss in 
this study often suggest that the ultimate goal of their art is that of making 
images and text as real as possible. This becomes clear in their letters and essays 
– for instance, those of Bishop (Poems 860) and Hughes (Handbook 20), as well as 
in Marianne Moore’s aesthetic aim of creating “imaginary gardens with real 
toads in them” (“Poetry” line 33). This endeavour is specifically significant in 
zoopoetics, since creating a space in which anymals can be themselves breaks 
with a tradition of putting them at the service of symbolism. Nevertheless, I 
will argue that this prevailing opposition in zoopoetics – to wit, anymals “as 
themselves” versus anymals “at the service of symbolism” – is not very informa-
tive when it comes to establishing what these poets mean by striving for reality. 
A traditional point of departure in theorisations of zoopoems is Jacques 
Derrida’s influential article “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Fol-
low)”. In this text, Derrida coins the term “zoopoetics” to describe Franz Kafka’s 
presentation of anymals in his work. Furthermore, to criticise, question, and 












trophy”, which refers to the exercise of probing the nature of a limit. Derrida 
turns to zoopoetry as a way of inquiring into the line between “Man” and “Ani-
mal” (as he puts it), because anymality was never forgotten in poetry, as it was 
in philosophy. I discuss limitrophy in section 4.2.1.
In proposing that we refashion our thinking into poetic thinking, limi-
trophy offers us a better understanding of the relationship between poetry 
and anymality. Practising limitrophied thinking is a first step towards under-
standing this relationship. In addition to limitrophising our thinking, poetry 
“defamiliarises” us as Victor Shklovsky claims (3), by which he means that a 
defamiliarising text arrests our perception and prolongs our attention by 
making familiar things ‘unfamiliar’. In section 4.2.2. I take a closer look at the 
notion of defamiliarisation and its counterpart, refamiliarisation. 
Both limitrophy and defamiliarisation help clarify the intimate relation-
ship between anymals and poetry. However, I think that taken together these 
concepts are ultimately too limited to account for the sensations and emotional 
tumult that a theory of zoopoetry has to account for. To establish a well-rounded 
account of zoopoetry, I propose a third component: “neerbraak” or downfallow 
(my translation of the term) – a concept coined by the poet Frederike Harmsen 
van Beek. When we experience a downfallow, we forget the presumed bound-
ary between text and world through an emotional stirring, as I explain in 4.3.3.
Limitrophy, defamiliarisation, and downfallow describe an unsettling 
of thinking, perception, and feeling. Together they prepare us for what I see 
as pivotal in zoopoetics: the presentation of a heightened reality through an 
experience of truth understood as ‘unconcealment’. This final Heideggerian 
outcome of the quest to establish the nature of zoopoetics relates to recent find-
ings in the field of biosemiotics, which combines theories of meaning with the 
natural world. In section 4.3. I explain how, from a biosemiotic perspective, 
poetry and nature as a whole are intimately linked. This might sound like a 
relativist approach to truth or, what is worse, a kind of biosophy. It is worth 
emphasising, then, that here I am neither opting for a post-truth account of 
zoopoetry, for which poetry is just as factual as science, nor advocating a form 
of relativism in order to magnify the power of poetry. Instead, I am seeking 
to tease out how poetry reveals the narrowness of our concepts of truth and 
reality. Ultimately, I want to make the argument, which I develop more fully 
in the next chapter, that our ideas of empathy adhere too closely to theoretical 
schemas. 
4.2  Dwelling on the edge of 
text and world: Limitrophy, 
defamiliarisation, and 
downfallow
4.2.1  “...a real cat, truly, believe me”: Limitrophy
I n “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)”, Jacques Derrida writes that, following what he perceived as the disturbing experience of being observed naked by his cat, “thinking perhaps begins here” (397). This 
form of thinking is aware of alterity, of being that cannot be incorporated into 
delineated thinking, as philosophy often attempts to do. Limitrophy, by con-
trast, 
will concern what sprouts or grows at the limit, around the limit, by main-
taining the limit, but also what feeds the limit, generates it, raises it, and 
complicates it. Whatever I will say is designed, certainly not to efface the 
limit, but to multiply its figures, to complicate, thicken, delinearize, fold, 
and divide the line precisely by making it increase and multiply. (398)
Derrida sees limitrophy at work in poetry, which he regards as a way of ques-
tioning, feeding, and complicating the limit between what he calls “Man” and 
“Animal”. Poems shelter singular cats, dogs, and even insects, who are granted 
agency and subjective experience. In a theoretical text such anymals are lost 
from view (this is true of the text I am writing now, despite the fact that it 
urges us to attend to them). Indeed, in scientific research they are grasped as 
instances of a species. However, in the arts singular anymals – when delivered 
from symbolic service – are allowed to just be there. Part of the practice of limi-
trophy entails exploring and complicating the supposed dividing line between 
human and anymal; another involves understanding how texts offer non-
abbreviated anymals a place to abide. Derrida’s shame at his nakedness – and 


































































ing this, Derrida makes sure that the reader will not fall into the trap of reading 
all anymals as allegorical stand-ins: 
I must make it clear from the start, the cat I am talking about is a real cat, 
truly, believe me, a little cat. It isn’t the figure of a cat. It doesn’t silently enter 
the room as an allegory for all the cats on the earth, the felines that traverse 
myths and religions, literature and fables. (374) 
Although Derrida’s cat should not be read as the “figure of a cat”, merely writing 
that “it is a real cat” does not present his reader with a real cat. When reading 
this passage, we do imagine a tiny cat but cannot yet touch the cat beyond his 
description of it, not least because the description lacks haecceity, or the special 
thisness Luke Fischer writes about (see chapter 1). The opposition that Derrida 
addresses here, though, is not that of a real cat versus an imagined, textual 
cat, but rather the contrast between cats in symbolic service versus real cats. 
It seems to me that Derrida is assuming either that freeing the cat from sym-
bolism means meeting a real cat or that textuality does not necessarily reduce 
the cat’s reality. I think that, Derrida’s introduction to zoopoetics, in addition 
to training us to see heterogeneity in a seemingly homogenous group, serves 
to sharpen and refine the theoretical opposition of reality versus poetry, text 
versus that beyond the text, or anymal symbolism versus the anymal as itself. 
Although it might seem to go without saying, zoopoetic thinking cannot be 
done without poetry:
thinking concerning the animal, if there is such a thing, derives from 
poetry. There you have a hypothesis: it is what philosophy has, essentially, 
had to deprive itself of. That is the difference between philosophical knowl-
edge and poetic thinking. (Derrida 377)
From Derrida we can learn that thinking concerning the anymal “begins here”; 
in other words, that it originates in openness, in thinking that has been “limi-
trophied”. Neither philosophy nor any scientific theory can capture individual, 
real anymals, which are best met in poetry. Still, unsettling our thinking so as 
to allow us to meet individual anymals is not the only effect of anymals fig-
uring in poetry. Although Derrida describes feeling shame when his cat looks 
at his nakedness, he does not take up this affect in his further thinking. He 
could have said that “thinkfeeling” begins here, for it is not only our propen-
sity to think in terms of limits that has been challenged; our “body-mind” has 










































becomes limitrophied. More needs to be done, however, to make room for any-
mals and explicate the essence of zoopoetry.
4.2.2  Defamiliarisation/refamiliarisation 
S ojourning in close proximity to a limit and thereby folding, dividing, and delinearising it, is a typical practice of zoopoetry. When a poem foregrounds an individual anymal, our assumed limit between human 
and anymal is called into question. Limitrophy comes close to the phenom-
enon of defamiliarisation, a well-known concept in literary theory that refers 
to art’s ability to make familiar objects strange. However, whereas limitrophy 
connects text and reader by destabilising thinking, defamiliarisation makes 
readers newly aware of their perception.
The effect of foregrounding an aspect of a text, defamiliarisation is not 
meant to convey a message, but rather shifts the reader’s attention to textual 
effects. This prolongs the time it takes to read a text. In their research into defa-
miliarisation, David Miall and Don Kuiken use a sentence that refers to a place 
in a garden called the Dark Walk: “It is a laurel walk, very old, almost gone wild, 
a lofty midnight tunnel of smooth, sinewy branches”. This sentence, Miall and 
Kuiken explain, does not merely convey something, but draws attention to 
itself through the alliteration of ‘l’ and ‘s’ sounds and using “midnight” and 
“sinewy” in a metaphorical way (391). As a result, the reader feels that her com-
mon reading convictions are being challenged. Miall and Kuiken quote Victor 
Shklovsky, who coined the term “defamiliarisation”, through which:
one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to 
make the stone stony. The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things 
as they are perceived and not as they are known. The technique of art is to 
make objects “unfamiliar”, to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty 
and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic 
end in itself and must be prolonged. (qtd. in Miall and Kuiken 391)
Miall and Kuiken empirically tested Shklovsky’s hypothesis and found that 
indeed “stylistic variations, known as foregrounding, prompt defamiliariza-
tion, evoke feelings and prolong reading time” (389). What Miall and Kuiken 
did not test, however, was the somewhat enigmatic preceding formulation 
concerning art’s ability “to make the stone stony”. This formulation encapsu-
lates poets’ wish to stay close to sensation in order to bring language to life. In 
other words, poets make the poetic elephant ‘elephanty’, the whale ‘whaley’, 
137and so forth, and in this research I aim to formulate how. The urge to “recover 
the sensation of life”, as Shklovsky puts it, comes close to the wish that Ted 
Hughes expresses, namely that his poems live, through the use of words that 
live. “Words that live, are words that we hear, like “click” or “chuckle”, or which 
we see, like “freckled, or “veined” … [w]ords which belong directly to one of the 
five senses” (Handbook 17). 
Defamiliarisation leads us away from the cerebral process of knowing and 
toward a prolonged perception. Poetry can renew readers’ sight by using sen-
sory language, for instance. According to Miall and Kuiken’s findings, a reader 
can also use feeling to bring the text back into familiar territory once more, 
a process that they call “refamiliarising”. Defamiliarisation and refamiliarisa-
tion are guided by affect: “defamiliarisation evokes affect, and affect guides 
refamiliarising interpretive efforts” (404). To refamiliarise a text is to return its 
meaning to familiar ground, which is associated with feeling. In this connec-
tion, Olivia da Costa Fialho writes that students experienced uncertainty after 
being defamiliarised, but that they then used this uncertainty to try to recon-
struct meaning and felt joy when they finally succeeded (116). Miall, Kuiken, 
and Da Costa Fialho describe a process in which the reader’s eye is caught by 
some feature of a text, whether alliteration, deviant grammar, or any other 
aspect that gives us pause. Trained readers know that writers foreground such 
things for a reason; once they get the clue, they feel joyful and appreciate the 
text even more. After a moment of uncertainty, Da Costa Fialho writes, read-
ers then “reorganise their mental schemata, refamiliarising to produce a new 
comprehension of the text” (120). 
Miall and Kuiken, and Da Costa Fialho tested foregrounding’s effects on 
readers using excerpts from novels. In novels, both studies conclude, a moment 
of defamiliarisation is followed by refamiliarisation and this process can be 
seen as “such reconsideration of the text surrounding foregrounded features 
[…] guided by the feelings that have been evoked in response to those features” 
(Miall and Kuiken 395). These feelings might include, for instance, uncertainty 
concerning an ellipsis (but which is then abated) or annoyance at the difficulty 
of reading a foregrounded passage (but which is then relieved in the light of a 
better understanding). 
To a certain extent, I think that poetry works the same way; a lot of what 
readers do when reading a difficult poem is analogous to problem solving. For 
instance, we see that alliteration serves some kind of purpose and that a volta is 
used for a pause and to change our view. Yet it seems to me that there are impor-
tant differences between poetry and novels when it comes to defamiliarisation 
and refamiliarisation, which need to be considered. In poetry a complete refa-

































































138 instance, the diphthong “ou” in Joke van Leeuwen’s line “hear loud shouting 
/ of crowds of humans as if they bay”, which I have discussed above (18). In the 
foregrounded reading, the diphthong mimics the baying of dogs; at the same 
time, in the non-foregrounded reading, it depicts shouting humans. But does 
this explanation of the line solve a problem and do we now come to a refa-
miliarising of the text? Partly we do: given the repeated “ou”-sound, we know 
there is some kind of mimicking in the text that merges human and dog. The 
bodily effect of the foregrounding stays alive, however, and cannot be fitted in a 
new context. It is precisely this twofold mode of reading and experience, which 
neither poses nor solves a problem, that makes the dog doggish and allows us 
to “walk flank to flank” with the anymal. 
4.2.3  Downfallow
Making the stone of stony, Shklovsky suggests, is a key practice of defamil-
iarisation. Maill and Kuiken’s and Da Costa Fialho’s studies, however, only 
tested a truncated translation of this phenomenon, which they call “feel-
ing”, understood as the reader’s feeling before refamiliarisation begins. 
Shklovsky, however, hints that in literature words should evoke sensations 
in such a way that the stone is made stony. In my view, zoopoetics needs to 
account for the experience of touching a cat in language or De Martelaere’s 
paradox, mentioned at the end of chapter 2. We need an additional concept 
to understand how this experience might come about. I think that read-
ers need to undergo a downfallow (neerbraak in Dutch) if they are to truly 
perceive something in a new light or even for the first time. This concept, 
coined by the poet Frederike Harmsen van Beek, goes further than limitro-
phy and defamiliarisation/refamiliarisation in that it not only challenges 
our thought and perception, but also opens our hearts by stirring our emo-
tions. Harmsen van Beek uses the neologism in the context of an anymal: 
A centipede I saw, in the bathroom, where such an animal is obviously not 
supposed to be, and, by the grace of God, this is tenderness, a centipede 
who spreads his already slight weight over all these tiny feet. This, then, is a 
downfallow. (Considering first and foremost that everyone finds centipedes 
repulsive).62 (Wat Knaagt? 39)
62 “Een duizendpoot zag ik, in de badkamer, waar zo’n dier natuurlijk niet hoort, en gratie Gods dat is 










































139The phrase “this, then, is a downfallow” hints at a definition, which points to 
a sensation of one’s emotions being stirred: it is a layered feeling of tenderness 
(felt? seen?) towards something or someone that would normally be considered 
repulsive. The remark between brackets is crucial, because a downfallow does 
always challenge our fixed ideas and breaks them down. Here, the tenderness 
wins out against the expected repulsiveness, with the speaker marvelling at 
the centipede’s minuscule weight, which nonetheless is spread out over all of 
his tiny feet.63 Two pages later, Harmsen van Beek gives another explanation 
of a downfallow, which has less to do with one’s emotions being stirred and 
more to do with words and inscription: “a writing down of a thought about 
something or other from a writer, formulated in such a way that a (pre)concep-
tion is broken down in the reader” (Wat Knaagt? 41).64 In translating “neerbraak” 
as ‘downfallow’, I am trying to capture the decomposition of fixed concepts 
(as in ‘downfall’) and hint at the adverb ‘braak’ with ‘fallow’. In Dutch, ‘braak 
liggen’ is used to refer to farmers’ fields that ‘lie fallow’ – that is, fields that have 
been left to restore themselves in anticipation of future sowing. I have sought 
to make this connection because the imaginative field that opens up when our 
emotions are stirred by a downfallow lies fallow: unsown ground ready and 
waiting to welcome the anymal. 
In a downfallow, Harmsen van Beek brings reader, text, and writer together 
in one event: the writer has to write in a way that precipitates the downfallow in 
the reader, rousing their emotions. Before I explain why I think the translation 
of the agricultural connotation of “fallow” is important, let me first indicate 
why the notion of downfallow is necessary if we are to arrive at a complete and 
convincing zoopoetics. Limitrophy and downfallow are similar in that they 
both challenge limits in one’s thinking, questioning the line between human 
and anymal (Derrida) or breaking preconceptions (Harmsen van Beek). Yet 
limitrophy does not involve our whole being, whereas a downfallow does. Defa-
miliarisation, the second concept discussed above, not only entails a renewed 
judgement but also includes our feelings. After the movement of defamiliarisa-
tion, we can refamiliarise with the object at hand. Although defamiliarisation 
is part of the process of a downfallow, the latter aims for no solution and enacts 
no refamiliarisation, by which the object in question would be put in a new 
context, as Miall and Kuiken would say. Through a downfallow, we stay defa-
miliarised and alive to the stoniness of the stone, doggishness of the dog, and 
63 The word “feet” here is also telling. Harmsen van Beek sees no impediment to using a word that 
is usually reserved for humans. This aligns with her conviction that there is no sharp dividing line 
between humans and anymals. For a discussion of this topic, see M. Meijer Hemelse 304.
64 “…de neerslag van een gedachte over het een of ander van een schrijver, zó geformuleerd dat een (voor)

































































140 disturbing unsmell of the horse. A downfallow causes us to lay barren; it and 
we become a receptive, empty place. That is why I think that the connotation of 
‘braak liggen’ (lay barren/fallow) should not get lost in translation as it merges 
with the meaning of the downfall of fixed, delineated concepts. Harmsen van 
Beek alludes to the state of being empty in order to receive:
In a real downfallow there has to be hidden as subtly as possible a secret 
stimulus to the emotions, that makes the reader’s heart receptive (ont-
vankelijk) to convictions … other than or even contrary to the own way of 
thinking. (Wat Knaagt? 41)65
Being receptive does not only mean being open to convictions other than those 
to we usually adhere. It also means that we, through our emotions being roused, 
become receptive to the stoniness of the stone. When our thought, perception, 
and feelings are unsettled, we enter the heart of the domain of zoopoetics, in 
which the stoniness of the stone – or rather the whaleyness of the whale – can 
be accounted for. 
65 “… in een echte neerbraak [moet] zich zo kies mogelijk een geheime prikkel tot ontroering verbergen, 
die ’s lezers ontvankelijk maakt voor opvattingen … die afwijken van of zelfs tegengesteld zijn aan 









































4.3  Zoopoetics and biosemiotics 
4.3.1  Zoopoetics and the intricacy of reality
A quest into the heart of zoopoetics can be found in Kári Driscoll and Eva Hoffmann’s What is Zoopoetics? In Driscoll and Hoffmann’s view, zoopoetics is concerned with the question of what it would mean to 
let anymals “be themselves” (6). Although an important element in an answer 
to this question is to stress that anymals should not be put to the service of 
symbolism, Driscoll and Hoffmann stress that more is needed for a complete 
account of zoopoetics. That said, naïve literalism shorn of symbolism also falls 
short (Driscoll, “Sticky Temptation” 213). Anymals in poems are still textual, 
poetic figures even when they do not serve as a symbol, Driscoll and Hoffmann 
argue, and we cannot meet them in a poem the same way that we meet anymals 
in real life. Hoffmann and Driscoll summarise their point as follows: “[i]n short, 
the white whale in Melville’s Moby Dick is not just a metaphor; but he is also not 
just a whale”. As they see it, the task of zoopoetical reading is “to explore what 
lies between these two extremes, the mutual imbrication and entanglement of 
the material and the semiotic, the body and the text, the animal and the world” 
(4, 4). Although I agree that it is important to examine these pairs in the study 
of zoopoetics, I do not think that what lies between these two extremes quite 
captures the specificity of zoopoetry. 
In the section on metaphor in the previous chapter, in which I reflected on 
the opposition between figurative and literal language, I discussed the rather 
culturally deterministic conception of metaphor put forward by Lakoff and 
Johnson. I argued for a more creative understanding of metaphors as a form of 
category extension, which grants a metaphor the ability to create new mean-
ings and even new beings. An underlying thought was that literal language 
and metaphors are not opposites, or at least that they often do not stand in 
142 opposition in the way that we think they do. To some extent metaphors become 
literal, because we necessarily come to live by the metaphors offered to us by 
our culture. To a larger extent, however, this ‘literalisation’ of metaphors 
needs to be explained differently. What is taken to be a metaphor changes over 
time and consequently what is understood as literal language shifts as well. 
The common view, that holds it possible to be either just a metaphor or just a 
whale forgets that the meaning of metaphors and naïve literalism fluctuate, as 
a result of which the meaning of the extremes also varies. 
To avoid a narrow perspective on reality, cultural critics must identify those 
instances in which connections drawn between phenomena (what I discuss here 
in terms of the equal sign) is accepted as fact and those in which it is regarded a 
metaphor. “Water = H2O”, for example, is accepted as a flat fact, whereas “water 
= what binds all life” would be regarded as a metaphor. The underlying convic-
tion here is that, although the formula H2O offers a truncated conception of 
water (in that it strips water of all the qualities that are perceived through our 
senses), certain reductive understandings of phenomena bear more truth than 
references to its messy, concrete reality.66 If prevailing paradigms determine 
what is metaphorical language and what not, it becomes all the more impor-
tant to pay attention to poets, who intimate what a new paradigm would look 
like, even if only inadvertently. The endeavour of grasping reality in words may 
be uncertain, but this is what zoopoetry relentlessly tries to achieve. It would 
therefore seem that exploring the space between anymals outside of the text 
and anymals that have been enlisted in symbolism is only a part of constitutes 
zoopoetics.
The following passage from Moby Dick can help us to understand why 
Driscoll and Hoffman’s critique on the neither/nor sentence needs to be taken 
one step further:
But even stripped of these supernatural surmisings, there was enough in 
the earthly make and incontestable character of the monster to strike the 
imagination with unwonted power. For, it was not so much his uncommon 
66 Jaap van Brakel argues that natural species do not exist. One of the examples he discusses is water. It 
seems that the phenomenon of water can be easily defined as H2O. However, Van Brakel shows that 
this presentation of water conceals many underlying decisions. For instance, it depends on whether 
and the extent to which water also bears H3O+ en OH- ions. In steam – which is also reduced to the 
formula H2O – there are H4O2 molecules. In the definition of water as H2O, a decision has been taken 
not to incorporate those molecules. Moreover, Van Brakel points out that the only constant factor 
in water and steam is the fact that there are H-molecules and O-molecules. The presence of these 
molecules together, however, does not necessarily result in the phenomenon of water, since they can 
simply form a mixture. For a full overview of all of the problems with defining ‘water’ and other so-































































bulk that so much distinguished him from other sperm whales, but, as was 
elsewhere thrown out – a peculiar snow-white wrinkled forehead, and a 
high, pyramidical white hump. (198)
The text goes on to describe the whale’s distinct features, relating to both 
his body and character, which make the phrase “just a whale” seem odd. The 
descriptions are in fact too precise to convey just a whaleyness because, when 
we come to think of it and give the phrase a bit more attention, whales are 
never just whales. What is more, the metaphorical function of Moby Dick (who 
symbolises ‘the force of nature’, ‘God’, and everything else that humans cannot 
reason away) somewhat chafes with this description of his wrinkled forehead. 
Symbolism cannot thrive when too much individuality is involved. What 
makes this zoopoetical description zoopoetically successful, therefore, is not so 
much a mixture of metaphor and the whale himself as a presentation of indi-
viduality through the text’s well-chosen words. Indeed, the whale is attentively 
described as an individual. In brief, having read this passage, we know more 
about the whale than we did before, even though he is a fictional character. For 
one, we have learned that he is someone we can get to know better, despite the 
metaphorical load that he is carrying. 
The point I am trying to make here may become clearer if we modify the 
line “the white whale in Melville’s Moby Dick” is neither “just a metaphor” nor 
“just a whale” (4). I propose replacing “Moby Dick” with ‘Atticus Finch’, the 
gentle, heroic father in Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird. Thus altered, the 
sentence would become: “Atticus Finch is neither “just a man” nor a “fictional 
figure of a man”. The meaning of this phrase appears somewhat obscure for 
several reasons: 
1. It is not clear what “just a man” means. It seems to suggest that all men are 
the same, but since this cannot be right, the phrase must mean something 
else (but what?); 
2. Atticus Finch is too real and too rich a fictional character for one to feel the 
need to relate him to anyone outside Lee’s novel;
3. The opposition in which these two options are placed is opaque. Why 
would “just a man” be something other than a “fictional figure of a man”? 
We come to know someone through our perception, empathy, and imagina-
tion. This process is not so much different from that of coming to know a 
fictional character. 
144 These doubts suggest that perhaps whales too (even the whale in Moby Dick) 
cannot be considered unknowable or just a representative of a species.67 The 
problem starts with the idea that naïve literalism might be thought of as a 
straightforward concept, whereas it is not. The meaning of the phrase ‘read-
ing literally’ is even opaque in the context in which it is used most frequently, 
namely theological debates about how to read the Bible.68 Words refer to other 
words, webs of beliefs, and worldviews. Hence, naïve literalism – the idea that 
a word refers unequivocally to one object in reality – is not a defendable option 
in the context of poetic figures of anymals. In short, “just whales” do not exist 
but are in fact individual whales. The phrase “the mutual imbrication and 
entanglement of the material and the semiotic” Driscoll and Hoffmann pro-
pose as a description of the essence of zoopoetics, rests, to my mind, too much 
on the common view in that ‘imbrications’ seem to presuppose the material on 
the one side and the semiotic on the other. I get back to this opposition in the 
next paragraph on biosemiotics. 
How then, should we approach De Martelaere’s paradox (of touching the 
cat in language when wanting to go beyond language), which is in fact a zoo-
poetical paradox? Can we “walk flank to flank” with anymals if only we stop 
burdening them with symbolic service? As I mentioned in the Introduction, 
Driscoll paraphrases Bataille who answers the question negatively:
[P]oetry and animality are intimately linked, since animality, understood as 
nonhuman subjectivity or non-linguistic consciousness, is that which eter-
nally eludes our attempts to capture it in language. In absolute terms, this 
poetic leap is doomed to fail – we will never reach the other side – but this 
is precisely what constitutes its value. (“Sticky Temptation” 216) 
The citation resembles Jenny Diski’s view on the unbridgeable abyss between 
human and non-human, which I discussed in the first chapter. The wording is 
practically the same and in both cases the passages are followed by a reference 
67 Another reason for the fact that it may be hard to understand the opposition described in 3. would 
be that the impact of the character of Atticus Finch reaches well beyond the boundaries of To Kill a 
Mockingbird as a text. When Harper Lee died on 15 February 2016, Barack and Michelle Obama said that 
“What that one story did, more powerfully than one hundred speeches possibly could, was change 
the way we saw each other, and then the way we saw ourselves” (qtd. in Jamieson). If a fictional text 
has such a bearing on society and is read over and over again, there is less care whether the character 
is living down the street or living in a fictional street. Along with the character’s realness and richness, 
the book’s impact makes the question otiose. 
68 For instance, how are we to read the many images in “Song of Solomon”, such as “Your eyes are 
doves”? (English Standard Version, “Song of Sol.” 1:15) Or why would we understand Jesus’ parables as 









































145to Nagel’s bat argument. It might even seem that in poetry, the abyss to be leapt 
across is even wider, since poems face not only an assumed opposition of non-
human versus human, but between poetry versus reality too.
What we can see here is that literature and philosophy tend to be out of tune 
with research on anymal cognition, which refutes the existence of an abyss. The 
way to access anymal minds (if that is at all the right wording) is not only by 
making analogies with our own subjective experience. In chapter 1 we learned 
that the notion of having to leap over an abyss can be questioned on many 
levels, not least because it wrongly assumes speciesism; that anymals are lan-
guagelessness; that anthropomorphism is inevitable (which is itself based on 
speciesism); and the idea that a mind is something closed off from the world, 
behaviour being the mind’s only visible expression. Moreover, the image of a 
leap over an abyss suggests two separate selves, which turns empathy and shifts 
of perspective into phenomena that are either done completely or not at all. A 
more accurate image of what anymal cognition research shows us, I would sug-
gest, is that of a gradual perspective shift by which one slowly but surely comes 
to understand anymals’ experiential lives. 
Conversely, anymal cognitivists might learn from poets and poetry. What 
Elizabeth Bishop has to say about the presumed line between words and things 
offers animal studies a better understanding of the accordance between world 
and word:
One of the causes of poetry must be … the feeling that the contemporary 
language is not equivalent to the contemporary fact; there is something out 
of proportion between them, and what is being said in words is not at all 
what is being said in “things.” To connect this disproportion a pretense is at 
first necessary. By “pretending” the existence of a language appropriate and 
comparable to the “things” it must deal with, the language is forced into 
being. It is learned by one person, by a few, by all who can become interested 
in that poet’s poetry. But as this imaginary language is elaborated and is 
understood by more people, it begins to work two ways at once. “Things” 
gave rise to the language; now the language arouses an independent life in 
the “things,” first dimly perceived in them only by the poet. (Jukebox 183)
Bishop’s feeling of contemporary language not equating with contemporary 
fact arguably appertains to language in general, in that naming facts would 
be an endless undertaking without a paradigm determining which facts are 
relevant. Bishop’s explanation that things come into being through the lan-
guage of the poet underscores my claim that we should pay attention to poets 






















146 Indeed, in the Introduction I claim that such poets can be seen as “conceptual 
deconstructionists”.
By “pretense” and “trying out”, poetic language and especially zoopoetical 
language can give rise to “things” in that they have the thisness Fischer writes 
about (see chapter 1). An excellent example is the neologistic use of the noun 
“unsmell” by Les Murray in “Yard Horse”, which I have discussed in chapter 
3. We understand horses better thanks to this neologism, in that we see them 
more clearly because their experiential lives have become more real to us. 
Through the word, the “thing” that was first perceived only by the poet takes 
on a life of its own. Hence, on the one hand, profiting from research done in 
anymal cognition, we do not have to take a doomed-to-fail leap across an abyss; 
on the other, poets question our paradigms. In so doing, they alter us and lead 
us to a deeper understanding of the world. 
4.3.2  Biosemiotics: The nature of zoopoetics
I t is not only poets who recognise that poetry and the world are closely linked. Work in the field of biosemiotics is challenging the speciesist binary of human versus animal and even questioning the idea that there is a gap 
between language, text, and world. Biosemioticians claim that nature itself 
operates in a poetic manner and that in order to understand nature we need 
to learn to read poetry and recognise poetic tropes and tools. Biosemiotics 
conjoins biology and semiotics in an attempt to shift the paradigm in biology 
from a view in which organisms passively react to their surroundings towards 
a conception of all organisms as interpretative beings. Uexküll and the linguist 
Thomas Sebeok are important forerunners of this school. Sebeok introduces 
the term “zoosemiotics”, which inserts linguistics into biology by means of an 
understanding of semiosis as “simply … the instinctive capacity of all living 
organisms to produce and understand signs” (3). Encapsulated concisely, the 
paradigm shift that biosemioticians are developing results in an understand-
ing of organisms as creatures with interpretative agency. 
Because interpretation is pivotal when it comes to understanding organ-
isms, biosemioticians advocate turning towards the humanities, since it is 
there that the art of reading (in an encompassing sense including interpreta-
tion and translation) is developed. Indeed, the biosemiotician Wendy Wheeler 









































147[m]olecular biologists trying to understand the workings of DNA molecules 
have, indeed, been obliged to borrow their lexicon from the languages of 
semiotics (codes, expressions, reading, transcriptions, translations, inter-
pretations, and so on). (“Critical Theory” 27-28)
Moreover, biosemioticians argue that figures of speech that have long been con-
sidered the stock in trade of the poet can be found in nature. Figures of speech 
have a natural history, they claim, and, as Wheeler puts it, do not “spring fully 
formed from the head of Zeus, appearing only in Homo Sapiens” (“Introduction” 
10). Ascribing a natural history to figures of speech may sound confusing: what 
might it mean to say that nature itself uses poetic tools? 
Besides the emphasis on organisms as agents interpreting their environ-
ment instead of merely reacting to it, biosemioticians also advocate another 
view of nature as a whole. Again, in the old paradigm the only explanation for 
all that exists is that it apparently was well adapted enough to have persisted. 
Biosemioticians disagree with this reductionist view of all that lives because 
nature “is a tinkerer”, as Wheeler argues (“Lightest Burden” 32). Nature tries 
things out, creating meaning by making loose new connections. This take on 
organisms, an example of which follows shortly, grants them more agency. 
Related to this view of organisms being agents is the biosemioticians’ empha-
sis on abduction instead of induction or deduction. Wheeler points out that in 
the sciences nature is expected to fit into two schemes of reasoning, induction 
and deduction. These schemes would be enough if nature did indeed behave 
mechanically in accordance with natural laws. Since nature is granted more 
agency in the biosemiotic paradigm, however, scientists are forced to abandon 
the mechanical paradigm. And since the sciences lay too much emphasis on 
deduction and induction as the ways of coming to knowledge about nature 
(which works, when organisms are machines), they overlook nature’s abduc-
tive creativity. 
Overlooking the possibility of nature being creative indeed fits neatly into 
a worldview that considers human beings the only creative creatures on earth 
and all other organisms’ behaviour merely efficient. In this received Cartesian 
paradigm, anymals’ creativity, play, communication, and artistry all fall into 
the category of anomalies, not because they are anomalous, but merely because 
they are evaluated within the wrong paradigm. In the following passage, Kalevi 






















148 The problem of novelty, the question of the source of diversity and new 
information, is one of [the] most fundamental questions in biology, in 
understanding life. Therefore, finding the poetic or poetic-like processes 
in living systems is what biosemiotics is about, and this is exactly where we 
need the humanities, the specialists in the arts. (17)
Poets and “poetic-like” processes can inform us about the world because tropes, 
tools, and language as a whole are not meta-natural phenomena; they are 
found in nature. What is more, it is thanks to the zoopoetical tool of metaphor 
that we can understand and even see the behaviour of anymals. As, for instance, 
of the wolf in the following passage, in which the researcher Gregory Bateson 
recounts a visit to the zoo, where he observes wolves. If we were to hold on 
to the paradigm of anymals being merely reactive creatures, we would simply 
miss what happens here: 
I went to see the nice little pack of wolves in Chicago at the Brookfield Zoo, 
ten of them lying asleep all day and the eleventh one, the dominant male, 
busily running around keeping track of things. Now what wolves do is to go 
out hunting and then come home and regurgitate their food to share with 
the puppies who weren’t along on the hunt. And the puppies can signal 
the adults to regurgitate. But eventually the adult wolves wean the babies 
from the regurgitated food by pressing down with their jaws on the backs 
of the babies’ necks. In the domestic dog, females eventually wean their 
young from milk in the same way. In Chicago they told me that the previ-
ous year one of the junior males had succeeded in mounting a female. Up 
rushed the lead male – the alpha animal – but instead of mayhem all that 
happened was that the leader pressed the head of the junior male down to 
the ground in the same way, once, twice, four times, and then walked off. 
The communication that occurred was metaphoric: ‘You puppy, you!’ The 
communication to the junior wolf of how to behave is based on a syllogism 
in grass. (qtd. in “Introduction” 6)
Syllogisms in grass have the following form: “grass dies, men die, men are 
grass” (“Introduction” 5). This characterisation of what we normally would call 
a fallacy is Bateson’s portrayal of how abductive nature works: it tries things 
out and – if the attempt works – creates new meanings. The action taken by 
the lead male in the pack of wolves is metaphorical, in the sense that the cat-
egory of “puppy weaning from regurgitated food or milk” is mapped onto 
the behaviour of the junior wolf. This results in a new meaning, which can be 









































149lead wolf tinkers with meaning and metaphor. Since the metaphor works – it 
makes a difference in the behaviour of the junior wolf – the behaviour cannot 
be explained mechanistically; it is the result of an interpretation. 
The fact that we can discover poetic processes in nature teaches us that the 
opposition between naïve literalism and metaphors is not informative. Meta-
phors, it would seem, are a natural phenomenon. Thus, text and world are not 
to be seen as opposites. As soon as we recognise that nature uses tropes, we can 
also let go of other oppositions: those of behaviour versus mind, mind versus 
body, object versus subject, and instinct versus cognition. By dismantling these 
barring convictions, it is possible for poetry to ‘unconceal’ worlds. 
4.3.3  Zoopoetics as unconcealment
I n a famous paragraph in A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, Uexküll explains how a supposedly singular object – his example is an oak – can har-bour different subjective environments. In a series of drawings, the oak is 
portrayed in the environments of a forester, girl, fox, owl, ant, and bark beetle. 
Readers are invited to direct their attention and zoom in or out according to 
the different aspects of the oak that are important in the respective organisms’ 
environments. Whereas the forester ponders the oak’s dead branches and won-
ders whether they should be severed, the girl sees a frightening face in the tree 
trunk, putting the oak in a magical environment. The fox and owl use the oak 
as a hiding spot, though in opposite ends of the tree, whereas for the ant it 
forms a hunting ground and for the beetle it is a breeding spot. Moving from 
how the oak affects subjects to the oak as object, Uexküll writes: 
In the hundred different environments of its inhabitants, the oak plays an 
ever-changing role as object, sometimes with some parts, sometimes with 
others. The same parts are alternately large and small. Its wood is both hard 
and soft; it serves for attack and for defense. If one wanted to summarize 
all the different characteristics shown by the oak as an object, this would 
only give rise to chaos. Yet these are only parts of a subject that is solidly put 
together in itself, which carries and shelters all environments – one which 
is never known by all the subjects of these environments and never know-
able for them. (132)
Strikingly, Uexküll forgets himself in this passage, becoming a selfless observer 
who cannot become a beetle, ant, or fox, but nevertheless presents their envi-






















150 from their point of view; his drawings and ponderings are aimed at capturing 
their environment as much as possible. He takes a foray into anymals’ various 
worlds and discloses them for us. From these forays, we learn that there is no 
one ultimate thing; reality is not entirely given to us or any other species. Yet 
Uexküll demonstrates that in disclosing a world it helps to assume a selfless 
view, which comes down to shelving one’s own interests and perspective and 
constantly paying attention to the world of the anymal in question. Continu-
ing with the example of the oak’s occupants, saying that an owl is “high up in 
the tree” does not help to disclose the owl’s world. The notion of being “high 
up” makes sense from a human perspective (perhaps a fox’s too). Even giving 
scientific classifications by naming order, genus, and species, although it might 
seem selfless, does nothing more than describe a human categorisation. Every 
organism creates its own Umwelt and a foray into these worlds is only possible 
if barring convictions are left behind.
It is on account of its ability to lessen such convictions that the philoso-
pher Martin Heidegger emphasises the role of poetry in disclosing reality. 
Heidegger read Uexküll, developing a conception of truth and being is not so 
much based on the conceptual pairs of “material and the semiotic, the body 
and the text, the animal and the world” (Driscoll and Hoffmann 4). For Hei-
degger, we can encounter reality in poetic texts. Heidegger’s notion of truth is 
best understood as ‘unconcealment’. Here we can see Uexküll’s influence, for 
in the quotation above the oak is disclosed through the study of the anymals’ 
various perspectives. It is in this process of disclosure, Heidegger argues, that 
poetry has a special role: 
Poetry, however, is no aimless imagining of whimsicalities, and no flight of 
mere representations and fancies into the unreal. What poetry, as clearing 
projection, unfolds of unconcealment and projects into the rift within the 
figure is the open; poetry allows this open to happen in such a way, indeed, 
that now, for the first time, in the midst of beings, it brings them to shine 
and sound. (45)
It is because Heidegger abandons the conception of truth as the correspond-
ence between thought and thing that he can speak of art and in particular 
poetry as the essence of truth. In poetry we can find a clearing in which beings 
can dwell (46-47). Any attempt to bring thought and world into accordance 
with one another will reduce the being to a fixed, timeless definition of that 
being, which does not exist. By emphasising the dimension of making (poïesis) 
in poetry, Heidegger breaks away from the Platonic idea that truth is eternal 









































151ment of being, which is not deformed by scientific classifications and social 
interests. This understanding of truth is implicit in zoopoets’ aim, namely that 
of creating an individual anymal that is allowed to exist without being used or 
deformed. 
In theorising zoopoetry, I have found that the binary of literal versus figura-
tive falls short, for it rests on a Platonic conception of art as the representation 
of reality. It is rather that poetry heightens reality: in many instances of zoo-
poetry, the anymal is presented without any preconceived goal or self interest. 
Poetry seeks to open up worlds, and zoopoets disclose anymals’ worlds by 
showing them in a non-truncated manner. A fully zoopoetical presentation of 
anymals therefore goes beyond either a naïve literal depiction (whatever that 
might be) or a metaphorised treatment.
The poem “Inventing a Horse” by Meghan O’Rourke illustrates what I 
mean by referring to ‘heightened reality’ in a Heideggerian sense. Or, more 
accurately put: Heidegger’s thought explains what is going on in good poetry 
such as this.69
Inventing a horse is not easy. 
One must not only think of the horse.
One must dig fence posts around him.
One must include a place where horses like to live;
 
or do when they live with humans like you.
Slowly, you must walk him in the cold;
feed him bran mash, apples;
accustom him to the harness;
 
holding in mind even when you are tired
harnesses and tack cloths and saddle oil
to keep the saddle clean as a face in the sun;
one must imagine teaching him to run
 
among the knuckles of tree roots,
not to be skittish at first sight of timber wolves,
and not to grow thin in the city,
where at some point you will have to live;
 
69 Although this discussion of “Inventing a Horse” has been published in my article “Animal Poetry and 






















152 and one must imagine the absence of money.
Most of all, though: the living weight,
the sound of his feet on the needles,
and, since he is heavy, and real,
 
and sometimes tired after a run
down the river with a light whip at his side,
one must imagine love
in the mind that does not know love,
 
an animal mind, a love that does not depend
on your image of it,
your understanding of it;
indifferent to all that it lacks:
 
a muzzle and two black eyes
looking the day away, a field empty
of everything but witchgrass, fluent trees,
and some piles of hay.
(O’Rourke, ll. 1-32)
The poem starts off with the optimistic title of “Inventing a Horse”, which is 
immediately downplayed and completed by the first line: “Inventing a horse 
is not easy”. To explain why it is not easy, O’Rourke asks the reader to imagine 
all of the things that one has to have and bear in mind when keeping a horse in 
real life. The idea of inventing the horse, then, is no gratuitous fantasy; it goes 
further than simply bringing a picture to mind. All of these things are listed in 
the first four stanzas. They probably echo the reservations that O’Rourke’s par-
ents might have had when, as a child, she expressed her wish to have a horse. 
O’Rourke interrupts her list of practicalities in the fifth stanza. The sen-
tence that begins in line 6 ends in line 13 by imagining the absence of money as 
the outcome of all of the material things that one would need. After this con-
clusion, it is as if the speaker asks herself again what inventing a horse involves. 
This time, it seems that listing of practicalities is not enough. Then, in lines 18, 
19, and 20, she focuses first on the body (the living weight, sound of his feet on 
the needles, and again his heaviness). After that, she turns to the horse’s “mind”, 
a word that she alternates with “love”. It is noteworthy that in the second line 
of the poem O’Rourke warns the reader that one must not only think of the 
horse, but of its surroundings too. As this imagining of the horse’s environ-









































153ends in the final line ends in line 16. Given that the main clause is interrupted 
by both a subordinated and a coordinated clause, the reader almost forgets that 
“since he is heavy and real /… / one must imagine love”. The word “real” stands 
out in this line. All of the horse’s characteristics are mentioned and it is as if its 
realness is one among these many qualities. One might judge this a category 
mistake (“I have a brown, quick, strong and real horse”), but in this case the 
mistake is intended. It reminds the reader of the task of a poet, which, as I have 
suggested, is captured by the Greek word poïesis, which means to make or create 
something. Like Heidegger’s interpretation of being, this category mistake is 
also a reminder that something real ultimately cannot be compartmentalised: 
the horse will finally elude all of the definitions projected onto him. 
The enjambment after “love” in line 23 reflects the difficulty with the kind 
of love that O’Rourke wants the reader to imagine. One must imagine love, yes; 
the whole point of keeping a horse is to nurture one’s love for the anymal. How-
ever, this love will be less romantic than the clichéd imagery of horses offered 
by television series. The love at stake here is devoted to a real anymal whose 
mind does not know love. Or, as the following line puts it: it is a love that does 
not depend on the image of it in a human mind. How can anyone imagine this 
form of love? Can we set aside our comforting images and preoccupations to 
picture an anymal mind? 
In the final lines, O’Rourke helps the reader to imagine the hardest part of 
the invention, namely the horse on his own terms. To imagine this, one needs 
to leave one’s own interests, practicalities, and even images of love behind. It is 
here that selflessness creates reality. When she focuses on the horse’s black eyes, 
the speaker not only describes what they look like, but also what they see. In 
the ongoing act of invention – the realisation that easy images will not do and 
the constant effort of setting aside one’s own convictions of what a horse essen-
tially is – O’Rourke finally imagines the horse from the horse’s point of view. 
At this juncture, the speaker describes the world as seen through his eyes: “a 
field empty / of everything but witchgrass, fluent trees / and some piles of hay” 
(lines 30-32). The clearing the poem creates for the horse is present and whole: 
he is no longer a ‘beauty’, ‘work horse’, ‘noble animal’, ‘man’s loyal servant’, or 
anything else. In the place of these categories, we have a real, whole horse that 
exists nowhere but in the poem. 
To complete this chapter, it is important to show that zoopoetics’ character-
istics each underscore and assume one other. The task of the poet, apparently, is 
that of paying selfless attention, especially to things that we initially consider 
unworthy of scrutiny. Then, to achieve this selfless attention, a downfallow is 
needed. In the end, then, zoopoetics is not an exercise in limitrophy, as Driscoll 






















154 experience a downfallow through the ellipsis of the verb and pronoun in “a 
field empty / of everything but witchgrass, fluent trees, / and some piles of 
hay”. At this point, the anymal mind mentioned six lines earlier is out of the 
reader’s mind and in the final stanza we are drawn, thanks to the ellipsis, into 
a ‘clearing’ of an equine way of seeing. We simultaneously see a horse staring 
and experience a way of looking that may not correspond to the form of vision 
that characterises our busy goal-oriented lives. Despite not presenting a fully 
fledged example, the ellipsis of the verb and pronoun is used here to enter the 
Umwelt of the horse. Moreover, and more generally, as a poetic tool pronoun 
drop can be informative for biologists. It might change the ways in which we 
think about defining organisms and alert us to anthropomorphisms at work in 
how we describe their lifespan; without assuming a fixed perspective belong-
ing to a definite self, poets show us how to present these organisms’ Umwelten. 
A next and final step that I must take is that of explaining that important 
concepts in zoopoetics prepare us to explore zoopoetical empathy. It is to the 

















































W ith the foregoing chapters zeroing in on specific zoopoetical tools and the nature of zoopoetics, we seem to have diverged consider-ably from my initial questions regarding empathy and what it is 
like to be a dog, horse, whale, or bat. However, what looks like a diversion is in 
fact an encompassing movement through which I have explored the salient 
ways in which zoopoetry elicits readers to empathise with anymals and imagi-
natively assume their perspectives. In this chapter I explain why I have taken 
this roundabout route.
In the first chapter I discussed the various labels that have been found for 
the notion of ‘feeling with’ put forward by John Coetzee in Lives. The variations 
in these descriptions indicate just how narrow the default definition of empa-
thy is. On this truncated view, empathy amounts to a matching of emotions 
between separate, real, and similar humans. To me, this grasp of the phenom-
enality that ‘feeling with’ can bring about seems problematic. Besides, this 
default definition of empathy results in a hierarchy of empathetic processes, 
whereby the cognitive re-enactment of another human’s emotion is ranked 
above the mirroring of, for instance, bodily postures. Indeed, some researchers 
do not count most manifestations of ‘feeling with’ as instances of empathy on 
the grounds that they lack a cognitive component (Coplan and Goldie; Mai-
bom, Empathy). This assumed hierarchy feeds the scepticism that precludes the 
possibility of ‘feeling with’ anymals in advance. To challenge this exclusionary 
approach, in previous chapters I have questioned some of the assumptions at 
work in the empathy debate by way of a discussion of zoopoetry.
Standard distinctions in the empathy debate stand in the way of attempts 
to understand the ‘feeling with’ elicited through zoopoetry. The assumed con-
trast between affective and cognitive empathy, based on the remnants of the 












that presents all aspects of life as intertwined and that moves us accordingly. 
Furthermore, the idea that only cognition can make an emotion empathetic 
shortchanges the potential effects of poetry or any other arts practices. What 
happens when one appreciates art, I argue in this chapter, is very much com-
parable to a distinct aspect of what can occur when one experiences empathy: 
the self recedes to the background so as to provide space for the other or the 
work of art. As the previous chapters make clear, zoopoetical tools point to a 
specifically zoopoetical form of empathy. Although it differs considerably from 
traditional understandings of the term, this practice of empathy is still best 
understood as a form of ‘feeling with’. My purpose in this chapter is to formu-
late a concept of zoopoetical empathy and reflect on what this concept might 
mean for the empathy debate in general. 
This final section of this study consists of two chapters, 5 and 6. In this 
chapter, I explore the concepts and distinctions that we need to define zoo-
poetical empathy. In this theoretical chapter, I start with a brief inquiry into 
how various art forms have been evaluated through the lens of the dominant 
paradigm in empathy studies. Instead of taking works of art as instructive for 
considering what empathy might entail in this research area, most research-
ers start with the interpersonal definition of empathy and then try to find the 
ways in which works of art match up with that definition. By distinguishing 
various zoopoetical tools in chapter 3, I took the opposite tack of letting zoopo-
etry dictate the contours of a definition of zoopoetical empathy. I develop this 
definition in this chapter. 
In this chapter, I describe what binds the work of different zoopoets 
together. I think that the prime effect of the zoopoetical tools – namely, a 
diminishing of the self, which provides space for anymals to roam around 
on their own terms – is best explained and deepened through the concept of 
attention, as it is concretised by the philosophers Simone Weil and Iris Mur-
doch. The ‘feeling with’ elicited through zoopoetry needs to account for the 
phenomenality of a receding self. The process of one’s self being effaced is not 
currently a topic in research on empathy. Indeed, it cannot arise as a topic, for 
interpersonal empathy presumes distinct selves. In experiencing art, however, 
spectators or readers often report a feeling of a “loss of self” (Stadler 321; I dis-
cuss this topic in section 5.2). Weil’s and Murdoch’s concept of attention offers 
a fruitful way of accounting for this feeling, since it does not require a self as 
a prerequisite for matching emotions. Instead, it calls for an emptied, yet still 
distinct self. Moreover, this concept of attention is rooted in aesthetic expe-
rience. To Murdoch, it is through a work of art and through the observation 
of nature that selfless attention is established. On both Weil’s and Murdoch’s 



















































and empathy in the empathy debate. In the case of zoopoetry, this opposi-
tion comes down to the contrast between anthropomorphism and empathy. 
In leaving Cartesian dualism behind and exploring instances of ‘feeling with’, 
we need an approach that emphasises perception and openness, rather than 
seeking to match similar peoples’ emotions. I conclude this theoretical chapter 
by enumerating those aspects of selfless attention that trace the contours of a 
definition of zoopoetical empathy.
Chapter 6 consists of four poetic case studies, in which I discuss the work 
of Elizabeth Bishop, Ted Hughes, M. Vasalis, Les Murray, Judith Beveridge, 
Frederike Harmsen van Beek, and Mary Oliver in the light of the enumerated 
element of selfless attention. That said, the sections on their poetry form small, 
stand-alone explorations that do justice to the singularity of their work. Meth-
odologically, my approach to formulating a definition of zoopoetical empathy 
is best described as hermeneutical; the zoopoetical tools forged out in the 
poems in chapter 3 point to concepts and distinctions in the work of Weil and 
Murdoch. Conversely, I draw on Weil’s and Murdoch’s thought in interpret-
ing the poems in chapter 6 and coming to an understanding of zoopoetical 
empathy. 
Contrary to Maibom’s and Coplan’s assumption that cognition is indispen-
sable for the process of empathy (see chapter 1), I argue that ‘feeling with’ need 
not solely be the result of a thought process that turns self-directed emotions 
into other-oriented emotions. Zoopoetry too can establish this.
5.2  The effect of evaluating art 
through the default definition  
of empathy 
I n chapter 1 I elaborated on the presuppositions underlying the empathy debate. I argued that two edited volumes – Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie’s Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives (2014) and Heidi Maibom’s 
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy (2019) – assume a separate self, 
the need for similarity, and, subsequently, the notion of matching emotions. 
These presuppositions demand conceptual analysis, in which I let zoopoetry 
play a key role. These two reference works resemble each other in adhering to 
the same tacit ideas of what a self is and what it means for selves to be alike. 
Unlike Coplan and Goldie, however, Maibom’s Handbook leaves room for a dif-
ferent approach in that it includes two chapters that question the concepts of 
separate selves and emotional matching. One, by Dan Zahavi, is written from a 
phenomenological perspective; the other, by Emily McRae, relates to the inter-
pretation of the notion of empathy in the Buddhist tradition.
As I have discussed in chapter 1, Zahavi questions the idea of matching by 
stressing that “everything else resembles everything else in some respect”. The 
basis of empathy, he suggests, is not matching emotions but the need to “spend 
time together” (“Phenomenology” 36, 37). The Buddhist approach to empathy 
also differs from the standard definition. McRae writes that the Buddhist tra-
dition focuses on the need for “dismantling narratives of self-clinging” (124). 
In both chapters, the necessity of matching (whether emotional or bodily) is 
diminished, which results in a broadening of our empathic horizons. McRae 
sees that in Buddhism “there are no necessary limits on our capacity to empa-
thize (and feel compassion), only the ever-changing limitations of previous 
conditioning, which can be undone, although not always easily” (132). Despite 
the inclusion of these two chapters in the Handbook, however, most of the 
other contributions take for granted the default definition of empathy, which 
involves matching emotions between separate, real, and similar humans. 
162 In both Coplan and Goldie’s Empathy and Maibom’s Handbook, the separation 
of affective from cognitive empathy affects how inquiries into empathy in aes-
thetics are presented. These inquiries also usually treat empathy as a process 
that unfolds between persons. The ingredients of aesthetic empathy, therefore, 
are derived from the default definition: there has to be some sort of fictional 
(preferably human) character with whom the reader can identify. On that basis, 
the reader can experience feelings that match the character’s; this process must 
occur between character and reader. Lastly, the matching of feelings has to be 
the result of cognitive perspective taking. In order to include these ingredients, 
the standard choice of research object in work on aesthetic empathy has been 
the novel with human protagonists.
As part of this strand of thought, when a work of art does not involve a 
form of character development, researchers typically link aesthetic empathy 
to the simulation of (bodily) movement. For instance, Gregory Currie writes 
that if we look at Rubens’ painting Descent from the Cross we “undergo bodily 
simulations which mirror aspects of [the depicted people’s] dispositions” (86-
87). Indeed, in instances in which we are not reading about a character with 
whom we can swap cognitive perspectives, it would seem that there is noth-
ing left for us to do but mirror bodily dispositions. Here, a trace of Cartesian 
dualism is noticeable in an evaluation of art. A depiction of living people on 
canvas can never be only a depiction of bodily postures (not least when the 
person depicted is Christ). Christ and the persons surrounding him are such 
well-known characters that we cannot merely see their physical dispositions. 
We see Christ’s body and his mother’s desperate look. We see lived bodies tak-
ing care of a deceased son, friend, and teacher; the history of their mourning is 
visible in their postures. 
In another contribution to Maibom’s Handbook, Noël Carroll wonders with 
whom we empathise when looking at paintings. He asks whether we are empa-
thising with the figures on the canvas, the painter, or perhaps even the whole of 
the depicted scene. As an illustration of his argument he takes Titan’s The Flay-
ing of Marsyas (approx. 1570), arguing that we do not empathise with Marsyas 
as he is flayed, for it is “improbable that the viewer of Titian’s masterpiece 
can be feeling what he is feeling”. Rather, viewers feel sorrow for what befalls 
Marsyas – an emotion that does not match up with Marsyas’ feelings. To save 
the value of empathy as an explanatory concept for analysing paintings, Carroll 
introduces the term of “vectorially converging emotions” by which he means 
that viewers have emotions that align with those of the depicted characters – 
“Marsyas is feeling regret. We are feeling sorrow” (287, 287). 
In my view, Carroll pays too little attention to the fact that we are the 











































































































conversely, not apply to non-figurative paintings. Furthermore, it seems that 
Carroll uses an argument to the consequence; the result of leaving empathy 
out of one’s analysis would presumably degrade the painting. To retain the 
concept of empathy as an analytical tool, he explains our aesthetic experiences 
of viewing the painting in the light of the default definition of empathy. This 
definition is all the more evident where Carroll rejects the possibility (sug-
gested by Dominic McIver Lopes) that we might empathise with the scene as 
a whole. For Carroll, this cannot hold water as an alternative interpretation of 
the term empathy, for the emotions conveyed by scenes differ from those of the 
characters: “a painting of a battle may express a feeling of confusion, without 
any of the depicted warriors expressing being confused”. Matching feelings are 
seen as a prerequisite here and it would appear that such matching can only 
occur between separate persons. Even more so, scenes, persons, and stories are 
to be seen as separate. Carroll also rejects Jenefer Robinson’s hypothesis that we 
are invited to partake in a mood presented by a painting. “[W]hat grounds this 
mood?”, he counters. “Objects like paintings don’t have moods or attitudes or 
points of view. So, where do they allegedly come from?” (290, 291).
On a different note – but also as a consequence of taking interpersonal 
empathy as the default definition – in her chapter on “Empathy in Music” the 
aforementioned Jenefer Robinson suggests that “high-level” affective empathy 
and “low-level” sub-personal motor simulation processes may work together 
in music (300). This might explain the medium’s often powerful effects. The 
fact that Robinson has to argue that these two levels may work together indi-
cates that this integration is not part of the standard account of empathy.
A final outcome of taking the default definition of empathy for granted that 
I will discuss here is found in Jane Stadler’s chapter on empathy in film. Work-
ing with the traditional definition of empathy in relation to the aesthetics of 
film, Stadler responds to Adriano D’Aloia, who refers to an inquiry carried out 
by Albert Michotte. Michotte noticed that “viewers feel inside characters result-
ing in a fusion of consciousness. This fusion is achieved via “inner imitation” 
as the observer internally reproduces the movements of the observed person”. 
This is related, D’Aloia argues, to viewers experiencing a “loss of self”, which 
brings him to say that viewers undergo “a total assimilation of subjectivities”. 
Stadler, however, refuses to consider this to be a possibility: “[n]eedless to say,” 
she writes, “‘total assimilation of subjectivities’ only occurs in science fiction 
and would not, in any event, be an instance of empathy”. Although Michotte 
describes what he has found in viewers’ experiences, Stadler calls this descrip-
tion an “overstatement” (189, 321, 321). I would suggest that this dismissal serves 
to preserve the default definition of empathy, whereas it would have been more 
fruitful to take viewers’ experiences of ‘feeling with’ into consideration. 
164 Rather than contrasting various aesthetic fields with the prototype of empa-
thy, I think that it is more instructive to take a specific art form as a guide for 
investigating specific kind of ‘feeling with’ that it instigates. Eileen John uses 
this methodology when she writes that a “literary work can make the poten-
tial, the limits, and strangeness of empathy into themes” (“Empathy” 309). She 
comes to this conclusion after having pondered instances of empathy that she 
experienced when reading “Axolotl”, a story written by Julio Cortázar. Feel-
ing empathetic towards a fictionalised axolotl (a salamander) might arouse 
scepticism, but it may also cause us to wonder about the default definition of 
empathy and, more to the point, what we lose when we adjust specific instances 
so as to fit that definition. By contrast, John seeks to formulate the particular 
ways in which a literary work establishes instances of empathy:
A broader point that seems relevant is that reading fiction is an activity 
we seek out partly in order to change our agency and “centeredness” with 
respect to thought and feeling. There is a relaxation of control, some kind 
of openness to letting other patterns of attention, conceptualization, and 
evaluation occupy the experiential foreground. However we ultimately 
locate “the self” in the psychological processes at work, it seems that empa-
thetic response to characters is one important form of experience enabled 
by this openness. (“Empathy” 313) 
In chapter 3 I discussed the ‘openness’ that results from the zoopoetical tools 
of questioning and hesitation. Here we can see how John emphasises the phe-
nomenon of openness in formulating the boundaries of empathy in relation 
to literature. Notions of “openness”, a “relaxation of control”, “change [in] 
our agency”, and “centeredness”, however, do not accord with the standard 
understanding of empathy. Yet they are the outcome of turning the hierarchy 
around; John does not work from the default definition and then argue that lit-
erature does or does not elicit this form of empathy. Instead, she starts with art 
and investigates the types of ‘feeling with’ that it brings to the fore. Although 
of course John has a sense of what ‘feeling with’ could mean, she prioritises the 
phenomena over the definition. 
In addition to the possibility that we might find other forms of ‘feeling 
with’, reversing the order of phenomena and definition in this way reveals that 
the default definition of empathy cannot account for all instances of ‘feeling 
with’, even according to Maibom’s broad definition of empathy (see chap-
ter 1 and the introduction to this chapter). Moreover, the openness that lets 


















































165suggests, it is not only cognition that remoulds self-centred emotions into 
other-centred emotions. Literary works can do this too. 
Formulating a definition of empathy from the evidence of the experience 
of artworks requires a new concept, which John tentatively describes in terms 
of “openness”. Although this may be a novel grasp of the phenomenology of 
empathy in the context of the empathy debate, it is not new to anyone who puts 
the arts first when analysing the relation between art and empathy. Indeed, “a 
relaxation of control” and shifts in “centeredness” and “agency” are both the 
effect of zoopoetical tools and a requirement for writing zoopoetry. A separate 
self is an absolute prerequisite in the interpersonal understanding of empa-
thy, yet John hints that the self’s importance might recede to the background 
when she writes: “other patterns of attention, conceptualization, and evalua-
tion occupy the experiential foreground” (“Empathy” 313). We cannot reflect 
on zoopoetry without engaging with implicit assumptions about anthropo-
morphism and speciesism, as well as existing definitions of self. All of these 
assumptions, however, rest on one tacitly agreed ground, which is the existence 
of a self, however sketchy, and an inkling of how it is distinct from other selves. 
As I have discussed in chapter 1, phenomenology lets go of Cartesian binaries 
and points to different concepts in the empathy debate. Instead of searching for 
matching separate selves, ‘openness’ and ‘perception’ become the important 
markers. Following John’s approach, we might ask whether there can be such 
a thing as empathy without distinct selves. 
Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch elaborate on this question in depth. I draw 
on their thought in formulating a definition of zoopoetical empathy. In pre-
vious chapters on zoopoetical tools, I have emphasised that a definition of 
zoopoetical empathy needs to take into account the silencing of human subjec-
tivity. In short, this silencing is the aim of all of these tools, through which they 
are able to bring readers closer to anymals. Seen from an interpersonal defini-
tion, empathising with anymals may not initially seem to be the central point 
of focus in Weil’s or Murdoch’s work. In their insistence on silencing human 
subjectivity in a process of unselfing, however, Weil and Murdoch indirectly 
put forward a new interpretation of what empathy might involve. In their 
elaboration of unselfing we find the same motifs that spur poets to write about 
anymals. Moreover, as I see it, poetry and unselfing have an intrinsic bond, 

























































5.3  ‘Unselfing’ as the organising 
principle for understanding 
zoopoetical empathy
A ttention is a key term in the work of both the French philosopher and activist Simone Weil and the novelist and philosopher Iris Murdoch. In her exploration of Murdoch’s concept of moral attention, Claude 
Gendron remarks that the notion has been “ignored or neglected by main-
stream ethical theories” (373). I would suggest that the notion of attention has 
been similarly overlooked in the empathy debate. The area of zoopoetry shows 
that there is a need to broaden our understanding of empathy, as John points 
out in discussing “Axolotl”. For my line of thought, the notion of attention has 
a twofold function. For one, it expresses the phenomenality of being immersed 
in a work of art. At the same time, it does not impose the interpersonal defini-
tion of empathy on either art or nature.
The importance of the notion of attention was first introduced by Weil, who 
plays on the double reference of the French verb ‘attendre’ to both ‘waiting’ 
and ‘paying attention’. This helps her explain what happens when someone is 
truly attentive: 
Attention consists of suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty, 
and ready to be penetrated by the object; it means holding in our minds, 
within reach of this thought, but on a lower level and not in contact with 
it, the diverse knowledge we have acquired which we are forced to make 
use of. Our thought should be in relation to all particular and already for-
mulated thoughts, as a man on a mountain who, as he looks forward, sees 
also below him, without actually looking at them, a great many forests and 
plains. Above all our thought should be empty, waiting, not seeking any-































































An object can only enter the mind when our thoughts are empty. If we do not 
exercise our minds to suspend thought, then we allow projections and cate-
gorisations to distort objects, contrary to the man on the mountain who sees 
without looking. It is therefore essential to leave categorisations behind and 
patiently wait to welcome the object as it is presented to the senses. 
In Weil’s vocabulary, the notion of truth is comprehended as that which is 
presented to us in unblurred vision. This notion of ‘naked truth’, as expressed 
in the quote above, echoes Plato’s idea of truth as abstract, pure and clear. 
Indeed, Weil follows Plato’s characterisation of truth in some respects, but 
diverges from his idea that truth is unattainable in our messy world. For Weil, it 
is possible for us to see the ‘naked truth’ of the other if we train our vision to be 
attentive. ‘Naked’, then, refers to the abstract object of truth in Plato’s work. In 
Weil’s work, however, it refers to an ego that has been stripped of thought and 
its accompanying categorisations. To establish the ways in which Weil’s con-
cept of attention might benefit anymals, the philosopher Elisa Aaltola shows 
how anymals are squeezed into humans’ self-serving interests on a daily basis: 
Animals are traditionally defined on the grounds of their use-value, and 
thus we speak of “farmed animals”, “pets”, “prey animals” and so forth 
depicting even their mental abilities and their moral status solely on the 
grounds of what category of use they belong to (hence, many tend to see 
least cognitive ability in the animals they use the most for food). Human 
interests and desires stand at the root of how nonhuman animals are 
defined and valued: pigs are presented as mentally dull sources of bacon 
with only instrumental value, if doing so enhances utilization. (“Love and 
Animals” 196)
According to Aaltola, these degradations of anymals are best explained through 
Iris Murdoch’s distinction between phantasy and the imagination. For Mur-
doch, phantasy refers to an overly self-directed notion of what we hold to be 
true, whereas imagination amounts to an exploration of the world by a selfless 
artist. In relation to anymals, Aaltola writes that we adhere to a self-directed 
notion of truth when we squeeze anymals into a system that suits ourselves; 
unsurprisingly the system’s designators of value and profiteers coincide. This 
effect becomes even more visible, Aaltola points out, once we see that the higher 
the profit generated by using an anymal (in this case by producing ‘pork’), the 
lower that anymal is ranked. Challenging this instrumentalised hierarchy 
of value would entail recognising anymals for who they are by diminishing 
human interests and “suspend[ing] all thought”, as Weil would say. Murdoch 
introduces the term “unselfing” for this process, meaning to let reality take the 
168 floor by acknowledging, as Aaltola puts it, “that others may be utterly dissimi-
lar from the definitions we have created” (“Attention” 197). Our egos (Murdoch 
uses self and ego alternately) must cease to be and we must become empty in 
order to be able to receive the other. 
Here again we find the idea (anticipated in the foreword of Uexküll’s Foray 
into the World of Animals and Humans), that encountering anymals on their own 
terms is a matter of breaking down “barring convictions”, not of lacking the 
equipment or devices necessary to enter anymal worlds. What, then, would it 
involve if we were to do away our convictions and give anymals our full atten-
tion, realising that they might be utterly dissimilar from our definitions? 
Many, perhaps even all, names, certainly stereotypes, some branches of tax-
onomy, and categorisations according to instrumentality, cuddliness, religion, 
and literary symbolism – all of these would have to go. Would we be able to do 
that? And, furthermore, what would we need in order to unburden our vision 
of reality of our self-directedness? 
Murdoch claims that observing nature and art offer ways of overcoming an 
overbearingly present self in that they direct us beyond our preoccupations. 
She writes the following, for instance, about seeing a kestrel: 
Then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. In a moment everything is 
altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is 
nothing now but kestrel. [We ought to] give attention to nature in order to 
clear our minds of selfish care. (qtd. in Aaltola 200)
Everything is altered, but not due to an act of will. The question of whether 
we would be able to do something, then, is less pertinent than the question 
of whether we are willing to submit ourselves to the view of the kestrel and 
refrain from action. In this passage, Murdoch conceives of the kestrel as com-
pletely separate from human interests. As such, the kestrel has the power to 
silence her human subjectivity – at least for a moment. Indeed, “[t]here is noth-
ing now but kestrel.” It is also important to mention here the unexpectedness 
that draws Murdoch out of her self, which emphasises the ‘actionlessness’ of 
attention. When looking at nature (Murdoch often alludes to birds in her nov-
els70), it is apparently possible that one’s selfhood can suddenly retreat. This is 
when reality can make its appearance. 


















































169As I have remarked in chapter 4, ‘reality’ and ‘truth’ are thick philosophical 
concepts, carrying the whole of the history of philosophy with them. I would 
venture beyond the scope of this chapter were I to delve into how Murdoch, 
using Platonic terminology, reshapes the environment in which she thinks 
the words ‘reality’ and ‘truth’ have their proper place. For my line of thought, 
it is important to see that Murdoch deviates from an Aristotelian conception 
of truth as the agreement between thought and world and turns instead to a 
more spiritual take on truth as a purified, impersonal sight that gives the object 
under contemplation the best chance to show itself as it really is. “As it really 
is”, then, means that the object is separate from any frame of mind or self that 
might distort or narrow its being. For Murdoch, then, the opposite of truth is 
an overly present self. 
It is not only the observation of nature that can precipitate a process of 
unselfing, but the experience of art too. Aaltola only touches on the subject of 
the arts in Murdoch’s and Weil’s work, but I think that it would be safe to say 
that art, especially in Murdoch’s work, is just as powerful a teacher as nature:
It is important too that great art teaches us how real things can be looked at 
and loved without being seized and used, without being appropriated into 
the greedy organism of the self. This exercise of detachment is difficult and 
valuable whether the thing contemplated is a human being, or the root of 
a tree or the vibration of a colour or sound. Unsentimental contemplation 
of nature exhibits the same quality of detachment: selfish concerns van-
ish, nothing exists except the things which are seen. Beauty is that which 
attracts this particular sort of unselfish attention. It is obvious here what 
is the role for the artist or spectator, of exactness and objective vision: 
unsentimental, detached, unselfish objective attention. It is also clear that 
in moral situations a similar exactness is called for (Murdoch “‘God’” 353).
Although Murdoch is Plato’s apprentice in many ways, in this quotation she 
signals her profound disagreement with his estimation of art. Plato sees art 
as an obstacle in the search for truth; the images that art provides us are three 
steps from reality (Republic, Book 10, 595A-598D). Murdoch, by contrast, sees art 
as truth’s main residence. In Plato’s work truth is to be as abstract as possible: it 
is a void, only truly present in the ideal world of Forms, whereas in Murdoch’s 
thought truth can be found in this muddled world. In Murdoch’s philosophy, 
the abstract void shifted from being a characteristic of Plato’s Idea of Truth to 
the ground for the artist’s selfless vision. 
In this respect, it is worth noting that Murdoch, like Carroll, discusses the 





























































170 tises the aesthetic experience of seeing the work over the questions of whether 
and the extent to which our emotions match up with figures depicted in the 
painting. Murdoch said she was “completely stunned” when she saw the paint-
ing (“Interview”), which she saw as “an expression of the death of the self” 
(Rowe 72). Yet at the same time, Murdoch lifts Marsyas’ agony to a shared per-
spective: “the God flays you [and] you lose your egoism in this sort of agony, 
which is also ecstasy” (qtd. in Rowe 72). The notion of “ecstasy” seems out of 
place in such a gruesome scene. Still, Murdoch uses the word because she has 
seen that Marsyas’ complexion is one of serenity and ecstasy. Murdoch’s com-
ments stand in stark contrast to Carroll’s evaluation, which I have discussed 
in section 5.2. This is due to the fact that Carroll prioritises the default defini-
tion of empathy, which results in a meagre understanding of the boundaries 
of our potential for empathic engagement. Murdoch uses the pronoun “you” 
because she expects the viewer to be able to absorb the painting and vicariously 
undergo Marsyas’ flaying. Of course, as viewers we do not suffer in the same 
way as Marsyas, but the spectator’s every flinch is part of a greater experience 
in which it suffices to be selflessly attentive to come to know what it is like to 
be him on a deeper level. 
For Murdoch, artists such as Titian display a “particular sort of unselfish 
attention” and thus unveil truth, a concept that coincides with morality in 
Murdoch’s philosophy, following Plato (“Sovereignty” 64). Seeing the truth 
about something or someone means that you can act towards them in one way 
and no other. Murdoch diverges from Plato, however, in taking the arts as the 
eminent device by which we might train ourselves in truthful vision. Hence, 
although art should not have an appointed moral duty – its educational power 
has to be seen as a by-product. Still, art is not to be considered frivolous, some-
thing we can do without. 
Artworks centring on anymals are sometimes ascribed merely a symbolic 
function (as Elizabeth Atkins has observed, this was the case before the onset 
of modernism in poetry at the beginning of the twentieth century) There are 
few spaces in the world in which human animals can meet anymals without 
drawing them into an anthropomorphised framework. One might say that it 
is better to meet them in reality than in art, but in our world their presence 
is mostly mediated through some kind of human structure. The worst exam-
ple of this may be a zoo, but also in a forest or at home we also see them in 
and through settings provided by humans. Zoopoetry, like other art forms 
(Murdoch predominantly speaks about paintings), offers us a space in which 
anymals can be met on their own terms. That is to say that zoopoetry is written 
in a human language, but is aware of the ‘grammar’ and images that constrain 


















































171and encountered by readers as selflessly as possible, mainly due to zoopoetical 
tools that shape our attention. 
We can see the difference between selfless and selfish literature on any-
mals when we realise that there are not only societal systems of “seizing and 
using” anymals, but also literary equivalents of selfishness (“Sovereignty” 353). 
Romanticism provides Murdoch with her main example of selfishness in the 
arts: 
We may notice, that with the dominance of what I have called neurotic 
Romantic literature the real individual has tended to disappear from the 
novel and his place has been taken by the symbolic individual who is the lit-
erary work itself … What we recall is the author himself, or else something 
very significant about him. (“Sublime and the Beautiful” 280) 
In contrast to the Romantic writer, Murdoch claims that “a great novelist is 
essentially tolerant, that is, displays a real apprehension of persons other than 
the author as having a right to exist and to have a separate mode of being which 
is important and interesting to themselves”. At another moment she calls char-
acters in great novels “free” and “independent of their author” (“Sublime and 
the Beautiful” 271, 271). The more ‘other’ they are allowed to be, the more ‘real’ 
they become. For Murdoch, the selfless eye is an “unsentimental, detached, 
unselfish and objective [form of] attention” (“Sovereignty” 65). This selfless 
attention results in a vision that consists solely of “the things which are seen”, 
such as the hovering kestrel, which is nothing but that hovering kestrel. 
The sight of the kestrel as it is constitutes a moment of truth. Truth is 
obtained in the selfless presentation of the object under contemplation. Note 
that this notion of truth, like Heidegger’s, has little to do with the correspond-
ence between thought and thing. Furthermore, Murdoch emphasises the 
writer’s “tolerance” in the quotation above because characters in a novel need 
to be able to live a life that is separate from that of the writer. In this sense, a 
presentation of otherness is a gauge of selflessness. Along these lines, I think 
that seeing anymals as they really are requires acknowledging their ‘otherness’. 
As the outcome of the author’s tolerance, otherness should be understood as 
‘alterity’ so as to avoid tolerance’s connotation of permissive indifference. 
Recognising anymals’ otherness does not imply that they are ‘too other’ to 
understand. Instead, the notion of alterity acknowledges that someone’s indi-
viduality always somehow slips away from our comprehension, which cannot 
encompass their whole being. Here it makes sense to refer to Emmanuel Levi-





























































172 of alterity in the context of anymals).71 Recognising the alterity of anymals 
does not imply that they are fundamentally different to humans; they are not 
different as such, but only in specific respects, determined by the particular 
point on which we chose to draw comparisons, as with other humans. Calling 
anymals ‘Other’ means that they are irreducible to a particular conceptuali-
sation, because their individuality resists being seized and used (Murdoch, 
“‘God’” 353). 
This resistance, however, can only be recognised when, with an unself-
ish eye, we try to see that they have their own worlds, intentions, likes, and 
dislikes. According to Murdoch, an unselfish eye can be trained by looking at 
small, almost invisible things, as she explains in the context of a treatment of 
Buddhism and Weil: 
[A] contemplative observation of contingent ‘trivial’ detail (insects, leaves, 
shapes of screwed-up paper, looks and shadows of anything, expressions of 
faces) is a prevalent and usually, in a minimal sense, ‘unselfing’ activity of 
consciousness. (Metaphysics 245)
Paying attention to these trivial details nurtures our selfless vision because 
they are very hard to “seize and use” in that they usually have no function and 
hardly any meaning for us (Murdoch, “‘God’” 353). It is difficult, therefore, to 
attend to “trivial” details. We are used to hastening our perception, to look for 
what is useful and try to fit what we see into a bigger picture. These forms of 
filtering and ranking what we see must come to an end by way of a process of 
unselfing. 
In the final stage in this process, which shows how art and morality coincide 
in Murdoch’s work, we see the other as an individual. This may sound easy but 
in fact it is immensely difficult. Both Weil and Murdoch think that this stage of 
unselfing is best described as love. As Murdoch puts it, “Love is the perception 
of individuals. Love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other 
than oneself is real” (“Sublime and the Good” 215). This realisation is difficult 
because our egos crave solace, a consolation that makes us feel good and which 
we subsequently mistake for love. According to Weil and Murdoch, however, 
love is ultimately the room given by the subject. 
It might be especially hard to see others’ individuality when anymals are 
the others in question and people do not often encounter them. Anymals are 
not only representatives of a certain group; their existence cannot be neatly 
71 See Levinas for an explanation of “the alterity of the Other” (30). The reasons that Levinas excludes 


















































173explicated by naming the species to which they belong. In following Murdoch, 
I would argue that a selfless view of anymals can be trained not only by meeting 
them, but also by experiencing art. Singling out one specific cow in a paint-
ing, for instance, and paying attention to her muscles, posture, gaze, and the 
blotchy pattern of her coat, calls for a specific attitude on the part of both the 
painter and viewers. This attitude would recognise that this cow is neither one 
among many, there for her milk or meat, nor used in any other sense. Instead, 
she simply abides there as the object of attention – resisting any system of 
appropriation.
The conscious, separate self, which is required for the matching of emotions 
according to the interpersonal definition of empathy, is discarded here, and 
we can already see that building a definition of zoopoetical empathy by way 
of Weil’s and Murdoch’s concept of attention brings us close to Eileen John’s 
observations. In terms of the empathy debate, Weil and Murdoch do not set 
projection and empathy in opposition to one another. For them, the key clash 
is rather that between the projection that results from an overbearing self and a 
selfless vision of reality. It is hard to place an instance of the experience of there 
being “nothing now but kestrel” in terms of the empathy debate. Perhaps it 
would best be described as a form of emotional contagion, in that the spectator 
and the kestrel seem to fuse. Then again, we do not know the kestrel’s emo-
tions. Actually, it is impossible to conceptualise the experience of letting the 
kestrel’s whole unappropriated reality take over one’s being, whilst still pre-
serving its alterity, within the limits of the interpersonal definition of empathy. 
Unselfing offers an alternative for the fruitless, though much-discussed 
notion that empathy must be accurate in that it involves the matching up 
of emotions. The experience of “nothing but kestrel” could, however, be 
accounted for in either the Buddhist tradition or phenomenological philoso-
phy, to which Murdoch’s and Weil’s thought relate. As I argued in chapter 1, 
the school of phenomenology has the edge when it comes to discarding Car-
tesian binaries. A phenomenological perspective clears the way for the anymal 
as a whole to come into view. In turn, selfless attention, as Weil and Murdoch 
understand it, explicates what is required of the observer when considering 
anymals. In becoming selflessly attentive, observers take a final step in break-
ing down the convictions that impede their ability to see anymals as a whole. 
It is only possible to upholding the idea of empathic accuracy by holding onto 
these binaries. A phenomenological account of anymals and the observer’s self-
less attention replaces empathic accuracy with perceptive accuracy. 
Remarkably enough, current definitions of empathy as discussed in chapter 
1 simultaneously consider empathic accuracy to be a prerequisite for empathy 





























































174 are projecting empathetic emotions onto other selves and whether our emo-
tions match the other’s. Furthermore, we do not know how closely they must 
match; too much resemblance might mean that I would lose myself, whereas 
too little means that I do not feel what you feel. Finally, we do not know what 
it is that must match: would matching among different emotions be sufficient? 
Must we rather have vectors joining comparable emotions, as Carroll argues? 
Or should we match in regard to one specific emotion? 
The process of the self receding and making room for the other’s alterity, 
by contrast, evades the intricate matter of there needing to be a complete (or 
nearly complete) matching of emotions. In the case of cognitive empathy, it also 
circumvents the need to reconstruct a narrative accurately. Selfless attention, 
the outcome of trained ‘unselfing’, indicates that accuracy is rather a matter of 
allowing the other to be present as a whole. Accurate empathy that lets go of 
the demand for distinct matching selves (based on faulty Cartesian assump-
tions) is selfless attention. Moreover, for Murdoch, selfless attention is what 
marks good artists, be they novelists, poets, painters, or creators of other kinds. 
In her view, it is also the standard for evaluating works of art and comprises the 
ideal attitude of the onlooker. 
Let me summarise the key aspects of the selfless attention produced 
through a process of unselfing: 
1. Selfless attention avoids the intricate opposition of projection and empathy 
by foregrounding the other and backgrounding the self;
2. Selfless attention stems from the difficult realisation that someone or some-
thing else might differ significantly from one’s interpretation of them;
3. This realisation often happens suddenly and befalls the subject; and
4. Selfless attention presupposes an essential separateness and acknowledges 
the other’s individuality. This process is best described as love. 
As I wrote in the introduction, these aspects lead us to a better understanding 
of zoopoetical empathy, which I explore in the next chapter. Although they 
are inseparable, I nevertheless relate each of these aspects to a different poet. 
I begin with Elizabeth Bishop’s poetics and poetry, which are best connected 
to the first aspect. I then discuss the poems and poetics of Ted Hughes, whose 
work is best explained in relation to the second and third aspects. That said, I 
discuss the second aspect more comprehensively with regard to the poetry of 
Les Murray. I connect the final aspect to the poems and poetics of Frederike 
Harmsen van Beek, Judith Beveridge, and Mary Oliver. These poets show how 
coming closer to anymals necessarily involves some or all of these aspects, for 


















































175silencing human subjectivity. In their poetics, these poets sometimes describe 
the know-how involved in achieving that. They describe what is needed to 
embed the poet’s attitude in a poem. Alongside their poems, I therefore have 
discussed their poetics, which become quite specific when dealing with any-
mals.
These aspects do not amount to a pre-given definition of empathy; they 
rather come to the fore when studying zoopoetry and are systematically evalu-
ated in Weil and Murdoch through the lens of selfless attention. Specifically, 
the evaluation of zoopoetry benefits from Weil’s and Murdoch’s concepts and 
distinctions, for their work allows us to explain how we are able to feel with an 
anymal in poetry without reducing its otherness. Rather than offering a fixed 
definition, then, the aspects of selfless attention that I have enumerated above 
point the way for a more fruitful way of thinking about the relation between 
zoopoetry and empathy. My hope is that the poems embody the relevance of 

































































6.1  “Empathy (is it?)”:  
Elizabeth Bishop’s vast 
zoopoetics 
6.1.1  Patience and selflessness in and through “The Moose” 
and “The Fish”
O f the poets whom I discuss in this chapter, Elizabeth Bishop’s approach to empathy and identification comes closest to Simone Weil’s and Iris Murdoch’s. Even on the level of her choice of words, 
Bishop’s poetics express the same mission – namely that of overcoming an all-
too-present self – and show an urge to achieve a clear vision of the other, which 
can be best connected to the first of the aspects of selfless attention that I listed 
in the previous chapter: “Selfless attention avoids the intricate opposition of 
projection and empathy by foregrounding the other and backgrounding the 
self”.
The influence of Weil’s work on Bishop’s poetics is direct; Bishop read 
Weil in 1953 and alludes to her work several times in letters and essays. 72 It 
may even be because of Weil’s influence that we read about the “selfless art-
ist” in one of Bishop’s letters, which has subsequently become famous and is 
now known as her “Darwin letter”. One of Bishop’s favourite poets was George 
Herbert and she read that Weil knew one of his poems, “Love”, by heart (Poems 
702). It is important to note, here, that the poem offers an abridged version 
of Weil’s notion of attention. Indeed, the poem tells of how Love waits for a 
sinner and creates a safe place for him to rest. The sinner feels unworthy of 
Love’s kindness, but Love persuades them to “sit and eat” (final line, Herbert). 
Waiting and the creation of resting places are also leading themes in Bishop’s 
poetics. Indeed, she writes about waiting patiently for a poem to finish. Bishop 







































One of the few good qualities I think I have as a poet is patience. I have end-
less patience. Sometimes I feel I should be angry at myself for being willing 
to wait 20 years for a poem to get finished, but I don’t think a good poet can 
afford to be in a rush. (Johnson 99)73 
In addition to patience, poets cannot do without selflessness, according to 
Bishop. Like in Herbert’s poem, patience and selflessness are connected quali-
ties, for it may take time for objects under contemplation to show themselves 
in full. Weil’s influence is particularly visible in this regard. Bishop’s interpre-
tation of selflessness, as well as the emphasis that she puts on it in her poetics, is 
thoroughly Weilian. Selflessness comes to the fore in a most appreciative way in 
her review of the work of Marianne Moore, her much-admired tutor. “Does it 
come simply from her gift of being able to give herself up entirely to the object 
under contemplation,” Bishop asks, “to feel in all sincerity how it is to be it?” 
(“As We Like It” 682). 
It is not just that the characteristics of selfless attention in Bishop’s work 
are comparable to those of Weil and Murdoch; the two thinkers’ views on how 
unselfing must be trained also resonates with Bishop’s writing. Much like 
Murdoch’s remarks on “trivial things”, Bishop underscores the need to pay 
attention to small things. Her work addresses the related qualities of patience 
72 Bishop makes a number of references to Weil’s work. In 1953 she writes the following in a letter to 
Marianne Moore: “I’m also reading Simone Weil after staving it off for several years – the mysticism 
often repels – and then suddenly she says something quite amazing & so simple you wonder why no 
one ever said it before (One Art 257). We can infer that Bishop read a specific “Farewell Letter”, in which 
Weil refers to a translation of Herbert’s “Love” and having a mystical experience of finding Christ. 
In this letter, Weil writes that she learnt “Love” by heart and adds the translation of the poem to the 
letter. Bishop writes about this translation in a letter to Joseph Summers of 1954: “Did you know – you 
probably do – that Simone Weil in one of her “Farewell Letters” tells how she ‘found Christ,’ I think 
– while reciting ‘Love bade me welcome yet my soul drew back’? I’d like to see her translation of it” 
(One Art 295). Bishop makes a mistake here in that this was not Weil’s own translation (perhaps due 
to the English publication). In any case, we know that Bishop read this specific “Farewell Letter”, in 
which the central themes of Weil’s thought culminate in the poem. Another allusion to Weil is found 
in Bishop’s literary statement “I was Just But Awake” of 1958, in which she again refers to Herbert’s 
“Love” as “the one that meant so much to Weil”. There is also her literary statement “Writing Poetry is 
an Unnatural Act” from the late 50s or early 60s, in which she quotes the first and last lines of “Love” 
before writing, again entertaining the erroneous idea that Weil herself translated the poem “This, I 
later discovered in Waiting for God, was Simone Weil’s favorite; she translated it and knew it by heart”. 
In 1964, eleven years after her first encounter with Weil’s work, Bishop mentions Weil again in a letter 
to Anne Stevenson, describing her as someone whom she enjoys reading (Poems 699, 702, 861).
73 Because this quotation is from a 1978 interview with Alexandra Johnson, it is certainly possible that 
Bishop had her poem “The Moose” in mind, which took her even longer than twenty years to finish. 
She told Elizabeth Spires about not being able to finish the poem depicting a bus trip that she took 
from Nova Scotia to Boston, saying that “I could never seem to get the middle part, to get from one 
place to the other”. Bishop began writing “The Moose” in 1946, when she was in her thirties. She had 
to finish the poem when she chose to include it in her “Phi Beta Kappa” reading at Harvard in 1972. 






























and selflessness in the context of encounters with anymals. In her poem “The 
Moose” Bishop patiently waits for the stanzas that enable her to finally show 
the moose and the italicised ‘it’ in the quotation above refers to a small dog that 
comes into full view thanks to Moore’s selflessness. Indeed, Bishop writes that 
she appreciated the philosopher John Dewey and Marianne Moore because 
they also “loved little things, small plants and weeds and animals” (Brown 
27). According to Bishop, the potential vices of poets writing about anymals 
all stem from to an overly present self, which distorts reality, whether by pas-
toralising, romanticising, or sentimentalising anymals, or using them to teach 
the reader a moral lesson.74 All of these forms of ‘selfishness’ constitute ways of 
keeping anymals out of sight, since they divert the attention from the anymal 
to the writer or moral lesson.75
Bishop’s poem “The Moose” exhibits the opposite of selfishness. The first 
stanzas in the autobiographical poem give the reader a cinematographic view 
of the landscape: we can see the river and bay, the setting of the sun, and grav-
elly roads, all from a bird’s eye point of view. After this panoramic sweep, we 
zero in; the sentence that began with the first line “From narrow provinces” 
finally ends with an image of a bus that “journeys west” in line 26. From the 
moment that the bus is introduced, we read as if keeping pace with the bus: 
“down hollows, up rises / and waits, patient” (lines 31-32). Thanks to the com-
mas and caesura, the narrated time and narration of time coincide. This brings 
Elizabeth Spires to tell Bishop that this “is such a dreamy poem, it seems to 
move the way a bus moves” (Spires 117). For some stanzas we ride through prov-
inces along with the bus and see thumbnail sketches of domestic life. The poem 
counts twenty-eight stanzas of six lines each, which makes it one of Bishop’s 
longest poems. An ‘experiencer’ is only introduced in the thirteenth stanza – 
not in the first-person singular, but in the first-person plural: 
A woman climbs in
with two market bags,
brisk, freckled, elderly.
“A grand night. Yes, sir,
all the way to Boston.”
She regards us amicably. (171 ll. 73-78; my emphasis)
74 For instance, in a letter to a fan (a certain “Miss Pierson” who had sought Bishop’s advice about writ-
ing poetry) Bishop writes: “If you feel you are moralizing too much – just cut the morals off – or out. 
(Quite often young poets tend to try to tie everything up neatly in 2 or 3 beautiful last lines, and it is 
quite surprising how the poems are improved if the poet can bear to sacrifice those last, pat, beautiful 
lines)” (One Art 596).
75 For further analysis, see my thesis, Brüggemann “Turning”.
181One would expect the speaker to adopt a first-person singular voice here, not 
least because Bishop herself emphasised that the poem was autobiographical 
and that “the events of the poem were ‘all true’” on several occasions (qtd. in 
Millier 466). It seems remarkable that the speaker herself is absent from this 
autobiographical poem; even the first-person plural appears only a few times. 
My point is not that a human mode of experience is absent here, since a con-
versation full of human interest is overheard in the following stanzas (the 
conversation has to do with someone who is taking to drink, someone else who 
is losing his mind, and someone else who has lost a son). I only mean to draw 
attention to how images of the experiences seem afloat in the bus, as if it were 
a dream (as Spires perceived), in which it is not clear who is having the experi-
ences.
The absence of an ‘I’ in an autobiographical poem may seem remarkable 
at first, but on second thought it may not be so strange. In fact, “The Moose” 
exemplifies what could be called the two Bishopian virtues of good poetry: 
selflessness and patience. Bishop told the aforementioned Spires that she 
had to wait patiently for the middle part of the poem to form in her imagi-
nation before she could finish the poem; likewise the reader has to wait for 
the entrance of the protagonist: the moose. When riding with the passengers 
in the bus and overhearing their conversations, one almost forgets that there 
surely has to be a moose in a poem called “The Moose”. Although they may 
be unaware of it, the reader has been waiting twenty-two stanzas before the 
moose makes her appearance. In Bishop’s poetics it is possible to write an auto-
biographical poem in which the ‘I’ is almost absent, in that Bishop regards not 
herself but the encounter with the moose as important. This, of course, is remi-
niscent of the zoopoetical tool of the pronoun drop: the speaker gives herself 
up in order to contemplate the moose. Patience and the absence of an ‘I’ pave 
the way for the moose to show herself in a slow, moose-like way: “she stands 
there, looms, rather” (line 139). The grammar loosens and comes to resemble 
the moose’s movement. Readers have to slow their reading pace accordingly. 
The passengers venture their observations and judgements: the moose is “per-
fectly harmless”, a “big creature”, a “she”, and “awful plain”. Impervious to 
these remarks, the moose remains “grand” and “otherworldly” until she walks 
out of sight. 
The moose’s otherworldliness may remind us of a similar moment in “The 






































182 I looked into his eyes
which were far larger than mine
but shallower, and yellowed,
the irises backed and packed
with tarnished tinfoil
seen through the lenses
of old scratched isinglass.
They shifted a little, but not 
to return my stare.
- It was more like the tipping 
of an object toward the light. (42-43, ll. 34-44)
“The Fish” is a free verse poem of seventy-six lines in which a speaker catches a 
fish and holds him in her attention. The speaker comes close to the fish through 
her observations, yet backs away when looking into his eyes. When looking 
someone in the eye, we assume that we are closely connected with them. Here 
however the speaker shies away from the danger of projection. The fish can-
not be sacrificed to any ideas or feelings on the part of the onlooker. The ‘I’ is 
mentioned in the poem, but in combination with verbs aimed at the fish, such 
as “saw”, “stared” and “admired”.
and then I saw
that from his lower lip
—if you could call it a lip—
grim, wet, and weaponlike,
hung five old pieces of fish-line,
or four and a wire leader
with the swivel still attached,
with all their five big hooks
grown firmly in his mouth.
A green line, frayed at the end
where he broke it, two heavier lines,
and a fine black thread
still crimped from the strain and snap
when it broke and he got away.
Like medals with their ribbons
frayed and wavering,
a five-haired beard of wisdom





























183Even the fish-lines and the wire leader are patiently described. They are part of 
the fish’s history, which is presented as a flashback through the many descrip-
tions of the wires: they are frayed, crimped, having come under “strain” and 
eventually “snapped”. Alliterating the ‘s’ sound in “strain” and “snap” inten-
sifies the experience of the fish-line breaking. The “snap” is followed by an 
enjambment, which makes the word even more onomatopoeic. The fish 
appears to have been caught by anglers at least five times and survived each of 
these encounters. It is important to pay attention to the seemingly thoughtless 
shift of perspective in line 64. Here, the outcome of so many observations is 
that so-called ‘private experience’ becomes suddenly observable. This makes 
“aching” a commingling word. The ‘I’ hesitates about calling the lip of the fish 
a lip, but there is no hesitation whatsoever when it comes to calling the jaw an 
aching jaw. True to Bishop’s own poetics, this aching jaw shows us that the ‘I’ 
stares at the fish with a completely selfless gaze. 
Bishop has more than once remarked on what she deems the erroneous use 
of animals as symbols or stand-ins in literature. I referred to her aversion to the 
use of metaphors in chapter 3 when Bishop writes that:
It was perhaps consoling and popular to think that the animals were just 
like the citizenry, but how untrue, and one feels … how selfish. There are 
morals a’plenty in animal life, but they have to be studied out by devot-
edly and minutely observing the animal, not by regarding the deer as a man 
imprisoned in a “leathern coat”. (Poems 686)
The reason for her reluctance, which is very Murdochian, is that using anymals 
in a metaphor is a form of selfishness. Also reminiscent of Murdoch is Bishop’s 
mention of how we seek consolation in using metaphors. As she writes of May 
Swenson’s poetry: “Miss Swenson is one of the few good poets who write good 
poems about nature, and really about nature, not just to compare it to states 
of mind or society” (“May” 734). In the first quotation, we read again that self-
ishness, in the form of using animals as a stand-in for a moral lesson, is what 
hinders seeing – in this case, seeing the deer as a deer. In the second, we can 
see that comparing animals to states of mind or society is a form of selfish-
ness. Through an emphasis on attention, Bishop sets up an opposition between 
projection and reality instead of between projection and empathy. Seeing new 
oppositions may be difficult, but in Bishop’s work truth is the opposite of self-
ishness, as it is for Weil and Murdoch. This is because truth does not mean 
accordance between thought and world; it is rather a presentation of the thing 






































184 self, which happens in Bishop’s poetry, therefore, foregrounds the other, allow-
ing us to perceive them truthfully. 
6.1.2  Selfless empathy in Bishop’s poetics
L ike Murdoch, Bishop takes selfishness to lead to untruthful writing. In contrast, Bishop mentions the selfless writing of Marianne Moore who establishes a true image of the anymal as anymal and connects us to the 
real world. In addition to using selflessness as an aesthetic standard for her 
poetry, Bishop describes an instance of selfless attention in her essay “Time’s 
Andromedas”. In this essay, she thinks about the relation between time and 
novels, before unfolding a string of minute observations of swarming birds:
[B]y watching one bird, then another, I saw that some flew a little slower 
than others, some were trying to get ahead and some flew at an individual 
rubato; each seemed a variation, and yet altogether my eyes were deceived 
in thinking them all precise and regular… infinitely more important was 
that impression the birds had given to me of having set up a time-pattern 
of their own, of having brought down the very sky and fused it with them 
in an absorption in their motions that left the other parts of sky and the 
lower world to move at a quite different clock-pace. (“Time’s Andromedas” 
642-643)
 
Bishop sees the birds, follows their individual flight patterns, and is even drawn 
out of herself. She perceives a time-pattern all of their own, beyond the human, 
yet palpable in the rhythm of the sentence “brought down the sky and fused it 
with them”. Bishop then relates the birds’ time-pattern with one’s experience 
of time when reading a novel, in which a different clock-pace takes over when 
you get carried away with the story: 
Within the invisible boundaries of the flying birds everything became 
theirs: the spaces between them, the time used and lapsing between them, 
my own momentary sense of time, looking up at them, were theirs. (“Time’s 
Andromedas” 644)
The birds’ time-pattern takes over and Bishop does not hesitate to write that 
her temporal experience fused with their time-pattern. This moment is compa-
rable with Murdoch’s view of the kestrel, in which the kestrel takes over to such 





























185goes further in the process of unselfing: she lets the rhythm draw herself and 
the reader out of human clock-pace. This resonates with the hesitations about 
the status of Murdoch’s observations of the kestrel in the empathy debate, in 
that we might wonder whether Bishop’s bird watching could be an instance 
of empathy. Neither Bishop attending to birds nor Murdoch sighting the kes-
trel would pass for an instance of empathy on the default definition, for what 
would be the matching? 
Yet the bird’s flight patterns resonate in us – something that we would 
never have picked up on had we put the interpersonal definition first and 
then tested Bishop’s description of the bird’s flight pattern against it. The bird 
watching, in which Bishop forgets herself, is an exercise in doing away with 
standard categorisations, in seeing reality outside of human frames of ref-
erence. Bishop’s voice is there: she uses an “I” and writes that “my eyes were 
deceived”. Her presence is impersonal, though, by which I mean that although 
the writing is focalised through her, she is important only in as far as her being 
there makes observations possible. Instead of wondering about matching, 
Bishop promotes selflessness and patience as the prerequisites for identifica-
tion or empathy. Her work exemplifies how one might do away with Uexküll’s 
“barring convictions”. Bishop contemplates birds in a way that does without 
classifications, categorisations, and stereotypes. This practice, it seems to me, 
is difficult. It is the eye of someone who does not seek correspondences but is 
prepared to learn and see afresh. 
Whereas Murdoch blames Romanticism specifically for blurring our vision 
of reality, Bishop sees that anymals are also lost out from view because they are 
pastoralised, symbolised, and sentimentalised, as I wrote at the beginning of 
this chapter.76 Recall the phrase with which Bishop praised Moore: “Does it 
come simply from her gift of being able to give herself up entirely to the object 
under contemplation, to feel in all sincerity how it is to be it” (“As We Like It” 
682). Here again we recognise both patience (contemplation) and selflessness 
(giving oneself up). Together, these two values ensure that the reader can feel 
in all sincerity how it is to be “it”. “To feel how it is to be it” may be a way of 
describing identification, but we haven’t come across Bishop’s prerequisites for 
getting there in the empathy debate. In the following passage Bishop puts for-
ward her own idea of what identification might entail:







































186 I have experienced it [identification] in listening to the noise made by a four 
year old child who could imitate exactly the sound of the water running 
out of his bath. Long, fine thorough passages of descriptive prose fail to 
produce it, but sometimes animal or bird masks at the Museums of Natural 
History give one (as the dances that once went with them might have been 
able to do) the same immediacy of identification one feels when reading 
about Miss Moore’s small dog. (“As We Like It” 682)
This passage concludes a few sentences later with the sentence in which Bishop 
praises Moore that I quoted above. We can conclude from this that the immedi-
acy of identification – the how it feels in all sincerity to be it – is due to Moore’s 
gift of giving herself up. It would seem that identification and selflessness 
are internally linked. The example of anymal masks is telling in this regard. 
Bishop does not refer to one specific museum, but given that she lived in New 
York in the 30s, when she wrote “As We Like It”, she might well have had in 
mind the masks reproduced below, which are held in the American Museum 
of Natural History.77 
Worn on one’s face or head, these masks are meant to bring the wearer into con-
tact with an anymal spirit. Like any mask, it is meant to endow the wearer with 
another identity instantly. According to Bishop, this shift in perspective has the 
same effect as a poem by Marianne Moore. In other words: you give yourself up 
in order to foreground the other – in this case, the eagle or wolf. 
The notions of giving oneself up, selflessness, and patience are all related 
in Bishop’s vocabulary. To her they are the ingredients of identification, an 
experience that is apparently not affected by the extent to which empathiser 
and target are similar; anything is possible. One can deduce that she considers 
identification and empathy interchangeable from the following excerpt from 
a letter, which she wrote to Anne Stevenson:
Dreams, works of art (some), glimpses of the always-more-successful sur-
realism of everyday life, unexpected moments of empathy (is it?), catch a 
peripheral vision of whatever it is one can never really see full-face but that 
seems enormously important. I can’t believe we’re wholly irrational – and 
I do admire Darwin! But reading Darwin, one admires the beautiful solid 
case being built out of his endless heroic observations, almost unconscious 
77 These masks have been part of the collection since 1896 (eagle mask) and 1900 (wolf mask), as Kathryn 
Sabella, researcher at the American Museum of Natural History, confirmed in an email to me of 3 
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188 or automatic – and then comes a sudden relaxation, a forgetful phrase, and 
one feels the strangeness of his undertaking, sees the lonely man, his eyes 
fixed on facts and minute details, sinking or sliding giddily off into the 
unknown. What one seems to want in art, in experiencing it, is the same 
thing that is necessary for its creation, a self-forgetful, perfectly useless con-
centration. (Poems 861)
A lot has been said about this section of Bishop’s famous so-called “Darwin-
letter”, which conveys so many aspects of Bishop’s poetics. What is important 
for my argument is how she underlines the need for thorough observation on 
the part of artists and biologists. Indeed, just a few paragraphs earlier in the 
same letter, Bishop states rather firmly that a “lack of observation [seems to me] 
one of the cardinal sins, responsible for so much cruelty, ugliness, dullness, bad 
manners – and general unhappiness too” (Poems 860). By contrast, Darwin, in 
Bishop’s estimation, is a hero of observation who builds a solid case out of his 
endless fixation on details and nothing else. And when Bishop reads a forget-
ful phrase in between all of these observations, a process of identification is 
put into motion: “one feels the strangeness of his undertaking and one sees the 
lonely man”. This process is very similar to those that she describes in relation 
to anymal masks. 
Although the letter – specifically the paragraph that I have just quoted and 
its final sentence in particular – are much discussed, the concept of selfless-
ness is given little attention. Yet Bishop mentions the concept several times 
in different wordings: Darwin’s observations are “unconscious” and “auto-
matic”, he writes a “forgetful phrase”, and the summarising final phrase 
mentions “self-forgetful” concentration. It is precisely because Darwin is “self-
forgetful”, along with his “perfectly useless concentration”, that one is able to 
identify with him whilst Darwin gives himself over to the objects of his con-
templation.78 This identification with Darwin may not count as an instance of 
empathy in the traditional sense; indeed, Bishop herself qualifies her use of 
the term with a parenthetical “is it”? However, if we take the ‘self’ out of the 
definition of empathy, like Bishop, then accurate empathy becomes accurate 
vision. We readers can experience Bishop’s poetics in action when we engage 
in her imagining: we see Darwin as a young man, noting and observing things 
self-forgetfully. When we take our own ‘selves’ out of the equation, the ques-
tion as to whether we are experiencing emotions matching up with Darwin’s 
78 Note here how this letter is in line with Bishop’s ponderings on her poetics, which I mentioned in 
chapter 1. In her letter to Donald Stanford, Bishop writes that they are the automatic, involuntary 





























189emotions “somewhat”, vectorially converging emotions, or the exactly the 
same emotions, becomes moot.
Finally, as a last move in the paragraph, Bishop claims that “a self-forgetful, 
perfectly useless concentration” is what one wants in art. In making this last 
point, she shifts her focus from the vocation of the biologist to the arts. For 
Bishop there is little difference between biology and art in regard to their ena-
bling source, which is selflessness. This is what makes the final shift possible; 
both the biologist and the artist draw the experiencer into a selfless view of 
what is under contemplation, be it a fish, moose, or the sound of water running 
out of a bath.
Bishop’s poetics bear a striking resemblance, therefore, to Murdoch’s 
description of the task of both the artist and spectator, namely “exactness 
and objective vision: unsentimental, detached, unselfish objective attention” 
(“Sovereignty” 65-66). Accurate perception is considered more important than 
accurate emotional matching, which is why Bishop can use commingling words 
in her description of Darwin (“the lonely man”, “the strangeness of his undertak-
ing”). This strand of thinking about feeling with someone or something may 
be unfamiliar and uncommon in the context of the empathy debate. Yet this is 
what comes to the fore when the arts are put first. What becomes clear is that 
selfless attention avoids the intricate opposition of projection versus empa-
thy by foregrounding the other and backgrounding the self. In avoiding this 
opposition, we can account for instances in which we experience a perspective 
shift or vicariously feel a movement or mood, but dare not name it empathy. 
What comes to the fore is an idea of empathy that is like interpersonal empathy 
in that it stands in opposition to projection, but deviates from interpersonal 
empathy in that it entails the diminution of the self. Empathy, here, is not an 
all-or-nothing experience of matching selves. Unselfish seeing or observation 
– trained through the experience of art or nature – becomes the key to grasping 






































6.2  “See it and live it…  
Turn yourself into it”:  
Capturing anymals with  
Ted Hughes
6.2.1  A fox and horses enjoying a life of their own 
I n the chapter on zoopoetical tools I referred to Ted Hughes’ poetics, in which he states that a poem is like an anymal: “an assembly of living parts moved by a single spirit” (Handbook 17). This remark is from the first chapter, “Cap-
turing Animals”, of Poetry in the Making: A Handbook for Writing and Teaching, in 
which Hughes presents his poetics and ways of teaching poetry to students in 
secondary school. A fervent anymal catcher in his youth, Hughes tells us that 
his interests changed when he “began to look at them … from their point of 
view” (16). He then started to write poems, which gave him a similar satisfac-
tion: 
I think of poems as a sort of animal. They have their own life, like animals, 
by which I mean that they seem quite separate from any person, even from 
their author … Maybe my concern has been to capture not animals par-
ticularly and not poems, but simply things which have a vivid life of their 
own.79 (Handbook 15) 
The idea that poems are like anymals touches on the intuitive connection 
between poetry and anymals, which was also expressed by Jacques Derrida (see 
chapter 4). To Hughes, the link between anymals and poetry lies in their both 
having “a vivid life of their own” (15). This statement reveals the boundaries of 
79 In this quotation Hughes also refutes the idea that poetic figures of anymals are necessarily anthropo-
morphised. His idea of anymals having a life of their own, separate even from their author, resembles 
Murdoch’s conviction that great authors are tolerant (“Sublime and the Beautiful” 271; “Literature” 
29-30). They also counter Singer’s idea that for novelists it is easy to empathise with their characters, 

























































our thinking: there is something that we cannot grasp; our thinking is shaken 
by something that resists being explained, rationalised, or defined. Hughes 
approaches this resistance by stressing that anymals and poems “have their 
own life”. What is more, “they have a certain wisdom” (Handbook 15). 
“They have their own life” describes anymals’ resistance to being translated 
into language – whether scientific or otherwise – without remainder. Poetic 
language, however, presents the greatest chance for both granting them lives 
of their own whilst ‘capturing’ them. Comparing anymals with poetry, like 
Hughes in “Capturing Animals”, reinforces the conviction that reading a poem 
is not about interpreting it, but about partaking in it, experiencing it. Readers 
and even writers encounter these autonomous lives, often in a moment of sud-
den realisation. Hughes explains this idea whilst referring to his own poem 
“The Thought-Fox”:
I imagine this midnight moment’s forest:
Something else is alive
Beside the clock’s loneliness
And this blank page where my fingers move, 
Through the window I see no star:
Something more near
Through deeper darkness
Is entering the loneliness:
Cold, delicately as the dark snow,
A fox’s nose touches twig, leaf;
Two eyes serve a movement, that now
And again now, and now, and now
Sets neat prints into the snow
Between trees, and warily lame
Shadow lags by stump and in hollow
Of a body that is bold to come
Across clearings, an eye,
A widening deepening greenness, 
Brilliantly, concentratedly,
Coming about its own business
192 Till, with a sudden sharp hot stink of fox
It enters the dark hole of the head.
The window is starless still; the clock ticks,
The page is printed. (Handbook 19-20 ll. 1-24)
Hughes leaves no doubt about where the poem begins: “I imagine”, he writes 
in the first line. The thought fox comes alive, then, in the mind of the speaker. 
However, the speaker’s view does not lessen the fox’s reality, for he is alive 
in the imagined “midnight moment’s forest”. To establish the fox’s reality, 
Hughes uses various zoopoetical tools: there is a pseudo-pronoun drop at the 
beginning of the fourth stanza, beginning with “Sets”. We assume that it is the 
fox that sets his prints in the snow, but in fact it is the “movement” that does 
this, which drives the fox as subject out of view. The pseudo-pronoun drop 
enables Hughes to avoid the burden of having to prove that the fox exists as a 
whole ‘self’ and let the reader focus on the fox’s action instead. Thanks to the 
monosyllabic nouns, the nose that touches twig and leaf is almost audible and 
tactile for the reader. The words “bold” in line 12 and “concentratedly” in line 
15 are commingling words, since they assume the fox to be a lived body and 
therefore make the fox’s experience visible. 
The most impressive way of foregrounding the fox, however, is through 
the poetic equivalent of the claire-obscure technique. The blank page is con-
trasted with the darkness of the night sky and still darker atmosphere of the 
woods. These form the background against which we envision the blank page 
and foreground the brilliant fox setting its paws in the white snow. The fore-
grounding is accentuated even more by way of a slight change in rhythm in line 
5. Like the introduction of the dog’s perspective in Joke van Leeuwen’s “Other 
People’s Dog”, the fox’s entrance is prompted by a spondee: “cold, delicately”. 
Like Bishop, Hughes foregrounds the anymal by backgrounding the self. 
Otherworldly in its mysteriousness, the fox is just there, until it enters the hole 
in the head “with a sudden sharp hot stink of fox”. Due to the poem’s atten-
tive atmosphere and chiaroscuro effect, we readers cannot thinksee further 
than ‘fox’. Hughes himself writes about how the poem, instead of delivering a 
meaning, presents reality: 
This poem does not have anything you could easily call a meaning. It is 
about a fox, obviously enough, but a fox that is both a fox and not a fox … 
It is a real fox; as I read the poem I see it move, I see it setting its prints, I see 
its shadow going over the irregular surface of the snow. The words show me 
all this, bringing it nearer and nearer. It is very real to me. The words have 





























193Hughes succeeds in presenting the fox in as real a way as possible. According 
to him, this is also what a poem is supposed to achieve. Indeed, a few sentences 
later he declares the fox’s achieved reality his aesthetic standard: “If I had not 
caught the real fox there in the words I would never have saved the poem”. The 
fox is simply there and to Hughes’ joy it will keep walking towards anyone who 
reads the poem (Handbook 20, 20). Again, as in Bishop’s zoopoetics, we see that 
reality is the standard against which Hughes measures his poetry.
Moreover, the way to reach reality is through thorough and sustained atten-
tion. In his chapter “Learning to Think” – which might just as well have been 
titled “Learning to See” – Hughes illustrates this by way of an exercise:
Imagine your uncle and nothing else – nothing whatsoever. After all, there 
is plenty to be going on with in your uncle, his eyes, what expression? His 
hair, where is it parted? How many waves has it? What is the exact shade? Or 
if he is bald, what does the skin feel like? His chin – just how is it? Look at it. 
As you can see, there is a great deal to your uncle – you could spend hours on 
him, if you could only keep him in your mind for hours; and when you have 
looked at him from head to foot, in your memory you have all the memories 
of what he has said and done, and all your feelings about him and his say-
ings and doings. You could spend weeks on him, just holding him there in 
your mind, and examining the thoughts you have about him. (Handbook 58)
An attention-training exercise such as this may seem rather easy, but if we really 
participate in it, it proves exceedingly difficult. It trains one to pay full atten-
tion to something by disciplining the mind not to think of something else. 
The exercise is reminiscent – as Hughes himself says – of yoga or mindfulness 
(Handbook 63). Hughes trained the state of mind whilst fishing: “all the nagging 
impulses, that normally distract you, dissolve. … You are aware in a horizonless 
and slightly mesmerized way … of the fish below the dark” (Handbook 60) The 
horizonless awareness occasioned by fishing is such an apt metaphor because 
it shows that consciousness in attention is not limited by the ego; in this form 
of awareness, the nagging ego has dissolved, very much comparable to Weil’s 
man on the mountain (see chapter 5). 
It is only in such a sustained exercise of attention that a turn – comparable 
to a volta – instigates a realisation of anymals’ fundamental distinctiveness. 
This turn and the attendant realisation are palpable in Hughes’ poem “The 
Horses”. Like “The-Thought Fox”, “The Horses” begins with a speaker: “I 
climbed through the woods in the hour-before-dawn dark”. The air is still and 
the world is frosty and dark. The speaker passes the titular horses, who are 
























































194 silent world”. Until the sun breaks through, performing a light show, upon 
which the speaker turns:
I turned
Stumbling in the fever of a dream, down towards
The dark woods, from the kindling tops.
And came to the horses.
There, still they stood,
But now steaming and glistening under the flow of light,
Their draped stone manes, their tilted hind-hooves
Stirring under a thaw while all around them
The frost showed its fires. But still they made no sound.
Not one snorted or stamped,
Their hung heads patient as the horizons,
High over valleys, in the red levelling rays
In din of crowded streets, going among the years, the faces,
May I still meet my memory in so lonely a place
Between the streams and the red clouds, hearing the curlews,
Hearing the horizons endure. (8-9, ll. 23-38)
After having initially passed the horses, the speaker turns to the horses again, 
as if the first encounter was not enough to truly see them. All of the speaker’s 
senses are open, giving readers an experience of the sunrise encounter through 
rhyme and repetition. The function of horizons in “The Horse” can be com-
pared to the horizonless attention that Hughes mentioned when reflecting on 
his mental attitude whilst fishing. The horizons have the Bishopian virtue of 
patience, like the heads of the horses, brought together by the alliterated ‘h’ in 
“high” and “hanging”. Although not indifferent, the horizons “endure”, gir-
dling the whole of the scene and making the experience possible for the reader, 
whilst staying impersonal. To underscore this effect, Hughes again uses a kind 
of pseudo-pronoun drop in the phrase “and came to the horses”. Although the 
‘I’ is mentioned in “I turned” three lines prior, Hughes omits the ‘I’ here so as 





























195the speaker, directing them to the pivotal line: “There, still they stood”. Fur-
thermore, omitting the first person emphasises passivity; it is as if “coming to 
the horses” happens to the speaker, rather than it being a wilful action. Even 
when the speaker expresses the wish “may I still meet my memory in so lonely a 
place” (line 36), and the focus lies on the speaker for the moment of that line, the 
attention span is not interrupted, since the depiction of the place (“streams”, 
“red clouds” “hearing curlews”) comprises the speaker’s experience. 
Thinking back to “The Fish” and “The Moose”, we note that they have a sim-
ilar atmosphere to that of “The Horses” and “The Thought-Fox”. Both Bishop 
and Hughes elevate the encounters with anymals above worldly time and their 
poems instigate a self-forgetfulness, for instance by dropping pronouns or 
using commingling words (“aching jaw” in “The Fish” and “concentratedly” 
in “The Thought-Fox”). It is noteworthy that ‘feeling with’ is evoked especially 
strongly when the pronoun is dropped and verb highlighted. This selfless feel-
ing of participation is specific to zoopoetry and must be taken into account 
in defining zoopoetical empathy. The zoopoetical tools that I have outlined 
in this study do not abound in Hughes’ zoopoems. The intensified awareness 
of the anymal in his work is rather due to the contrast of light and dark and 
speaker’s turn, which is only intensified by the pronoun drop that selflessly 
presents the anymal.
 6.2.2  Two forms of mysticism: Hughes versus Vasalis
I n both Bishop’s and Hughes’ poems we can detect one and the same aspi-ration and the motives that accompany their quest. Together with the imagine-your-uncle exercise, their poems bear characteristics that I think 
are best explained in reference to the tradition of mysticism. A detailed discus-
sion of how this tradition relates to poetry is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
However, one of mysticism’s characteristics – subject/object effacement – pro-
vides insight into how zoopoetry establishes empathy. 
Poetry in general is often linked to mysticism.80 According to the literary 
theorist Maaike Meijer, the unifying tenor of M. Vasalis’ poetry derives from 
mysticism. Significantly for this study, Meijer discusses the role of nature in 
mystical experience, albeit briefly. The main characteristic of mysticism that 
she distinguishes is subject/object effacement, in which the subject experi-
ences unification with the object, which is often instigated by a sudden turn. 
80 For an enumeration of poets writing in the mystical tradition, see Glicksberg 235. For an analysis of 
























































196 God and nature, but in principle everything can draw the subject out of every-
day experience and let them see and know at a heightened level. The subject is 
passive; that is, the heightened sight or knowledge is not the result of an effort. 
Instead, it befalls the subject (Lust 29-30). In Vasalis’ poetry, Meijer points out, 
this transformed mode of knowing and seeing is announced by words such as 
“opeens: (all at once), “plots” (suddenly), “plotseling” (suddenly), “dan” (then) 
and “toen” (then) – all of which indicate the turn in question (Lust 22). We can 
read an example in line 20 of Vasalis’ poem “The Donkey” (in a translation by 
Adrienne Rich)81:
 
In the brief, blue twilight
I took a little walk.
The ground was red, cracking with drought.
The air was thin, terribly high,
And stiff capricious blue thistles
Rustled frantically and unwilling.
Quietly grazing near a grey rock
All at once I saw on long legs
A young donkey;82 (20; my emphasis)
Like the appearance of the anymal in Bishop’s and Hughes’ poems, the change 
in rhythm in line 7 leads the reader’s attention to the donkey. Indeed, the turn 
is ushered in by an “all at once”, upon which the speaker walks on, but altered.
The whole scene of the poem bears many similarities to Hughes’ “The 
Horses” and “The Thought-Fox” and Bishop’s “The Moose”. All of these poems 
start with a depiction of the atmosphere – dawn or dusk, dark versus light – 
that lifts a moment out of time and in this way intensifies our awareness of the 
anymals. The turn in both poems is sudden, befalls the speaker, and does not 
result from discursive thinking, all of which seems to fit neatly in the tradition 
of mysticism. What is more, in “The Moose” Bishop sets the scene by contrast 
81 Thanks to Diederik Oostdijk for sharing his finding of Rich’s translation from Rich’s archive in Rad-
cliffe Cambridge, Massachusetts.
82 In de korte , blauwe schemering
 deed ik een kleine wandeling.
 De grond was rood, gebarsten-droog.
 De lucht was dun en vreeslijk hoog,
 en blauwe distels stijf en grillig  
 ritselden driftig en onwillig.
 Stil grazend naast een grijze rots
 zag ik opeens op hoge benen





























197ing dark and light. This is clear in the lines in which the “bus driver stops with 
a jolt, / turns off his lights” and the moose appears from the impenetrable wood 
(172). Although the turn here is mechanically prompted in that the driver stops 
the bus, its effect resembles both Hughes’ and Vasalis’ turns and accords with 
mysticism. The passengers in the bus all feel a sweet sensation of joy whilst 
the moose stays grand, otherworldly. The moose breaks into regular, humanly 
experienced time by looming and taking her ‘moose time’. 
The four moments in the poems that I have unpacked in this chapter are all 
best interpreted from the perspective of mysticism: this applies especially to 
the turns at stake in these moments, but also for the experiences of untimeli-
ness expressed in these poems, and the speakers’ altered awareness once the 
transformational moments are complete. When we consider this last feature 
more closely, however, the poems also differ in an important respect. Vasalis’ 
“The Donkey” ends as follows: 
his face was proud.
His long amber eyes shone
Like water, earnest and mature
And impartial was his glance.
And with a quick sharp start,
I stood rigid with astonishment.
Or was it with respect
For this lovely, undamaged beast
That I slowly went further?
A painful memory:
I too used to be like that.
That wholeness and gentleness,
Easy gravity and inwardness – 
O could I recover that again,
Begin anew at the beginning.83 (20)
Quite unlike Hughes and Bishop, Vasalis projects herself onto the donkey, 
who reminds her of what she once was: pure and meek. This may count as 
an instance of subject/object effacement, but we need to explicate the way in 
which this effacement is established. Weil’s paradoxical notion of subject/
object effacement whilst staying separate is necessary to reveal the difference 
between Vasalis on the one hand and Hughes and Bishop on the other. Quite 
suddenly, in Vasalis’ poem, the donkey is denied a separate life.
Meijer does not address the problems that attend experiences of unity with 
























































198 that I addressed at the beginning of this chapter. Put succinctly, these have to 
do with the opposition between projection and empathy. The effacement of the 
distinction between subject and object does not account for the difficulties that 
are encountered by such practices of effacement. The speaker might assume the 
unity has been secured, but actually only be projecting herself onto the object. 
Conversely, it may be that unity rather effaces the speaker so as to highlight 
the object. 
The mystical experience of meeting the anymal in Hughes’ and Bishop’s 
poetry consists of a self-effacing turn through which the subject gives way to 
the anymal under contemplation. Their mysticism, therefore, stays grounded 
and earthly. Moreover, the unification in question here does equate the ‘I’ with 
the anymal, unlike in Vasalis’ “The Donkey”. Instead, by training attention 
and abstaining from self-directed thoughts and inclinations, in Hughes’ and 
Bishop’s poetry the focus – quite literally, the spotlight – falls on the anymal. 
Yet in Vasalis’ poetry anymals are not often the ultimate priority. This is 
true of “The Donkey”, in which the speaker projects pride, purity, and integrity 
onto the donkey. In the final lines, the speaker identifies with the donkey, but 
not in the way that Bishop understands identification. In “The Donkey” the 
speaker reminisces about her own youth and longs for lost qualities, which she 
subsequently projects onto the donkey. The turn in “The Donkey” is not a turn 
away from the ego; in fact, it is a turn towards the ego and the donkey is put at 
the service of this deepened self-awareness.84 This poem’s mystical dimension 
differs profoundly from the mystical moments in Hughes’ and Bishop’s zoo-
poems. In these works intensified seeing is aimed at the anymal itself, achieved 
83 doorzichtig, zijn gelaat was trots.
 Zijn lange, ambren ogen blonken
 als water, ernstig en bezonken
 en onpartijdig was zijn blik.
 En na een korte, felle schrik
 verstarde ik in verwondering.
 Of kan het eerbied zijn geweest
 voor dit schoon, ongeschonden beest,
 waarmee ik langzaam verder ging?
 Een pijnlijke herinnering:
 zo ben ik vroeger ook geweest. 
 Die gaafheid en zachtzinnigheid,
 onzware ernst en droomrigheid,
 o kon ik dat nog ééns herwinnen,
 kon ik nog ééns opnieuw beginnen. (20, ll. 1-24)
84 The same happens in the following poems in Vasalis’ Verzamelde Gedichten: “De weiden liggen 
ongezegd in ‘t licht” (79), “Paard gezien bij circus Strassburger” (74), “De winter en mijn lief zijn 
heen” (65). An exception is “Duif” (72) in which the speaker admires a pigeon after a thunderstorm. 





























199through the zoopoetical tools that I have discussed in this study (though they 
are used sparingly) as well as similes, which refer back to the anymal. 
Again, the specific form of attention advocated by Weil and Murdoch and 
the notion of self-effacement help us understand the difference between the 
two modes of mysticism on view here. Separateness (a motif that I address 
more comprehensively in relation to Les Murray’s poetics and poetry in the 
next section), the conviction that something has an irreducible life of its own, 
is only tenable when self-interests are overcome. A selfless attitude results in 
a terrestrial form of mysticism, in which an anymal is neither enrolled in the 
service of a melancholic speaker nor seen as a portal to another dimension or 
lost paradise. Instead, anymals are given a place where they can be real, that is: 
themselves.
The concept of reality, so often emphasised by Bishop and Hughes, appears 
closely connected to empathy in their zoopoetry but not as it might be in the 
case of characters in novels, for instance. The notion of “catching animals” 
at stake in Hughes zoopoetry differs from what Virginia Woolf calls “catch-
ing a character” in novels. In her essay “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown”, Woolf 
recounts something that happened whilst she was preparing to give a lecture. 
Suddenly “a little figure rose before her who said, ‘My name is Brown. Catch 
me if you can’” whereupon Woolf is seduced by its “‘will-o’-the-wisp’” and goes 
after it. Woolf then claims that nothing is more important for a novel than hav-
ing a character that is real. This reality is established, she goes on, when we see 
and think “of all sorts of things through its eyes – of religion, of love, of war, 
of peace, of family life, of balls in country towns, of sunsets, moonrises, the 
immortality of the soul” (3, 11). This might well be problematic for zoopoetry, 
in which we do not think about these subjects through the eyes of the fish, 
moose, or fox. Indeed, we are scarcely engaged in an active thinking process 
at all.
If we were to apply a strict definition of a shift in perspective, we would 
have to face the question of whether we have adopted the anymals’ perspec-
tives, let alone empathised with them. However, practices of feeling with “a 
bold body” and an eye that “concentratedly” goes “about its own business” 
(Hughes, Handbook 19-20) will never meet the strict demands of a definition 
of empathy such as Peter Goldie’s, for instance. For Goldie, eliciting empathy 
through literature requires being “aware of the other as a centre of conscious-
ness distinct from myself” and having a “substantial characterization” and 
“narrative that I imaginatively can reenact” (qtd. in “Introduction” 2-3). That 
said, even less demanding definitions are too specific to allow for the experi-
























































200 empathy as “an emotion that is more appropriate to the state or situation of 
someone other than the person who experiences it” (qtd. in “Introduction” 2), 
We feel with the thought-fox, all more so given that there is nothing more 
than this fox. We feelsee him set his paws in the snow, we shift between seeing 
his footprints in the snow, feeling the snow ourselves, experiencing the fox’s 
hesitancy, and glimpsing the fox through the window. But these instances of 
‘feeling with’ entail more than having vicarious emotions or re-enacting a nar-
rative. They comprise movement, hesitance, and sights of a fox’s body. Most 
importantly, they do not involve an ‘I’ ready for matching. Hughes draws the 
reader into the fox’s world using a dictum that is rather like Bishop’s: namely 
that the poet should reach for reality. 
Hughes himself explains that this how zoopoetry enables empathy. In 
“Capturing Animals”, his objective is to teach young students how to write 
poetry. Here, the extended metaphor/non-metaphor of ‘anymals being poems’ 
serves to explain how one should let poems live – an intricate matter, since 
words also have lives of their own (they refer to other words and contain several 
meanings). In bad poetry “the words kill each other”, Hughes writes. To avoid 
this, a future poet needs to do one thing:
That one thing is, imagine what you are writing about. See it and live it. Do 
not think it up laboriously, as if you were working out mental arithmetic. 
Just look at it, touch it, smell it, listen to it, turn yourself into it. When you do 
this, the words look after themselves, like magic … After a bit of practice … 
you will surprise yourself. You will read back what you have written and 
you will get a shock. You will have captured a spirit, a creature. (Handbook 
19; first italics mine)
“See it and live it”; “turn yourself into it”: here Hughes unpacks the connec-
tions between reality and empathy. The imagine-your-uncle exercise showed 
us how difficult it is to not think of anything else but the object to which are 
attending. But when we do this – when we have listened to “it” and “turned 
ourselves into it” – the object will present itself to the maker. Rather than 
rehearse narratives, selfless attention (as advocated by Bishop and Hughes and 
conceptualised by Weil and Murdoch) is markedly passive in that it empha-
sises seeing and listening. Through these sensations we are able to have a living 
experience of the anymal. This, I would suggest, is what characterises a zoo-
poetical understanding of empathy.
The practice of feeling with anymals proposed by Bishop and Hughes 
entails observing them without judgment, attending to them whilst refraining 





























201not a form of empathy in the traditional sense. Hughes’ and Bishop’s zoopoetry 
functions, then, as a sustained training in unselfing by nurturing passivity and 
letting ourselves be altered by way of a turn. 
One might say that Les Murray’s poetry is the best example of unselfed 
grasp of reality. The absence of people is felt in the grammar, choice of words, 
and metaphors of his vast corpus of zoopoetry. Despite the lack of human 
presence, this body of work expands our faculty of ‘feeling with’. In contrast 
to Hughes and Bishop, Murray uses a vast array of zoopoetical tools, as I have 
shown when I discussed “Yard Horse” in chapter 3. In what follows, I focus spe-
cifically on how his poetics has a place for anymals’ alterity. I explain his ideas 
on ‘feeling with’ through the reading and writing of zoopoetry in relation to 
























































6.3  Disanthropic empathy  
in Les Murray’s “romp in the  
Old Kingdom”
6.3.1  Disanthropy, empathy, and “Equanimity”
I n Les Murray’s Translations from the Natural World, a volume of poetry pub-lished in 1993, we take up all sorts of perspectives: those of a tick, yard horse, DNA, mollusc, pair of eagles, sperm whale, and so forth. No one is too small, 
too big, or too different for Murray’s expansive zoopoetical project. Contrary 
to Bishop’s and Hughes’ mystical approach to anymals, in Murray’s poetry we 
get to think of “all sorts of things through its eyes” (as Virginia Woolf thought 
important when establishing reality of a character; Mr. Bennett, 11). 
However, these sorts of things are not important to a human character. 
Murray’s task, therefore, is that of translating not only anymals’ thoughts and 
feelings, but their whole world. In chapter 3 I argued that Murray achieves this 
by using many zoopoetical tools (simile, metaphor, pronoun drop, and neolo-
gism). The full range of these tools are needed for him to recreate and translate 
the world of a specific organism and vouchsafe their otherness. Les Murray’s 
translations are the eminent example of the second aspect of selfless attention 
that I described in the previous chapter, namely the realisation that someone or 
something else might be distinctively different from one’s own interpretation 
of them. When it comes to understanding how the other’s alterity is granted 
through separateness, Weil’s explanation is instructive.
Weil has very strong convictions regarding what deforms the being of 
beings, writing in Gravity and Grace that “I do not in the least wish that this 
created world should fade from my view, but that it should no longer be to 
me personally that it shows herself … To see a landscape as it is when I am not 
there”. This desire for self-effacement stems from the idea that “those things 
















































longer things that I see” (42). Can a poet or writer present this subjectless sight? 
It would completely realise a disinterested presentation of the other. 
Weil is neither the first nor the only thinker who has wished to imagine 
a world without the human gaze. Greg Garrard has coined the term “disan-
thropy” to capture this aspiration on the part of artists. On the one hand, the 
notion refers to the desire to see the world devoid of humans (Garrard shows 
how this is detectable, for example, in the work of D.H. Lawrence and Friedrich 
Nietzsche). On the other, it captures the formal problem of how writers are to 
depict a world without themselves providing a point of view. Weil’s desire com-
prises both of these impulses: hers may be a desire for the world to be present 
on its own terms, in relation to which she also betrays a paradoxical wish to see 
the landscape as it is, but without her viewing it. To rephrase the second aspect 
of selfless attention: how can I present the other as separate from myself? 
According to Garrard, a good example of disanthropy in literature is a chap-
ter in Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse (1927). The chapter depicts a period in 
which the protagonist, Mrs. Ramsay, and her two children have died and the 
reader views their uninhabited house. No one is observing but Woolf and no 
one is experiencing but the reader. Garrard notes that the novel’s disanthropic 
time span is only temporarily; after some time people – and thus recognisable 
points of view to the reader – arrive at the house again. For Garrard, the best 
example of disanthropy is a documentary titled La Région Centrale (1971). Gar-
rard describes that in making this film, the artist Michael Snow chose a location 
in Quebec where no human ever comes and that is only accessible by helicop-
ter. He set up a camera there and “then ingeniously ensured that every trace of 
human subjectivity would also be expunged from the production of the film”. 
“The impassivity of Snow’s film”, Garrard writes, “hails the viewer as a coolly 
intrigued explorer of a radically alienated Earth” (46). He quotes Regina Corn-
well, who suggests that “in La Région Centrale there is no attempt to conquer or 
to anthropomorphize nature. … Man and nature are separate, and Snow’s use 
of his specially devised camera supports that separation” (qtd. in Garrard 46).
The idea of separateness preventing nature from being anthropomor-
phised is something Weil, Murdoch, and the poets whom I discuss in this 
chapter would endorse. However, a camera that captures nature does not give 
us a view without a human gaze. Images on film are intended for viewing and 
such viewing is mediated through a man-made device, designed specifically 
for the human eye. This object, the camera, passively records its surroundings 
and in that sense it is disanthropic. That said, the film is not the outcome of a 
trained passivity, meant to make room for the other’s alterity. Anthropomor-
phism may be reduced to a minimum in a camera, but ultimately the viewer is 
free to anthropomorphise away. Weil’s and Murdoch’s thoughts on separate-
204 ness, in contrast, constitute a form of training in seeing with a selfless eye in 
artist and spectator alike. I would suggest, therefore, that they offer a better 
solution to the formal problem of realising a subjectless gaze than Snow’s dis-
anthropic camera. According to Murdoch, it is precisely this separateness that 
makes a literary work great:
A poem, play or novel usually appears as a closed pattern. But it is also open 
in so far as it refers to a reality beyond itself, and such a reference raises… 
questions about truth… Art is truth as well as form, it is representational as 
well as autonomous. Of course the communication may be indirect, but the 
ambiguity of the great writer creates spaces which we can explore and enjoy 
because they are openings on to the real world and not formal language 
games or narrow crevices of personal fantasy; and we do not get tired of 
great writers, because what is true is interesting… Any serious artist has a 
sense of distance between himself and something quite other in relation to 
which he feels humility since he knows that it is far more detailed and won-
derful and awful and amazing than anything which he can ever express. 
This ‘other’ is most readily called ‘reality’ or ‘nature’ or ‘the world’ and this 
is a way of talking that one must not give up. (“Philosophy and Literature” 
247)
Reality is presenting the other as other in the space created by artists, not 
deforming them so as to bring them into line with one’s own phantasies. 
Indeed, we might watch without seeing, read in the light of expected outcomes, 
and use ready-made language to understand something new. In contrast with 
this attitude, Murdoch presents the great writer whose literary works diminish 
our assumptions by showing something that is “other”—other, that is, than 
the writer or reader themselves. This “otherness” disposes the writer (and the 
reader with her) to humility in the sense that she must make room for this oth-
erness, which, according to Murdoch, is another word for “reality”. Another 
characteristic of great writers is that they create openness: what they write 
leaves “openings” in which “reality” can move around. In this sense writers 
both create a world and refer to the world, as Murdoch points out. 
By reading Les Murray’s Translations from the Natural World we can get a sense 
of how disanthropic empathy – as I will call it – might feel. It is a form of ‘feel-
ing with’ that does not take matching emotions and similar selves as point of 
departure. Instead, it is an attempt to be selflessly present. A poet cannot do 
without the humility mentioned by Murdoch, which Murray phrases in terms 
of the awareness that “the centre of the world is in fact wherever a living thing 





























205To empty ourselves … of our false divinity, to deny ourselves, to give up 
being the center of the world in imagination, to discern that all points in 
the world are equally centers and that the true center is outside the world, 
this is to consent to the rule of mechanical necessity in matter and of free 
choice at the center of each soul. Such consent is love. (Waiting 100)
In the next section I show how this self-abnegation relates to the subject of 
love. What stands out in this quotation is a sense that although de-centering 
ourselves humbles us, it does not put a view out of our reach. The view that is 
still possible is a perspectiveless view. For Murray, poems are the ultimate reali-
sation of this de-centred condition, for they present us “an enlarged spiritual 
present in which no life is suppressed, where foreground and background are 
limited and where detail is important” (Paperbark Tree 160). Murray also dis-
plays this same tolerant view of creation in his poem “Equanimity”, in which 
he writes about how glimpses of true attention reveal the world as it is. It then 
forms a place
where the churchman’s not defensive, the indignant aren’t
on the qui vive,
the loser has lost interest, the accountant is truant to 
remorse,
where the farmer has done enough struggling-to-survive
for one day, and the artist rests from theory – 
where all are, in short, off the high comparative horse 
of their identity (179, ll. 26-32)
Once humans are off the high horse that distinguishes their identity from 
those around them, there is room for an awareness that binds them to other 
lives. As in Hughes’ zoopoetry, passivity is necessary if one is to achieve a state 
of attentive equanimity. When we look around us, however, this state of mind 
is sometimes hard to detect. It is therefore 
More natural to look at the birds about the street, their life
that is greedy, pinched, courageous and prudential
as any of these bricked tree-mingled miles of settlement,
to watch the unceasing on-off
grace that attends their nearly every movement,
the crimson parrot has it, alighting, tips, and recovers it, 
the same grace moveless in the shapes of trees
















































and scarcely willed. That it lights us from the 
incommensurable
we sometimes glimpse, from being trapped in the point
(bird minds and ours are so pointedly visual):
a field all foreground, and equally all background,
like a painting of equality. Of infinite detailed extent
like God’s attention. Where nothing is diminished by
perspective. (179-180, ll. 48-60)
God’s scarcely willed attention, in which nothing is backgrounded or fore-
grounded, resembles the perspectivelessness that Weil craves, again like the 
man on the mountain who sees without looking (see chapter 5). Like Mur-
ray, she sees this form of attention as realised in God. Maybe it is impossible 
for us to completely reach this state of equanimity, but we can learn it – for 
instance, by looking at birds, whom we can see as equals thanks to this state of 
equanimity. Murray’s double emphasis on the grace that binds all life and the 
alterity of different life forms may seem paradoxical. However, Murray’s work 
explicates a view that is perspectiveless, sees what makes all that lives a cen-
tre of the world, and realises that all of these centres are irreducible. A human 
perspective on birds, for instance, is precisely that: aspects of birds will be fore-
grounded and backgrounded in this perspective. Only God can see all of these 
living centres in a perfect, perspectiveless way. Still, that does not mean that 
we cannot strive to follow his example. In his evaluation of Murray’s poetry, 
Stephen McInerney describes the poet’s endeavour as that of creating “a poem 
[that] consciously leaves open a space in which the Other moves (174). As with 
the clearing in Heidegger’s thinking, Murdoch’s idea of the writer (“Sublime 
and the Beautiful” 271), and Hughes’ insistence on endowing anymals with a 
“vivid life of their own”, here again a space for (anymal) Others to roam around 
is seen as the characteristic of good art and good poetry.
Disanthropic empathy, then, is not a matter of matching feelings and dis-
tinct selves. Counterintuitively, separateness does not depend on encapsulated 
selves who re-enact narratives and feelings. Rather, it relies on a subject who 
does not project her own narratives and feelings. All life is bound together by 
God’s gaze, for which everything is distinct and exists in a truly autonomous 
and yet open way – like a work of art, as Murdoch and Hughes put it. Realising 
this condition in full demands a degree of accuracy that the default definition 
of empathy lacks. Empathy becomes a matter of creating space, which, accord-





























207The ensemble of effects in a poem calls into play our autonomic nervous 
system, the one we don’t consciously control, by bringing about a state of 
alert in us. This is the state balanced between the urge to fight or flee and the 
urge to surrender, and in it we mime movements and gestures presented to 
us by whatever has caused the alert. It is a mirror state, or an echoic state, in 
which we half-consciously imitate the dance that is danced before us, and 
we probably flicker in and out of this state very rapidly, alternating it with 
other states such as intellectual receptivity. (Paperbark Tree 357)
In miming and dancing the dance of poetry readers are taken on an artistic 
journey that does not reproduce things that we already know or sensations that 
we have felt before:
We can, by mime or using the deep structure of language, go for a romp in 
the Old Kingdom, among the eloquent wordless animals, faster than you 
can start to wonder whether you should intellectually approve what you 
are feeling. (Paperbark Tree 358)
The embodiment of poetic language and the deep structure language bind us 
all, making anymals eloquent despite their wordlessness. Murray’s remark 
here is reminiscent of the biosemiotic adagio of language having a natural 
history (see chapter 4). This is not to say that vision of walking in the Old King-
dom, when evaluated intellectually, would ring false, an idle fancy. According 
to Murray, such a reaction originates in an Enlightenment paradigm (‘narrow-
speak’ in Murray’s terminology) in which literature stands opposed to science. 
Instead, people seek the world and truth when they resonate with what is pre-
sented in a poem. Zoopoetical tools create the opposite of ‘narrowspeak’. In 
short, they are the poetical variant of unselfing techniques. Poets show their 
true artistry in zoopoetry, then, because unselfing is even more important in 
zoopoetry than that is in poetry in general. Murray is able to translate anymal 
worlds by a process of unselfing through zoopoetical tools. 
6.3.2  Submerging oneself in a sperm whale’s world
D espite being less clear than Bishop’s anymal masks, which gave her an immediate feeling of identification, Murray’s poems also func-tion as a kind of virtual reality headset. They too shift our perspective 
















































208 Referring to the possibility of translating an anymal world, Murray presents 
his poetics by way of a possum in the final sentence of “Possum’s Nocturnal 
Day”: “nothing is apart enough for language”. What, then, for Murray, is 
needed to translate not only thoughts but also bodies, movements, and sensory 
experiences? Pushing this question further, how does one translate for human 
readers sensory experiences that are unknown to them? Murray answers pre-
cisely this last question poetically in “Spermaceti”:
I sound my sight, and flexing skeletons eddy
in our common wall. With a sonic bolt from the fragrant
chamber of my head, I burst the lives of some
and slow, backwashing them into my mouth. I lighten,
breathe, and laze below again. And peer in long low tones 
over the curve of Hard to river-tasting and oil-tasting
coasts, to the grand grinding coasts of rigid air.
How the wall of our medium has a shining, pumping rim:
the withstood crush of deep flight in it, perpetual entry!
Only the holes of eyesight and breath still tie us 
to the dwarf-making Air, where true sight barely functions.
The power of our wall likewise guards us from
slowness of the rock Hard, its life-powdering compaction,
from its fissures and streamy layers that we sing into sight
but are silent, fixed, disjointed in. Eyesight is a leakage
of nearby into us, and shows us the taste of food
conformed over its spines. But our greater sight is uttered.
I sing beyond the curve of distance the living joined bones
of my song-fellows; I sound a deep volcano’s valve tubes
storming whitely in black weight; I receive an island’s slump,
song-scrambling ship’s heartbeats, and the sheer shear of current-forms
bracketing a seamount. The wall, which running blind I demolish,
heals, prickling me with sonars. My every long shaped cry
re-establishes the world, and centres its ringing structure. (44, ll. 1-24)
The ‘I’ in the poem seems to be a sperm whale, since spermaceti is found in 
the heads of sperm whales (Physeter macrocephalus). The poem’s title, however, 





























209spermaceti organ. Consisting of a waxy substance, this organ was in the past 
wrongly taken to be the whale’s semen (hence its name).
A sperm whale has poor eye vision and uses echolocation for hunting and 
communication. The reverberations of the clicks emitted by the whale give 
him information about prey and other whales. The waxy spermaceti makes 
the clicks very loud, enabling the whale to communicate over long distances 
(Ferrari et al.). 
Entering Murray’s poem from a biological perspective enhances our under-
standing of it. Knowing how echolocation works helps us appreciate certain 
lines in the poem in which this phenomenon is addressed. What a biological 
perspective cannot intimate, however, is what it is like to be a sperm whale. 
Yet conveying this is precisely Murray’s goal – this is why, for instance, the 
poem starts boldly with an ‘I’. Not solely a member of a species, the whale is an 
individual in communicating with other individuals. ‘I’ changes in “our” and 
“we” at points where the sperm whale clarifies something about the world he 
inhabits. Although a first-person perspective may lead us to identify with the 
whale, one might counter our feeling of identification by saying that humans 
lack an organ by which we might experience echolocation. Thus that we differ 
from sperm whales too much to know what it is like to be one. Murray refutes 
this argument in this poem, not by emphasising our similarities with sperm 
whales, but rather by beginning with our differences.85 He works with the fact 
that whales live in the water instead of on land, for instance, and use echoloca-
tion instead of eyesight.
As I discussed in the first chapter of this study, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
famously said that if a lion could speak, we could not understand him. In this 
poem, however, Murray seems to celebrate what language can achieve. Lan-
guage, here, is the opposite of the “squeezing and using” that Murdoch argues 
against (“’God’” 353). Murray calls poetry “whole thinking”, which reminds 
us of how poets use zoopoetical tools to strive for wholeness.86 For instance, 
upon reading the first four words of “Spermaceti” (“I sound my sight”), we are 
drawn into the sense of echolocation first by the use of ‘I’ and second by the 
alliterative use of the ‘s’ in “sound” and “sight”. The alliteration heightens the 
effect of experiencing sound and sight as one thing. This is exactly what echo-
location entails, but is unknown to humans, who usually use their eyesight 
primarily. The experience of sound as sight occurs five times in the poem: “I 
85 He also articulates this refutation in a poem from the same volume as “Spermaceti”, “Bat’s Ultra-
sound”, which explores translating the phenomenality of echolocation for human readers. 
















































210 sound my sight” (line 1), “I peer in long low tones” (line 5), “we sing into sight” 
(line 14), “our greater sight is uttered” (line 17) and “I sound a deep volcano’s 
valve tubes” (line 19). Describing the experience of sound as sight repeatedly, 
in different ways, nonetheless evokes a sense of recognition in the untrained 
reader. I would say that this repetition is the poetic counterpart of “spending 
time together”, which for Dan Zahavi is indispensable for empathy, as I dis-
cussed in chapter 1 (“Phenomenology” 37). 
Whales experience the distinction between land and water in exactly the 
opposite way to humans. So although humans are absent in the poem, they 
are present in the negative. Murray’s work of translation is meant for humans; 
accordingly, the chosen themes (air versus land, eyesight versus earsight) are 
dictated by their distance from human experience. Murray takes his time to 
show to the reader these oppositions from the whale’s point of view. Instead 
of thinking about the air as a giver of life, to the whale it is “dwarf-making”, a 
place where “true sight barely functions” (line 11). Nevertheless, the whale has 
to come to the surface to breathe, which ties him to the air (line 11). Whereas 
whales can communicate in water (“I sing beyond the curve of distance the 
living joined bones” [line 18-19]), on land they cannot. When they wash up 
they become disjointed (indicated in line 15), whereupon they experience “the 
slowness of the rock Hard” (line 13). Communication is possible thanks to the 
water wall that transmits the long low tones for miles. The wall also functions 
as a medium for receiving information about coasts (lines 6 and 7) and sunken 
island (line 20), because the sounds reverberate. Sometimes a ship passes by 
using sound propagation, which the whale interprets as the ship’s heartbeat, 
distorting the whale’s song (line 21). The “sh” – sound in “shear sheer” evokes 
the sound of waves crashing against rocks (line 21). When the whale breaks 
through the surface of the water, his world has lost its centre, which is then 
restored again by the sound that the whale produces. 
The way in which the whale characterises members of his group with the 
word “song-fellows” (line 19) is not really a direct translation of the whale 
world but gets its meaning in opposition to the human world. We could read 
this designation and then experience a downfallow because it moves us to 
break down our usual conceptions of whales. (People might say that “they are 
big mammals”, “sperm whales are cunning hunters”, or “their wax was taken 
to be their semen”; these characterisations are comparable to those uttered by 
the passengers riding Bishop’s bus). Through this downfallow we see whales 
as not squeezed and used, but as a whale would see another whale: namely, as 
someone who understands her song. 
A perspective shift such as this is an example of the difficult realisation that 





























211interpretation of them. We are training to be selfless by realising that our own 
perspective is not a view from nowhere, but one among the many centres that 
make up the world and that we choose what we foreground or background. 
Trained selfless attention is a better solution to the formal problem of disan-
thropy to those surveyed by Garrard, since we are responsible for achieving 
this attitude. As Murray indicates, a perspective is not necessarily fixed; it is 
translatable and can be lived.
Zoopoetical tools are the poetic means of training a selfless eye; in Les Mur-
ray’s zoopoetry, they ensure that these anymals are the centres of their world, 
their existence is nowhere being seized or used (“‘God’” 353), and their alterity 















































6.4  Love that bestows 
individuality in the work  
of Judith Beveridge,  
Frederike Harmsen van Beek, 
and Mary Oliver
6.4.1  Selfless love revisited 
T he final aspect that I discerned in Weil’s and Murdoch’s concept of selfless attention, is that “selflessness presupposes an essential sepa-rateness and acknowledges the other’s individuality; a process which 
is best described as love”. In her article on Weil’s and Murdoch’s understanding 
of love, the philosopher Elisa Aaltola writes that ‘love’ is rarely discussed in 
anymal ethics. This is because philosophers tend to substantiate the thesis that 
anymals should have rights by way of either Kantian rationalism – in which 
feelings in general are discarded – or the utilitarian principle of the maximisa-
tion of pleasure (“Love and Animals” 193). In both of these ethical theories, the 
subject of love is seen as too opaque to ground an ethical rule. Aaltola, however, 
points out that distorted visions of reality arise, in part, because of the neglect 
of the subject of love – to be precise, the subject of love as it is explicated in 
Weil’s and Murdoch’s work. 
This neglect of love in anymal ethics, Aaltola claims, has meant that any-
mals might easily be regarded as numbers instead of individuals. Conversely, 
we might be inclined to think of love in terms of craving or idealising another. 
But that is not love as Murdoch and Weil conceive it; in their view, craving 
for consolation rather stems from a self-serving phantasy that we mistake for 
love. Often we let our ego’s interests dictate our vision and we come to live in a 
self-made fantasy world. For Murdoch, this is the opposite of the imagination 
or attentive love. In Murdoch’s wordings, love is “the perception of individu-
als. It is the extremely difficult realisation that someone other than oneself 
is real. Love, and so art and morals, is the discovery of reality” (“Sublime and 



















































































understand others via ourselves. Projecting ourselves into others comes more 
naturally than awaiting their otherness.
Following Murdoch, we can understand why love is important in the empa-
thy debate. In line with Aaltola’s stress on the importance of love for anymal 
ethics, I think that Murdoch’s and Weil’s notion of love offers us an essential 
view of the character of the form of ‘feeling with’ evoked by zoopoetry. I have 
already shown how zoopoetry sets forth the entangled relationships among 
humans and anymals; these entanglements cannot fully be explained, how-
ever, without this specific notion of love. Furthermore, the notion captures the 
phenomenology of being in anymals’ presence, be it in real life or via poetry: 
a back-and-forth movement between complete attunement to the anymal in 
question and a selfless wonder about their experiential life. 
According to Murdoch, art (or rather, good art) offers an unselfed vision of 
reality. Hence, selfless attention can be trained. In this respect art and morality 
collide, since Murdoch sees a “just and loving gaze” as the key characteristic 
of a moral agent (“Idea” 327). There is room for ever-more detail in this gaze, 
Murdoch explains, bringing us closer and closer to someone or something. 
However, we usually seem to have no other option but to use general language, 
in which individuality is erased. Studying anymals’ individuality, instead of 
reducing them to their species-being, is a fairly new phenomenon in science.87 
The arts, in contrast, have a long history of searching for ways to preserve any-
mals’ individualities, as in zoopoetry. In this last section, I discuss the ways in 
which love preserves anymal selves and allows poets to present their subjective 
experience. 
6.4.2  What is it like to love bats? A zoopoetic manual  
by Judith Beveridge
C hapter 1 of this study focused on the irreducibility of subjective expe-rience, circling around Thomas Nagel’s seminal article “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”. Nagel’s point is that theories of consciousness need 
to address the “what it is like for someone to be that someone”, that is, the 
subjective experience of a single point of view. As an example of subjectivity’s 
irreducibility to an objective, physical element, Nagel introduces the example 
of a bat. By way of this example, he makes clear that we imagine what it is like 
to be a bat for me, but never what it is like to be a bat for a bat. Nagel describes 
87 For a discussion of anymals’ individual personalities, see Ogden. 
214 bats as an alien form of life, because he wants to show that what it is like to 
be a bat stays out of the reach of conceptualisation. Bats, therefore, perfectly 
illustrate the irreducibility of ineffable qualia. Nagel does not feel the need to 
explain their alienness: “anyone who has spent some time in an enclosed space 
with an excited bat knows what it is to encounter a fundamentally alien form 
of life” (438).
Aside from the fact that later in the article Nagel contradictorily ascribes 
all sorts of characteristics to bats (e.g. that they have subjective experience or 
they find their way via echolocation, which gives them a 3D, auditory picture of 
the space) whilst simultaneously calling them alien, the peculiarity of Nagel’s 
argument is already apparent in the sentence that I have just quoted. Here, 
he presents the idea that bats are alien as a truism. No doubt, an excited bat is 
frightening to behold, especially if we are not used to bats, not having spent 
time together. What might frighten or upset us in this case, however, is pre-
cisely the bat’s fear. Strangely enough, Nagel already knows what is exciting 
the bat: the enclosed space.88 The bat feels trapped in a space that is not his or 
her own and is frightened. The explanation of his or her excitement, there-
fore, is not that alien at all. Moreover, the bat’s fear is the cause of our fear in 
Nagel’s example, which therefore exemplifies both empathy and a shift of per-
spectives. Nagel rationalises his feeling of fear by calling bats alien. Another 
approach is possible, however, according to which we take a step back and start 
with what binds us with the bat – our shared fear. If we take this alternative 
route, we encounter more uncertainties and questions about the bat’s behav-
iour. It asks more of our time and willingness to learn. It demands a certain 
form of attention, which is much harder to train than easily setting the bat 
aside as being alien. 
This is the route taken by the poet Judith Beveridge in her poem “How to 
Love Bats”. Love is the generic term for this approach to the anymal and is best 
understood in the manner put forward by Murdoch and Weil. Not taken aback 
by the bats’ alienness, Beveridge urges the reader to articulate and train their 
love for them. Although the poem rests on the idea that ignorance breeds intol-
erance, of course it has much more to say than this truism suggests. Indeed, it 
insists that loving is a way of becoming: 
88 Another reading might be possible, if we understand the sentence as describing Nagel himself being 
in a bat’s surroundings, which feel enclosed to him. I think this interpretation is not especially likely, 
however, since a bat’s habitat is usually a cave, which bats of course do not experience as enclosed. 
This makes the excitement harder to explain. Moreover, bats live with each other in a cave, whereas 
Nagel writes about a bat, singular. I therefore think that “an enclosed space” has to do with the bat 





























215How to Love Bats
Begin in a cave.
Listen to the floor boil with rodents, insects.
Weep for the pups that have fallen. Later,
you’ll fly the narrow passages of those bones,
but for now — 
 
open your mouth, out will fly names
like Pipistrelle, Desmodus, Tadarida. Then,
listen for a frequency
lower than the seep of water, higher
than an ice planet hibernating
beyond a glacier of Time. (ll. 1-11)
“Begin in a cave” is the first imperative in the poem. For philosophers, the cave 
is the place in which an intellectual journey starts. That said, if all goes well 
and a philosopher frees his or her mind, they certainly do not return to the cave 
(unless you are Socrates). Plato’s cave is a place of shadow-knowledge. There 
may be copycats here, and a lot of parroting, but the actual anymals themselves 
are not present. To achieve real knowledge, philosophers need to somehow 
shed their body. Instead of resting beside the flickering light of the fire, they 
should turn towards the steady, blinding light of the sun. For the love of bats, 
however, we have to go into the cave again and start thinking where bats start 
their life. 
In the cave, we are compelled to enlarge the limits of our sensory experience. 
Here, we can feel the tight connection between poetry and anymals argued 
for by Derrida, Hughes, and Driscoll. In “How to Love Bats”, the training in 
empathy and perspective shift depends solely on the studious use of language. 
Strictly speaking, there is no pronoun drop here for the poem consists of 
imperatives. One characteristic of imperatives, however, is precisely that they 
leave the subject out. It would appear that loving bats entails the absence of 
the subject; at the same time it involves training yourself to swap perspectives 
with a bat. If Thomas Nagel wrote about bats being alien, the question now 
would be this: would he have done so had he visited a bat cave? Had he spent 
time with them in their own surroundings and not in an enclosed space? Had 
he read “How to Love Bats?” by Judith Beveridge?
In Beveridge’s poem, once we have entered the cave, we are urged to mourn 
the pups that have fallen and listen to the rodents and insects crawling on the 


















































































216 resigned remark that however many aspects of bats we might imagine, they 
do not take us very far, for our own imagination restricts our ability to grasp 
their subjective experience, the “what it is for a bat to be a bat” (Nagel 439). 
Although Dennett might concur with this, he rebuts Nagel’s further claim that 
scientifically gathered facts about a bat’s sensory apparatus have nothing to tell 
us about what it is like to be a bat either. Beveridge, in turn, poetically denies 
Nagel’s first claim (that our imagination is inadequate to the task of imagining 
a bat’s subjective experience from a bat’s perspective, since it is based upon our 
own experience and therefore limited). She lets the reader imaginatively seek a 
sound that falls outside of our hearing range using a phenomenological meta-
phor: “a frequency / lower than the seep of water, higher / than an ice planet 
hibernating / beyond a glacier of Time” (lines 8-11).
It is as if Beveridge is saying that we can extend our experiences, by way of 
a phenomenological metaphor, for instance. Initially, her imperatives lead us 
to where bats are:
Visit op shops. Hide in their closets.
Breathe in the scales and dust
of clothes left hanging. To the underwear
and to the crumbled black silks — well,
give them your imagination
and plenty of line, also a night of gentle wind.
 
By now your fingers should have
touched petals open. You should have been dreaming
each night of anthers and of giving
to their furred beauty
your nectar-loving tongue. But also,
your tongue should have been practising the cold
of a slippery, frog-filled pond.
 
Go down on your elbows and knees. (ll. 12-24)
We are not bats and are unable to become them. Our tongues may never factu-
ally become “nectar-loving”, as Beveridge’s commingling characterisation has 
it – we just do not have such tongues. Instead of walking down the dead-end 
ally of sceptical reasoning, however, Beveridge directs the reader towards an 
understanding of love that consists partly of taking up a perspective by placing 






























217Some imperatives are straightforward: we know how to go down on our elbows 
and knees (line 24), spend time in charity shops, and hide in their closets (line 
12). In short, we know how to be where bats are. But then the encouragements 
become more obscure:
You’ll need a speleologist’s desire for rebirth
and a miner’s paranoia of gases —
but try to find within yourself
the scent of a bat-loving flower. (ll. 25-28)
 
The cave in which bats are born and sleep forms a second womb, which humans 
can enter on the proviso that they have a speleologist’s desire for rebirth – which 
is itself a commingling phrase. Obviously, speleologists do not necessarily have 
a desire for rebirth and if they have it will not be fulfilled by entering a cave. 
There is a sense, however, in which a bat re-enters the womb each time that they 
fly back into the cave. A speleologist can easily bond with bats, then, since they 
both long to be in caves. A “desire for rebirth” can only serve as an identifier, 
however, if we are talking about a creature who combines human and bat. The 
following stage of coming to love bats involves identifying with them, even as 
they are viewed as pests. 
Read books on pogroms. Never trust an owl.
Its face is the biography of propaganda.
Never trust a hawk. See its solutions
in the fur and bones of regurgitated pellets.
 
And have you considered the smoke
yet from a moving train? You can start
half an hour before sunset,
but make sure the journey is long, uninterrupted
and that you never discover
the faces of those Trans-Siberian exiles. (ll. 29-38)
 
“Read books on pogroms” (line 30) is an unsettling imperative. Beveridge does 
not refrain from comparisons between populations suffering under ethnic 
violence and bats threatened by battues. Owls, for the latter, are one source of 
danger. In a human world owls might stand for wisdom, but in a bat world 
we need to reinterpret their appearance. People are another threat. Bats are 
seen as pests; when they hide in chimneys in people’s homes, they are often 


















































































218 and smoke from chimneys (line 33) leaves us with no other way of reading this 
stanza than as a comparison between the persecution of bats and Jews. 
In Coetzee’s Lives, Elizabeth Costello’s comparison between slaughter-
houses and concentration camps is met with resistance on the part of the poet 
Abraham Stern. Costello says that if Jews were treated like cattle, then cattle 
are treated like Jews (148); Stern’s main objection is that this inversion insults 
the dead. The comparison is also reminiscent of the starfish washing ashore in 
Judith Herzberg’s poem “Starfish”, which we were urged not read as a meta-
phor (see chapter 3). Like Costello and Herzberg, Beveridge does not flinch in 
drawing the comparison. Perhaps she does so more obliquely than Costello, 
though, since she shifts between perspectives and contexts, moving quickly 
from one stanza to the other: 
Spend time in the folds of curtains. 
Seek out boarding-school cloakrooms.
Practise the gymnastics of web umbrellas. (ll. 39-41)
 
Practising folding and unfolding like web umbrellas (line 41) and spending 
time in the bats’ environment is not enough. Beveridge goes further in the fol-
lowing stanza, using musical metaphors, rhyme, and rhythm to convey a bat’s 
Umwelt. The metaphors are phenomenological in that they, like commingling 
words, perform the bat’s subjective experience in a comparison that resonates 
with the human reader. 
Are you
floating yet, thought-light,
without a keel on your breastbone?
Then, meditate on your bones as piccolos,
on mastering the thermals




at describing the spectacles of the echo — 
but don’t watch dark clouds
passing across the moon. This may lead you
to fetishes and cults that worship false gods





























219“Spectacles of the echo” (line 51) is reminiscent of the phrase “I sound my 
sight” in Les Murray’s “Spermaceti” because it too translates echolocation for 
humans, most of whom primarily use their eyesight. Recent studies may tell us 
that echolocation is a way of hearing and not a completely alien way of view-
ing the world (as Thomas Nagel argued), yet it still needs to be translated for 
untrained humans.89 This because for bats echolocation is as normal a way of 
grasping the world as sight is for humans. Do not confuse a bat with the blood-
licking vampire, Beveridge urges the reader. Instead, one must repeatedly 
Practise echo-locating aerodromes,
stamens. Send out rippling octaves
into the fossils of dank caves —
then edit these soundtracks
with a metronome of dripping rocks, heartbeats
and with a continuous, high-scaled wondering
about the evolution of your own mind. (ll. 55-61)
With this final imperative, which loses its imperative character on account of 
its length, Beveridge invites reader’s sense of wonder at our evolved bat minds. 
It is an example of Murdoch’s “unsentimental, detached, unselfish objective 
attention” (“Sovereignty” 64). The notion of alienness has no place in this 
unselfish attention, since it tells us more about preconceived ideas about bats 
than bats themselves. Put differently, perceptions of bats’ alienness stem from 
projection rather than patience. 
In the final stanza Beveridge tells us that love cannot be prescribed, that 
there is no manual for it. What teaches us how to love bats is nothing more 
than observation: 
But look, I must tell you — these instructions
are no manual. Months of practice
may still only win you appreciation  
89 Sean Allen-Hermanson in the essay “So That’s What It’s like!”, for instance, shows that echolocation 
is in fact a kind of hearing: “Echolocatory experience probably just has an auditory character. It’s the 
experience of hearing rapid squeaks and shrieks and their echoes, and though a bit unusual to con-
sider, it is easily within one’s imaginative grasp. To the complaint that knowing what it is like for a 
bat to hear echoes isn’t the same as knowing what it is like for a human, or for me, one need only point 
out that it should at least be no more mysterious than asking what it is like for a dog to see something. 



















































































220 of the acoustical moth,
hatred of the hawk and owl. You may need
 
to observe further the floating black host
through the hills. (ll. 62-68)
Ultimately, there is no manual for love. To perfect the art of loving bats, one 
needs to observe them continuously and selflessly. This advice is very much 
in line with both Murdoch’s and Weil’s analyses and Bishop’s description of 
Darwin. 
6.4.3  The opposite of an “urgent, impelling being” in 
Frederike Harmsen van Beek’s “Good morning? Heavenly 
Lady Ping” 
T he previous sections on Hughes, Bishop and Beveridge have provided us with examples of a detached, unsentimental, and unselfish observa-tion and how to train ourselves to realise that “something other than 
oneself is real”. It may be that “How to Love Bats” also exemplifies Weil’s and 
Murdoch’s conception of love as “the perception of individuals” (Murdoch 
“The Sublime and the Good” 215). This interpretation of love is illuminating 
at this juncture of this study, for it shows that many of the poems that I have 
discussed so far unselfishly observe individuals as representatives of a species 
rather than as individuals in their own right. Seeing an individual would entail 
attending not only to an anymal’s species-specific being, but to their biogra-
phy too. Just as humans have specific life histories and idiosyncrasies, so do 
anymals. Since having conversations with individual anymals requires spend-
ing extended periods of time with them, however, their biographies usually go 
unwritten – save for those of our pets. It is unsurprising, then, that most of the 
zoopoetry about individual anymals concerns pets. In his monograph Poetry 
and Animals: Blurring the Boundaries with the Human, Onno Oerlemans makes 
the disheartening comment that “[b]roadly speaking, Western cultures value 
individual animals when they are pets, but not if they are wild animals or live-
stock”. All anymals not only have species-specific Umwelten, but also individual 
histories and therefore personal, multiform takes on the world, about which 
we know nothing. When we let these facts sink in, we might concur with Oer-
lemans’ remark that to do justice to anymals’ specific subjectivities is to remain 





























221The hazards of anthropomorphising or mystification, but also of rationalising 
anymals’ individuality away as alien are felt all the more keenly when these 
individuals are recognised as having faces in a Levinasian sense. Seeing someone, 
instead of an instance of a species inhibits us being silent about them. We may 
not be accustomed to descriptions of the biography of an individual bat, who 
may have a different experience of time, relationships, others, deaths, joys, and 
sicknesses – that is, all of those elements of which a human biography usually 
consists. We can nonetheless make a start, however insufficient, by imagining 
being in their context and their ability to echolocate. 
That said, the dividing line between a species-specific description of an 
Umwelt and a personal history may not be so clear cut; smells will be part of 
any credible dog biography, for instance. By contrast, Oerlemans refers to Fred-
erick Gaber’s analysis of poems by William Wordsworth, in which he (Gaber) 
points out that Wordsworth demonstrates the awareness that “the subjectivity 
of the object exists but cannot be known” (127). Oerlemans quotes Gaber on 
Wordsworth: 
His protection of the discreteness of the objects he experiences, his refusal… 
to overwhelm them with his own urgent impelling being, is in part a pro-
tection of his own individuality, which he does not want to lose by blending 
it with another or by being swamped. (qtd. in Oerlemans 127) 
Oerlemans underscores Gaber’s view by adding that Wordsworth’s poems “pre-
sent the paradox that an awareness of and respect for the subjectivity of another 
being requires one to be more or less silent about it” (127). I do recognise the 
many ways in which a zoopoem can lose sight of the anymal; a zoopoem might 
produce a sentimental image instead of appealing to the senses, project feel-
ings and narratives onto anymals rather than listen to them, fantasise about 
the anymal rather than selflessly observe it, or take anymals as occasions for ser-
monising rather than honing our attention. That aside, however, I have shown 
that there are ways of being aware of the other’s subjectivity without having 
to stay silent about it. Gaber himself gives us a clue as to what these involve: 
grasping the other’s individuality, in short, entails nurturing the opposite of 
our “urgent impelling being”. 
An example of what I mean here can be found in Frederike Harmsen van 



















































































222 To understand a wee bit of chickens, one must have been one really. I am 
not a chicken, but I have known many of them since I was young. Of quite 
a few I remember not only their names, but also their faces and habits. I 
have, so to speak, curled up to roost in their barns in between the beams 
and their neglected homes, quite rightly named “coops” and was able to get 
an impression. I have seen them from up close, heard them, smelled them, 
rethought them. Hens. And roosters. Sure enough. To understand some-
thing, anything, other than one’s own life form – anyway understanding 
is usually possible, but comprehension is not and therein lies the difficulty 
– to fathom something, anything, even if it is clear from the start, as it is 
with everything, it will never work. For a start one has become diminutive 
– scarcely absent, as unsuspected as possible, and therefore very loving (In 
Goed en Kwaad 238).90 
Harmsen van Beek’s bouncy style reflects our hesitations in trying to grasp 
other forms of life. It is an example of the back-and-forth movement that I 
mentioned in the first chapter. According to Harmsen van Beek, successfully 
seeing the individual anymal requires a diminished self, which she equates 
with being “very loving”. Here again we recognise the Murdochian and Weilian 
theme of the necessity of self-abnegation in giving our full, loving attention to 
the object. 
Love, then, works both ways. It directs our attention to a chicken, but not 
just a chicken as a member of a species, but rather as someone with a face and 
certain habits. At the same time, by directing our attention toward a chicken, 
we ourselves become “scarcely absent”. As Harmsen van Beek suggests in her 
poem “Good morning? Heavenly Lady Ping”, which is dedicated to the speak-
er’s cat, Lady Ping, who lost her entire litter. From the cat’s perspective, the 
speaker trying to comfort her becomes “the intimate roommate with extended 
hind legs”: 
90 Om kippen een beetje te kunnen begrijpen, moet men er eigenlijk een zijn geweest, Ik ben geen kip 
– maar wel heb ik er van jongs af vele gekend. Ik herinner me van verscheidene niet alleen de namen, 
maar ook de gezichten en de gewoonten. Om zo te zeggen, ik heb me klein gemaakt en ben op hun 
stokken in de schuren tussen de balken en in hun eeuwig verwaarloosde woningen, zeer terecht 
genoemd hokken, gaan zitten – en zo heb ik me een indruk kunnen vormen. Van nabij heb ik ze 
gezien, gehoord, geroken en nabedacht. Kippen. En hanen. Jawel. Om iets, wàt dan ook, om een, van 
je eigen, afwijkende levensvorm te kunnen begrijpen – enfin begrijpen kan meestal wel, maar bevatten 
kan niet, en daarin schuilt de moeilijkheid – om iets, wat dan ook, te doorgronden, zelfs indien van 
te voren al duidelijk is, zoals met alles, dat het toch wel nooit lukken zal, moet men om te beginnen 





























223This illness, dear pitiful madam,
Is a butcherly scallywag and this much is clear:
There is no way of littering up against it, even for the 
undertaker, the intimate roommate, the
well-known server of lukewarm milk,
who on extended hind legs
almost can’t keep pace with the burying
is it not, Lady Ping, radarmoustacheod, 
double-pointedly-capped, ladyeyelike catess?
It is better now to sit without wistfulness in 
the raw fragrant morning air, now the sun is still
tender and the curtains still vivid in the good
cheerful wind. Oh stalktaily gorgeous,
look, silent simpleminded dearest,
there goes an important, very tiny but
quite tasty critter between the gravel stones
under the heavenly blue hydrangea.
(To my dejected cat, for comfort at the departing of her brood).91 (24-25, ll. 11-29)
The poem makes abundant use of neologistic compounding. For instance, 
Harmsen van Beek manages to give three new compounds in sequence (“radar-
moustacheod, double-pointedly-capped, ladyeyelike catess”) without making 
the poem difficult to read. We come to know that the cat is the speaker’s “dear-
est” because she says so in line 24. We already knew this, though, on account 
of the unselfing compounds. They have a double effect: we zero in on the cat 
through the compounds, which, at the same time, convey the speaker’s love. 
“Radarmoustacheod” is the most feline of the three compounds. It reminds the 
reader that a cat receives most of her information about the surrounding world 
through her nose and whiskers, which are more than a human moustache in 
that they function as a radar. “[D]ouble-pointedly-capped” and “ladyeyelike” 


















































































224 cat in them, because inventing neologisms is a way of showing one’s love for 
something whilst celebrating its individuality. 
Love can also be detected in the lines “It is better now to sit without wist-
fulness in / the raw fragrant morning air, now the sun is still / tender and the 
curtains still vivid in the good / cheerful wind”. This is because the commin-
gling words “raw fragrant morning air” are meant specifically to divert the 
cat’s attention to the morning air and the vivid curtains. Seeing curtains as 
vivid calls to mind the “aching jaw” in Bishop’s “The Fish” (see my discussion 
above). The curtains are vivid for a cat – they move, they can be chased. Here 
Harmsen van Beek uses an adjective to perform a quick shift in perspectives, 
like Bishop in “The Fish”. 
At the end of the poem especially, Harmsen van Beek exemplifies her own 
advice that one should be “scarcely absent … and therefore very loving” in 
attending to anymals. The final lines, in which the small but important and 
tasty critter is introduced, begins with the imperative “look”. Although this 
word is set between commas, as if the speaker is talking to the cat, here the 
speaker’s and cat’s view coincide in that the critter is important to the cat and 
the speaker has again shifted perspective. Or, to put this perhaps more pre-
cisely, the speaker labels an interspace that is understandable for both of them. 
If one is lovingly attentive, one can see that the critter is important to the cat. 
Commingling words are the preeminent zoopoetical tool for marking an any-
mal’s individuality. By the end of the poem the perspective shift is complete: 
the critter of great interest lightens the cat’s grief for her lost litter. It consumes 
all her attention, upon which the poems ends abruptly – a bit like a cat’s way 
of (not) saying goodbye. 
91 deze ziekte, lieve beklagenswaardige mevrouw,
 is een wrede rakker en zoveel is wel duidelijk:
 er valt niet tegenop te baren, waar zelfs het 
 begrafeniswezen, die intieme huisgenoot, die
 zeer bekende schenker ook van lauwe melk,
 op zijn verlengde achterpoten het ter 
 aarde bestellen welhaast niet meer bij kan
 benen, nietwaar, dame Ping, radarbesnorde,
 dubbelgepuntmutste, mevrouwogige poezin?
 Het is nu beter te zitten zonder weemoed in
 de rauwe geurige ochtendlucht, nu de zon nog
 teder is en de gordijnen levendig in de goede
 vrolijke wind. O halmstaartige voortreffelijke,
 kijk, zwijgzame zwakzinnige allerliefste,
 er loopt een belangwekkend, héél klein maar
 bijzonder lekker beestje tussen de kiezelstenen
 onder de hemelsblauwe hortensia





























2256.4.4 Zoopoetical empathy as attention through  
Mary Oliver’s little hawk
P ets are anymals who inhabit human animals’ daily lives. We readily assume that they have individual characters because we gradually but inevitably come to know their habits. Zoopoetry, however, can direct 
us to a more inclusive grasp of who has individuality. To come to know indi-
vidual anymals as more than representatives of their species, we need to ascribe 
them experiential states that go beyond species-specific experiences. In the 
following poem, Mary Oliver shows no hesitancy to ascribe specific subjective 
experiences to an anymal who is probably not a pet. In so doing, Oliver gives 
us an example of the direct perception argument concerning anymal minds, 
which I discussed in the introduction and chapter 1. The poem is also a criticism 
– perhaps inadvertent– of the idea that if we cannot know everything about a 
certain mind, we must be sceptical about knowing anything about it: 
The Real Prayers Are Not the Words,
But the Attention that Comes First
The little hawk leaned sideways and, tilted,
rode the wind. Its eye at this distance looked 
like green glass; its feet were the color
of butter. Speed, obviously, was joy. But
then, so was the sudden, slow circle it carved
into the slightly silvery air, and the
squaring of its shoulders, and the pulling into 
itself the long sharp-edged wings, and the 
fall into the grass where it tussled a moment,
like a bundle of brown leaves, and then, again,
lifted itself into the air, that butter-color
clenched in order to hold a small, still
body, and it flew off as my mind sang out oh
all that loose, blue rink of sky, where does 
it go to, and why? 
(133, ll. 1-15)
The title of the poem could well have been a quotation from Simone Weil’s 
work. In the poem, the attention that comes first is the observation of the little 
hawk. The prayer presumably starts with the final lines, with “my mind sang 


















































































226 end of the poem has a religious connotation. However, even though someone 
is praying, the mind of the speaker itself is only important insofar as it is atten-
tive of the little hawk. Looked at in terms of poetic tools, we may notice that 
the words pray and prey are homophones. Given that ‘preier’ is an old word for 
birds of prey, we read the word “prayers” in the title equivocally.92. We have 
seen passages in poems that are comparable to Oliver’s ascription of joy to the 
hawk; both Elizabeth Bishop’s “The Moose” (“Taking her time, she looks the bus 
over”) and Ted Hughes’ “The Fox” (a body that is bold to come”) use commin-
gling words, which combine mind and body, to show subjective experience. 
Here Oliver goes further, not hesitating to use a supposedly human word – 
“joy” – to refer to a hawk’s behaviour: “Speed, obviously, was joy.” But it is not 
only the speed, but also the whole of the hunt that is joy to the hawk, from 
the carved circle in the air to the squaring of its shoulders. In fact, what con-
stitutes joy does not stop at the limits of Oliver’s description, for the line only 
stops at the end of the poem. The joy of the hawk’s flight fills the onlooker with 
amazement. Ascribing joy to anymals has an important history. Jane Goodall 
broke the anthropodenialist rules of ethology by writing that chimpanzees, 
like humans, are “capable of solving problems, capable of love and hate, joy 
and sorrow, fear and despair” (xiii). Recognising these abilities and emotions 
in anymals goes hand in hand with perceiving them as individuals, since they 
imply that each anymal has a separate experiential life. Seeing minded, feeling 
bodies is a way of beginning to recognise their individuality, when it comes 
to both humans and anymals. “Joy” is a commingling word in that it shows 
that there is no dividing line between body and mind. This becomes visible 
when Oliver sees joy in “the squaring of [the hawk’s] shoulders”. We might be 
inclined to regard this as anthropomorphic projection: humans square their 
shoulders when they have accomplished something; indeed, it is a sign of 
proud joy. Calling Oliver’s observation of joy anthropomorphic is one possible 
response to her use of the commingling word “joy” in the poem. Goodall, how-
ever, writes the following: 
Young animals, human or otherwise, show such similar behavior when 
they are well fed and secure – frisking, gambolling, pirouetting, bouncing, 
somersaulting – that it is hard not to believe they are not expressing very 
similar feelings. They are, in other words, full of joie de vivre – they are happy. 
(xiii-xiv) 





























227The joie de vivre is what binds all living beings; when we are attentive we recog-
nise it across species. It is because she has spent so much time with anymals that 
Goodall does not hesitate to name what she sees joy. The emotion is easily rec-
ognisable since we all perform the same behaviour when feeling happy. We can 
spend time with anymals by reading unselfed texts about them, of which the 
zoopoems I discussed are eminent examples. It is important to notice that the 
notion of joy in the poem refers to the hawk’s whole being: Oliver’s meaning is 
precisely that the hawk is full of being, full of joy. Elizabeth Costello uses the 
word joy along similar lines in Coetzee’s Lives to underscore her central thesis 
that there are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination: 
What is it like to be a bat? Before we can answer such a question, Nagel sug-
gests, we need to be able to experience bat life through the sense-modalities 
of a bat. But he is wrong; or at least he is sending us down a false trail. To be 
a living bat is to be full of being; being fully a bat is like being fully human, 
which is also to be full of being. Bat-being in the first case, human-being 
in the second, maybe; but those are secondary considerations. To be full of 
being is to live as a body-soul. One name for the experience of full being is 
joy (45).
Costello subsequently adds that it is hard to sustain one’s fullness of being 
in confinement, “where the flow of joy that comes from living not in or as a 
body but simply from being an embodied-being has no place” (Coetzee 47). 
Saying that joy – or experiencing life as a “body-soul” – is fundamental to both 
human animals and anymals does not mean that the differences between them 
are unimportant. They are, however, secondary when it comes to talking about 
the “what it is like”. A pig has different needs than a butterfly when it comes to 
letting the joie de vivre flow. These differences, however, do not inhibit empathy 
as zoopoetry intuits. Zoopoetical empathy, then, would be best described as a 
form of selfless attention, which gives the anymal under contemplation space 
in which to roam around. Rather than searching for matching emotions, zoo-
poetical empathy emphasises the need for a selfless attitude on the part of the 
subject. To that end, zoopoetry tries to stretch and train our imagination by 
bringing us to experience unselfing zoopoetical tools. In Costello’s words, it 
calls on us to open our hearts to anymals (Coetzee 48); it asks us to love anymals 
in their individuality and separateness, as Murdoch and Weil would have it. In 
these ways, all of the zoopoems that I have discussed appeal to us to enlarge 
our sympathetic imagination so as to acknowledge our entangled empathies. 
All of this is at play in Oliver’s hawk. Oliver sees the flow of joy in the 


















































































228 tion. This overflowing joy emphasises that humans and other anymals have 
a fundamentally shared nature. In the final lines, Oliver uses the zoopoetical 
tool of questioning: “Where does it go to and why?” If we value wonder and 
attentiveness, leaving questions in one’s work should not be taken as a sign of 
indecision. Oliver’s questions show that our attention holds an individual. The 
asking of these questions individualises the bird, for the bird is the only person 
who can provide us with answers. The questions open up the possibility that 






























I n this study I have explored entanglements among humans and anymals through reading and interpreting zoopoetry. My aim has been to find grounds upon which to formulate a definition of zoopoetical empathy by 
analysing poetry, with an eye on the poems’ specificity. Looking back, I can now 
see that, in this study, I have accepted an invitation that Martha Nussbaum 
extended a long time ago in the form of an important question. “Might there 
be other ways of being precise?” Nussbaum posed this question as part of her 
endeavour to have the study of novels included in ethical theory, as opposed 
to analytic philosophers’ “dry”, “disengaged”, and “disentangled style” (Love’s 
Knowledge 19, see 3.4.1). Like ethical theory, zoopoetics and the empathic 
engagements with anymals unfolded through poetry call for a mode of inter-
pretation that is the opposite of a disentangled and disengaged method. I have 
examined a way of analysing zoopoetry that would bring to light aspects of 
engagements that would otherwise escape our attention: signs of unexpected, 
shared anymality learned through metaphors and similes; indicators of visible 
subjectivity noticed through commingling words; and the unstable margins of 
fixed paradigms, interrogated through questioning and hesitation.
As a final, emblematic example of the necessity of zoopoetry’s specificity, let 
me discuss Judith Herzberg’s poem “The Way” (“Zoals”). 
The Way
The way you sometimes enter a room, and don’t know why,
and then have to go back along the track of your intention,
the way, without groping, you sometimes grab something from the closet
and only when you have it know what it is,
the way you sometimes take a package somewhere,









that you feel too light, the way you, while waiting,
fall in love for a second with every new person
but still are mainly waiting,
the way you know: I have been here before but don’t know why,
and you suddenly pick up a scent which
reminds you, the way you know with whom you have to be watchful
and with whom not, with whom you can lie down,
that is the way, I think, animals think, and know their way. (6)
 
Herzberg uses an extended simile to instigate a wait-and-see attitude in the 
human interpreter. Something is “the way” that something else is. However, 
the lulling effect of the repetition of the phrase “the way” might almost lead 
us to forget that a simile needs two things that are related to each other. By 
being tentative and hesitant, the poem instead sketches possibilities that we 
are invited to experience: instances of shimmering knowledge and half-felt 
intuitions that we recognise, but are not immediately related to anymals. In 
that sense the poem gestures as to its content; the reader becomes caught up in 
an indefinable feeling of reading an endless riddle that has neither a question 
nor an answer. It is through the simile that Herzberg can say and not say how 
anymals think – this is almost saying something ex negativo about their think-
ing process. 
The final line of Herzberg’s poem indicates that it is actually human read-
ers that serve as a point of comparison for anymals, not the other way around. 
Without knowing it, we inhabit an anymal’s perspective, whilst thinking that 
Herzberg is labelling those vague moments in a human animal’s daily life that 
wordlessly fall between knowing and not knowing, awareness and unaware-
ness. The simplistic resolution is suddenly given in the final sentence, shaking 
this default perspective. Even in the resolution, however, we feel that we are 
exploring a possibility. All of the poem’s descriptions of vacillating conscious 
decisions, moods, and feelings feel familiar, yet it appears that they are not 
only our own. This stretches our empathetic skills and renders potential scep-
tical comments moot. Without filling the space that this opens up with new 
beliefs about anymals and humans, the poem nevertheless does not stay silent 
about the anymals’ experiential world. This is thanks to other zoopoetical 
tools, such as the hesitation in “I think” and the meaning of “track” in “track 
of your intention”, which relates to a thoroughly lived experience. Finally, the 
simile’s resolution in the final sentence causes a downfallow, in that the emo-
tions stirred up – an inhalation occasioned by a wordless, affected affirmation 









Crucially, Herzberg uses her trademark zoopoetical tool of questioning and 
hesitating to open up a space. The conjecture “I think” in the final line leaves 
room for a refutation and reminds us that knowledge is always provisional. It 
might also remind us of the famous “I think” penned by Charles Darwin at the 
top of his first-known sketch of the tree of life, or of the ground of being in René 
Descartes’ cogito argument. I think that Herzberg’s “I think” is a zoopoetical “I 
think”; it is used as a thinkfeeling, a sensation (which requires a neologism) 
showing that this poem reveals another way of being precise. It is through such 
zoopoetic specificity that poems can provide anymals with a space in which 
their existence is not diminished for human’s sake. Zoopoetical tools are at the 
heart of the process of unsettling pre-established perspectives through poetry. 
These tools play a key role in imagining anymals’ alterity, whether by unself-
ing observation, silencing human subjectivity, or enabling us to investigate our 
shared anymality, without effacing difference. 
Summary
A vast body of research addresses the relationships between empathy and novels figuring human protagonists, and the notion that novel reading as a kind of ‘empathy training’ meets little skepticism. As the 
saying goes, readers can live a thousand lives in the minds of the characters in 
the novels they read. 
How different the case when the protagonists are anymals instead of 
humans.93 This study focuses on zoopoetry to explore the intricate relation 
between anymals, poems, and empathy. It addresses the abyss between the 
anymal and the human, whether an abyss of knowledge or of phenomenal 
experience, to argue that poets who write about anymals employ ‘zoopoeti-
cal tools’ to bridge the gap between the two worlds. They employ an array of 
traditional poetic tools such as rhythm and metaphor, but they also draw from 
a previously unnamed zoopoetical lexicon to illustrate how the assumed abyss 
between the anymal and the human is in fact based on speciesism and Carte-
sian dualism.
In his article “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” (1974), the philosopher Thomas 
Nagel provocatively argues that we are unable to know what it is to feel bat-
like. We might be able to imagine to a certain extent what it is to fly around and 
catch insects in our mouths, he writes, but then we only know what it is like for 
us to behave like a bat, whereas we can never know what it is like for a bat to be 
a bat. In trying to imagine what a bat experiences, we stumble on a line we can 
never cross, between our own subjective worlds and the phenomenal experi-
ence of the bat. Researchers in both literary studies and biology often invoke 
Nagel’s example and presume a skeptical stance concerning the knowability 









and envisionability of the phenomenal experience of anymal others. In this 
vein, Jenny Diski writes that there is “an abyss of knowledge that we simply 
can’t cross” (73). 
Three central oppositions emerge from speciecism and Cartesian dualism 
to complicate explorations of zoopoetical anymals: anthropocentrism versus 
anymals as themselves; projectivism versus empathy or sympathetic identifi-
cation; and anymals inside a text versus anymals outside a text. Note that the 
tension in these oppositions is less felt when human subjects receive poetic 
attention. Zoopoetical anymals, however, seem to be inevitably anthropomor-
phised by poets and readers alike. As a result, empathy seems to become an 
unattainable ideal; with whom would we be empathising? 
In this study I argue, however, that many of these assumptions about any-
mal minds are based upon Cartesian dualism. This study, therefore, is driven 
by two central questions that counter these assumptions. In what ways does 
zoopoetry confront and unsettle Cartesian dualism? How do instances of 
perspective shift and empathy evoked through zoopoetry contribute to the 
empathy debate? These questions are not straightforwardly answered. Instead, 
the chapters show a hermeneutical to-and-fro movement between the poems, 
philosophical ideas, and the topic of empathy. 
The first chapter “Philosophical and Literary Perspectives on the Prob-
lem of Anymal Minds” sketches the philosophical problem of anymal minds, 
beginning with an account of Nagel’s famous bat example and its implications 
that reach beyond philosophy. It turns to the notion of empathy to explain how 
Cartesian dualism is still alive in this debate. Exploring the close connection 
between poetry and philosophy, the chapter proposes an answer to the default 
definition of empathy which involves matching emotions between separate, 
real and similar humans. The chapter culminates in a discussion of The Lives 
of Animals by John Coetzee, a novella that epitomises the relation between 
anymals, poems and empathy when Coetzee juxtaposes reading Ted Hughes’ 
“The Jaguar” to walking with a jaguar “flank to flank” (114). This juxtaposition 
confronts the above-mentioned opposition of anymals inside a text versus any-
mals outside a text. 
Chapter 2, “Giving Anymals a Voice”, addresses the opposition between 
anymals viewed through the lens of anthropocentrism and anymals as them-
selves. Due to the untranslatability of anymals’ worlds, capturing anymals’ 
voices is perhaps the most difficult thing to achieve. I postulate that poets 
imagine anymals as body-minds, and picture their voices accordingly, not as 
inner disembodied propositions, but as bodily language. Here, I introduce the 
concept of ‘zoopoetical tools’ to substantiate the idea that in poetry anymals 









“Pigs” offer literary examples to show that the distinction between under-
standing thoughts either as de re (about the thing; leaving out the perspective 
of the experiencer) or de dicto (about what is being said, a reflection of the mind 
of the experiencer) falls short. This final finding questions in a broader sense 
our idea of a mind as closed off from the world. 
Chapter 3 “Openness, Wholeness, and Growth: Exploring Additional Zoo-
poetical Tools” discusses the zoopoetical tools rhythm, metaphor, simile, and 
neologism, and a series of more specific zoopoetical techniques like descrip-
tions ex negativo, pronoun drop, commingling words, questions and hesitations, 
and zoopoetical chiaroscuro through the interpretation of zoopoems by Judith 
Herzberg, Ted Hughes, Elizabeth Bishop, D.H. Lawrence, Ida Gerhardt, and 
John Updike. In each poem, these tools diminish the degree of anthropocen-
trism and reveal the anymals as themselves. This phrase, however, poses a 
difficult question: what would it mean to imagine anymals as themselves?
Chapter 4 “Anymals Moving Through Text and World” addresses the degree 
to which anymals roam on the line between poetry and reality. How much real-
ity do zoopoems convey and what do we mean when we say that text and world 
are separate entities? The opposition between “anymals inside of a text ver-
sus anymals outside of a text” is a complicated one, especially when bearing 
in mind the ease with which human protagonists exist in the real world. The 
outcome of the analysis significantly impacts the overall proposal that readers 
through reading zoopoetry can empathise with anymals. 
Chapter 5 “Towards an Understanding of Zoopoetical Empathy” returns to 
the empathy debate to construe a theoretical definition of zoopoetical empa-
thy that is commensurate with the findings from the previous chapters. An 
evaluation of Iris Murdoch’s and Simone Weil’s concepts of unselfing helps to 
formulate a definition of zoopoetical empathy that stays close to the poetical-
ity of the ‘feeling with’ experienced when reading zoopoetry. In following Weil 
and Murdoch, I propose selfless attention to be the heart of zoopoetical empa-
thy, instead of matching emotions. 
In Chapter 6, “Four Poetic Case Studies”, aspects of selfless attention are 
highlighted. Connecting zoopoetry and zoopoetics, Elizabeth Bishop’s “The 
Moose” and “The Fish”, Ted Hughes’ “The Thought-Fox” and “The Horses”, 
Les Murray’s “Equanimity” and “Spermaceti”, Judith Beveridge’s “How to Love 
Bats”, Frederike Harmsen van Beek’s “Good Morning? Heavenly Lady Ping” 
and Mary Oliver’s “The Real Prayers are Not the Words, but the Attention that 
Comes First” envision a form of “feeling with” that consists of the achievement 
of an attentive, diminished self. Selfless attention functions as an interpretative 
framework for the poems, and, finally, it also broadens the default definition 









non-textual, in which the observer feels with the object under contemplation 
despite the absence of obvious or strict similarities. 
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Dankbaar ben ik ook voor de voortdurende zorgvuldige aandacht van 
mijn copromotoren dr. Bettine Siertsema en dr. Kristine Steenbergh. Ik heb 
veel geleerd van Bettines rake opmerkingen over gedichten. Ik herinner me 
een half uur waarin we spraken over een versvoet in een gedicht van Hughes 
en mijn ontroering na afloop over de mogelijkheid om het een half uur lang 
met iemand over een versvoet te hebben. Kristine is de gedroomde dagelijks 
begeleider en copromotor van elke promovendus. Haar manier van begeleiden 
door fundamentele kritiek én vertrouwen te geven, strekt tot voorbeeld. Haar 
voortvarende hulp in de afronding van dit project heeft het mogelijk gemaakt 




























I thank the reading committee: prof dr Jacqueline Bel, dr Marco Caracciolo, 
prof dr Leonie Cornips, dr Kári Driscoll, and dr Eileen John for making room 
for my text in their – no doubt – hectic academic lives. 
Omdat mijn moeder in het hoofdgebouw van de VU op de dertiende ver-
dieping – die toen de faculteiten filosofie en theologie herbergde – werkte, heb 
ik de VU van kinds af aan als tweede thuis beschouwd. Ik zal de gang van de 
dertiende missen, met in het aquarium de harde werkers: Janet, Amrita, Erin, 
Roel en Babs. Babs, veel dank voor de kopjes thee, steunende woorden en je 
deelname aan de proefpromotie. Prof.dr. Dick Schram dank ik voor zijn hulp 
met het opstellen van vragenlijsten en het lezen van mijn artikel. Hoewel de 
vragenlijsten het proefschrift niet hebben gehaald, hebben de antwoorden van 
leerlingen me wel aan het denken gezet over de mogelijkheid van empathie 
door het lezen van poëzie. Mira kwam af en toe buurten aan het eind van het 
traject, en riep op een dag de voorspellende woorden: “volgende week heb je je 
goedkeuring!” Ik ben benieuwd naar haar dissertatie. 
Ik ben dankbaar voor de verschillende filosofieclubjes waarin ik mag 
werken en gewerkt heb. In het bijzonder noem ik Desirée, Frans en Hans, die 
ik bovendien erkentelijk ben voor de namiddagen in de kroeg. 
I thank dr Simon Ferdinand for his thoughtful, thorough comments and 
corrections on the drafts. If you ever need someone to look at your English 
texts, please contact him. He is the most generous corrector you could wish for. 
Hoewel de werkrelatie nog pril is, heeft de Radboud Docenten Academie 
zich een ondersteunende, meelevende gemeenschap betoond. Ik dank daar-
voor in het bijzonder Femke, Natascha, Arnoud en Monique – fijn dat ik met 
jullie kan samenwerken!
Mijn school, Het Amsterdams Lyceum, verdient mijn dank. De interesse 
van de rectoren Roel, Hellen en Tom doet me goed. De lieve, leuke, slimme, 
grappige leerlingen die me om de zoveel tijd lekker primair “Hoe is het nou 
met uw boek?” toeriepen, ben ik heel dankbaar. Zonder de anderen tekort te 
willen doen, noem ik twee oud-leerlingen: Ismini en Simone, dank voor jullie 
openhartige aandacht en gulle gastvrijheid. De Avio-gangers zijn me dierbaar, 
onze lunches en onze gesprekken over grote en kleine onderwerpen in de lera-
renkamer laten me elke dag blij naar school gaan. Jasper, wat een goeie, lieve 
collega ben je! Dank je wel dat ik de lesuren met een gerust hart aan je kon over-
laten. Mandy en Michiel, jullie hartelijke vriendschap, gevoeligheid en humor 
stemmen me al jaren dankbaar.
Met het noemen van Mandy en Michiel ben ik overgegaan naar het 
bedanken van vrienden en familie. Hoe dichterbij de mensen staan, des te 
moeilijker is het de juiste woorden te vinden. Waarschijnlijk kunnen alleen 




























en betrokkenheid van jullie heb gekregen. Maar laat ik toch een poging wagen 
in de taal van alledag:
Dawn, buddy-in-Bishop-and-beyond, thank you for the final touch on the 
summary. Sharing the love for Elizabeth Bishop with you has been such a joy 
these past years. Let’s read more poetry, share meals, and track wildlife together 
with Lewis, Mariëtte and Robin in the years to come.
Alide, dankzij jouw uitnemende lessen werd duidelijk dat ook in muziek 
het other-minds probleem een pseudoprobleem is. Tegen de leden van Trio-
TAS, Sandra en Annemieke, wil ik zeggen: spelen zullen we, ooit! 
Aangetrouwde lieve vrienden Jan en Annemarie, en met jullie Thomas en 
Christiaan en Marjolein, jullie interesse in mijn werk deed me vertrouwen in 
de goede afloop ervan. Ik voel me gedragen door onze verbondenheid als we 
samen over het Groningerland turen en praten tot in de avond. Lieve Anne-
marie, ook veel dank dat je wilde proef-opponeren.
Carmen en Lenny, wij vormen met elkaar het groepje “God, natuur en 
dergelijke” en in dat groepje komt inderdaad alles aan bod, en alles met even-
veel liefdevolle interesse. Jullie zorgden ervoor dat ik genoeg bleef drinken en 
lieten me keer op keer zien dat er andere landen te ontdekken zijn, buiten de 
grenzen van het proefschrift. 
Lieve Hedda, dank voor de je krantenknipsels over de verhoudingen tussen 
mens en dier, je lieve appjes en alle kroegkeren de afgelopen jaren. 
Petra, lieve Peet, onze inmiddels decennialange vriendschap houdt me 
al jaren figuurlijk warm en sinds kort ook letterlijk in de vorm van de door 
jou gebreide trui. Ik ben dankbaar voor “this block of life” met je en voor de 
gastvrij heid van Hedde en jou en de ietwat aarzelende Sally en de vrijmoedige 
Doko. 
Jessica en Esther, en met Jessica Froukje en de heerlijke Sally-bully, ik kan 
me geen leven zonder onze vriendschap voorstellen. Jullie betrokkenheid, 
steun en levensvrijheid zijn verweven met de gedachten in dit proefschrift. Jes, 
wat een goed idee was het van de puzzel! Dank ook dat jullie (behalve Sally) 
wilden proef-opponeren en pedelleren. 
Margriet en Job, Tera en Derko, jullie zijn de liefste schoonmensen die 
iemand zich maar kan wensen. Dank voor het inmiddels jarenlange innige 
contact dat we hebben. Mijn schoonouders Aleid en Herman hebben me in de 
jaren dat we elkaar mochten kennen keer op keer hun gastvrijheid en liefde 
getoond. 
Ik dank mijn tantes Willemijn en Lies voor alle dagen samen eten, wande-
len en kouten. Mijn stiefvader Henk dank ik voor zijn open armen.
Het is vreemd om jullie te bedanken, zussen, omdat we zo bij elkaar horen, 
maar ik noem jullie wel heel graag: Lois en Tamar. Wat een geluk heb ik met 
251jullie en met jullie partners Sanne en Bas, en kinderen Ynthe, Mirthe en Raaf. 
Zoveel liefde en gein brengen jullie in mijn leven. Ik ben dankbaar voor onze 
onverbrekelijke band, die zich ook juist toont wanneer ik soms wat sociaal 
krakkemikkig reageer. Onze ouders leven niet meer, maar we hebben wel 
elkaar en we vinden hen in onze kinderen en in elkaar terug. En er is nog een 
band bij gekomen, omdat jullie ook mijn paranimfen wilden zijn. 
Ten laatste, maar eigenlijk ten eerste, Mariëtte, mijn vrouw, en onze kin-
deren Merijn en Robin, lieve extended family member Willeke, en de poezen 
Minnow en Scout. Veel delen van dit proefschrift zijn geschreven met één poes 
op schoot en de ander knipogend dichtbij. Jullie nabijheid, poezen, heeft het 
schrijven aan dit proefschrift ook inhoudelijk veel goed gedaan. Lieve Willeke, 
wat moesten we toch zonder je? Lieve, grote Merijn, ik ben trots op de man die 
je inmiddels bent, dank voor je bezoekjes en je heerlijke omhelzingen. Lieve, 
iets kleinere Robin, met je scherpzinnige opmerkingen zet je me aan het den-
ken over iederdieren en over de wereld die we met hen delen.94 Dit boek kon 
ik alleen maar schrijven dankzij de allesomvattende vreugde die je me elke 
dag brengt. Mijn lief, Mariëtte, met jou samen leven is mijn grootste geluk. 
Ik dank je voor je enthousiasme voor dit project, je magnifieke taalgevoel en 
je vermogen om mijn zelftwijfel om te buigen in “gewoon gaan schrijven en 
eraan blijven”. 
Dit proefschrift is opgedragen aan mijn ouders, Atie Kruijff (1945-2005) en 
Dick Brüggemann (1933-2002). Mijn weerbarstige, zorgzame vader heeft me 
voorgehouden hoe belangrijk leren is. Ik had graag zijn schallende lach willen 
horen en zijn trotse gestalte willen zien op de dag van mijn promotie. Mijn 
liefdevolle, wijze moeder leefde de selfless attention voor die in dit onderzoek 
centraal staat. Ik kan nog steeds maar niet goed zonder haar zachte blik en fijn-
zinnige gedachten, maar ik ben dankbaar dat ik me deze afgelopen schrijfjaren 
op een nieuwe manier met haar verbonden kon voelen. 
94 ‘Iederdier’ introduceer ik hier, op de valreep, als vertaling van ‘anymal’.
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